BOOK REVIEWS

ALCIATI, Roberto (ed.), *Giovanni Cassiano. Conversazioni con i padri* (Letture cristiane del primo millennio 59), Edizioni Paoline, Milano 2019, 1472 p.

Roberto Alciati, grande esperto e conoscitore del monachesimo tardo antico, ha recentemente pubblicato per le Edizioni Paoline, nella collana *Letture cristiane del primo millennio*, una nuova traduzione italiana delle *Conlationes* di Cassiano, in cui sono riprodotti ventiquattro dialoghi di alcuni monaci del deserto egiziano con Cassiano e il suo compagno di viaggio Germano. L'opera si presenta con una mole di una certa rilevanza, poco meno di 1500 pagine, di cui 111 dedicate a un'accurata e ampia introduzione. Un ulteriore pregio di questo volume è rappresentato dal testo latino a fronte, ripreso dall'edizione del *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, volume 13, integrato, per alcuni passi, dal testo delle *Sources Chrétiennes*, volumi 52, 54 e 64.

Benché siano già state pubblicate due traduzioni in lingua italiana dell'opera di Cassiano (Giovanni Cassiano, *Conferenze spirituali*, a cura di O. Lari, Edizioni Paoline, Alba, 1966 e Giovanni Cassiano, *Conferenze ai monaci,* a cura di L. Dattrino, Città nuova, Roma, 2000), la versione di Alciati non si presenta come una semplice riproposizione di quanto edito in passato, ma propone alcune interessanti novità che meritano di essere presentate. L'innovazione più evidente riguarda il titolo: Alciati, rinunciando alla tradizionale traduzione di *conlationes* con 'conferenze', propone il termine 'conversazioni'. Questa scelta è giustificata da due ordini di motivazioni. Già le prime volgarizzazioni dell'opera di Cassiano avevano evitato il termine conferenza, traducendo '*conlationes*' con 'ragionamenti' (pp. 15-16). Inoltre, la natura dei discorsi dei padri del deserto riprodotti da Cassiano mal si adatta al genere delle conferenze pubbliche, a cui la tradizionale traduzione potrebbe far pensare. Si tratta, piuttosto, di colloqui nei quali all'insegnamento impartito dall'anziano si alternano questioni e puntualizzazioni dei suoi interlocutori, Cassiano e Germano: da qui la scelta, ben motivata e condivisibile, di tradurre il titolo dell'opera con 'Conversazioni con i padri'.j

Altrettanto condivisibile è il giudizio che Alciati fornisce sul fine delle 'Conversazioni con i padri'. L'incontro tra anziani e giovani è un topos particolarmente ricorrente nella letteratura monastica tardo antica, in particolare nei detti dei padri del deserto. Tuttavia, i dialoghi

Augustiniana 70(2), 337-531. doi: 10.2143/AUG.70.2.0000000

di Cassiano non si caratterizzano 'per le risposte definitive, bensì per la capacità, quasi maieutica, di suscitare domande nei giovani, consentendo loro di affinare la tecnica propria del dialogo, quella di porre le questioni in maniera efficace' (p. 33). Quest'aspetto si collega facilmente alle ricorrenti puntualizzazioni riguardanti l'impossibilità di fornire un insegnamento unico e valevole per tutti: le differenti esperienze umane richiedono consigli, direzioni e stili di vita appropriate al singolo essere umano. Entrambe queste caratteristiche, la domanda che prevale sulla risposta e la differenza sull'omogeneità, rendono l'opera di Cassiano utile e interessante anche al giorno d'oggi e non solo a un pubblico di studiosi, ma anche a quanti sono interessati a intraprendere un cammino spirituale, guidati da uno dei grandi classici del monachesimo latino.

L'introduzione di Alciati si sofferma su numerosi elementi che permettono anche al lettore meno esperto di collocare l'opera di Cassiano nel suo contesto storico-religioso. In particolare, la distinzione tra *praktiké*, il cui fine è la purificazione dell'anima dai vizi, e *theoretiké*, il cui fine è la contemplazione divina, è giustamente ricondotta all'interno dell'influenza che Evagrio Pontico ha avuto nella formazione ascetica e teologica di Cassiano (pp. 34-41). Ugualmente importante è la comprensione dei rapporti tra le *Conlationes* e le altre due principali opere di Cassiano, le *Institutiones* e il *De incarnatione*, che, come mostrato da Alciati, formano una vera e propria trilogia ascetica (pp. 57-65). Anche la critica alla recente ipotesi di Tzamalikos, secondo cui sarebbe esistito un altro Cassiano tra il 475 circa e il 548, che avrebbe scritto in greco e che non avrebbe avuto alcun contatto con il mondo latino, mette in evidenza la competenza di Alciati non solo nel comprendere e presentare l'opera di Cassiano, ma anche nel dialogare criticamente con la ricerca moderna sulla sua figura (pp. 72-78). Non mancano, infine, pagine molto interessanti dedicate alla prima difficile ricezione delle *Conlationes*, che solo grazie alla mediazione della *Regola di Benedetto* saranno in grado di affermarsi nei secoli successivi come un classico della spiritualità monastica (pp. 86-91).

Il commento di Alciati si estende a tutto il testo di Cassiano con numerose note a piè di pagina, in cui sono forniti sia riferimenti bibliografici per un opportuno approfondimento, sia spiegazioni o chiarificazioni del ragionamento di Cassiano. Tuttavia, in questa sede si segnala un probabile refuso alla nota 15 alle pagine 816-817, al fine di una sua futura correzione nel caso di una seconda edizione dell'opera. Commentando un passo della *Conlatio* 13, dedicata al rapporto tra grazia e libero arbitrio, si afferma che 'Cassiano scrive questa Conversazione quasi sicuramente prima della disputa di Agostino con

Pelagio, il cui inizio si colloca negli anni 428-429 [..] in altre parole, Cassiano non sta rispondendo qui a presunte accuse di Agostino né intende prendere posizione all'interno di una disputa che, come detto, non è ancora cominciata'. Pur tralasciando la questione dell'influsso della controversia pelagiana sull'opera di Cassiano, si segnala che la disputa tra Agostino e Pelagio può considerarsi conclusa con l'anno 418, dopo il quale non si hanno più notizie sul conto di Pelagio e il cui posto all'interno della controversia pelagiana è preso da Giuliano d'Eclano.

Ciò nonostante, il lavoro di Alciati merita di essere accolto più che favorevolmente dagli studiosi e non solo: è merito di ogni traduzione permettere di avvicinare un pubblico molto ampio a un'opera antica e in questo caso specifico, considerata la mole dell'opera, occorre essere particolarmente grati. Forse anche lo stesso Cassiano aveva pensato per la sua opera a un pubblico particolarmente ampio, come sembra prospettare un'acuta osservazione posta al termine dell'introduzione da Alciati, secondo cui è 'necessario chiedersi se Cassiano si fosse dato per queste pagine l'obiettivo di definire la perfezione del monaco, intesa come un'opzione specifica per interpretare l'itinerario della vita cristiana, o se egli non pensasse piuttosto di delineare qui l'ideale del cristiano tout court – e, per questo, dell'essere umano –, come se l'ascesi prospettata in queste Conversazioni non fosse più un'alternativa tra diverse vocazioni ma l'unica strada da intraprendere per essere del tutto fedeli al discepolato di Cristo e, in tal modo, per giungere alla pienezza di quella stessa natura che il Creatore aveva conferito alle sue creature predilette' (p. 94). Con un tale interrogativo in mente, non si può che rimandare il lettore interessato alla lettura, o alla rilettura, dell'opera di Cassiano.

Giulio Malavasi

ALEXANDRE, Monique, DESCOURTIEUX, Patrick, OLLIER, Jacques, VANNIER, Marie-Anne, WOLINSKI, Joseph, *Le Catholicisme des Pères* (Conférences du Studium), École Cathédrale/Parole et Silence, Paris 2007, 167 p.

Ce livre contient le texte des quatre conférences sur le catholicisme des Pères données au Collège des Bernardins pendant l'année 2006-2007 par des spécialistes reconnus à la Faculté Notre-Dame. Le catholicisme des Pères se caractérise par la confession de l'unité du Verbe incarné et leur interprétation intégrale de l'Écriture Sainte.

Monique Alexandre fait une analyse de la scrutation de l'Ecriture par les Pères et présente le conflit des interprétations, à savoir les controverses avec le judaïsme et les gnostiques. Selon Alexandre, il ne faut pas majorer le fossé entre l'école exégétique d'Alexandrie, qui soulignait la recherche du sens caché, et celle d'Antioche, qui avait préféré le sens littéral. En effet, il faut tenir ensemble les deux approches possibles des Écritures, la lecture spirituelle et la lecture historique.

Joseph Wolinski discute l'actualité des Pères en référant à la transmission de la foi et le kérygme pascal. L'évènement pascal au témoignage du Nouveau Testament est illustré par le premier discours de Pierre (*Actes* 2). Le kérygme pascal est un résumé miraculeux de la foi chrétienne. Deuxièmement, Wolinski évoque l'évènement pascal au témoignage des premiers Pères de l'Église, plus particulièrement Ignace d'Antioche. La transmission de la foi se fait à travers l'initiation chrétienne, la préparation et la célébration du baptême comme nouvelle naissance et nouvelle création. La transmission est une ouverture sur la nouveauté radicale du mystère pascal. L'auteur se base sur Irénée et Origène pour accentuer le rapport entre les deux Testaments. Le matin de Pâques, le passage de l'Ancien au Nouveau s'est accompli à travers la Résurrection du Christ; il se reproduit dans le croyant, "*saisi par puissance de la Résurrection sous l'action de l'Esprit Saint*" (p. 102).

Marie-Anne Vannier développe le thème de la charité chez les Cappadociens et saint Augustin. L'expérience de la charité, vécue dans l'amitié de Grégoire de Nazianze et de Basile, s'est concrétisée dans la vie cénobitique. Augustin, qui était l'homme des grandes amitiés, en particulier avec Alypius, est devenu l'auteur de la célèbre Règle. Il y reprend l'image de la première communauté de Jérusalem (*Actes* 4, 32) et commente d'une manière très forte l'expression '*cor unum*' en ajoutant '*in Deum*' ('soyez unanimes [...] *un seul cœur, tendus vers Dieu*'). Les Cappadociens se sont efforcés d'édifier la charité dans l'Église. Saint Augustin établit le lien entre unité et charité. La Trinité est source de toute charité et condition de son édification. La charité devient expression de la Trinité.

Mgr Patrick Descourtieux se demande ce que signifie l'évangélisation pour les Pères. Évangéliser, c'est rassembler les enfants de Dieu dispersés, partir à la recherche de ce qui, dans chaque culture, est comme une pierre d'attente pour la Révélation. L'auteur fait référence au thème célèbre des *semina Verbi* chez Justin et Clément d'Alexandrie. Évangéliser, c'est aussi prêcher "*parce qu'on a scruté les Écritures, que l'on confesse la foi et qu'on cherche à édifier la charité*" (p. 153). Évangéliser, c'est être prêt à donner sa vie, témoigner du Christ même jusqu'au martyr.

La présentation des quatre conférences nous donne l'occasion de réfléchir sur l'interprétation des Écritures, l'initiation à la foi chrétienne, la valeur de l'amitié et de la charité dans la communauté ecclésiale, et la mission intrinsèque de l'évangélisation.

La fin du livre contient une présentation brève des intervenants, une table des matières et une liste des publications de l'école cathédrale aux Éditions Parole et Silence.

Gabriel Quicke

ALICI, Luigi (ed.), *Agostino. Il libro della pace. La città di Dio, XIX* (I Classici del pensiero 15), ELS Scuola, Brescia 2018, 231 p.

Nuova traduzione italiana del diciannovesimo libro del *De civitate Dei*, condotta sul testo critico di Bernhard Dombart e Alfons Kalb (4a ed., Leipzig 1928-1929) e riveduta rispetto alle versioni precedenti curate dallo stesso Luigi Alici (Rusconi, Milano 1984; Bompiani, Milano 2001). La pubblicazione di un singolo volume del *magnum opus* agostiniano in XXII libri è in continuità rispetto alla linea editoriale de La Scuola, che ha già all'attivo una traduzione dei libri VIII-IX, uscita per le cure di Antonio Marzullo e Virginia Foà nel 1975. L'ultima versione di Alici arricchisce ulteriormente il già consistente il numero di versioni italiane recenti disponibili, quali quella (con testo latino a fronte) di Domenico Gentili per Città Nuova (Roma 1978-1991), la traduzione curata da Carlo Carena – di cui è uscita anche una versione del solo libro XIX – per Einaudi (Torino 1992) e quella di Domenico Marafioti per i tipi di Mondadori (Milano 2011).

Il testo italiano è preceduto da un'ampia introduzione che procede dal generale al particolare, inquadrando dapprima l'opera nel contesto storico che ne ha sollecitato la composizione, vale a dire il sacco di Roma da parte dei Goti di Alarico – efficacemente definito "l'11 settembre del mondo antico" da Alici – e i suoi strascichi socio-politici, sia all'interno della Chiesa sia dell'élite senatoria romana. L'opera è poi collocata nel contesto della produzione agostiniana. Le linee di riflessione che trovano espressione compiuta nel *De civitate Dei* hanno radici profonde e affiorano anche altrove negli scritti del vescovo di Ippona. In particolare, sono già formulate *in nuce* in alcuni passaggi del *De libero arbitrio*, del *De vera religione*, del *De cathechizandis rudibus*, delle *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, dei sermoni al popolo, soprattutto il *De excidio urbis*, con cui la continuità tematica è evidente, e dei sermoni Dolbeau 25 e 26. Alici procede poi

contestualizzando il libro oggetto della traduzone nel piano complessivo del *magnum opus* e riassumendone le principali argomentazioni. Agostino mette qui ancora una volta a confronto le due città, al fine di dimostrare il fallimento dell'impianto etico-politico della città terrena, nella quale non è possibile trovare né felicità né giustizia. Al centro della riflessione del vescovo di Ippona sono i temi della pace e dell'ordine, affrontati da diverse angolazioni e nella loro dimensione non solo spirituale, ma soprattutto storica. Agostino dimostra che la pace è il sommo bene attingibile nel corso dell'esistenza terrena e il cristiano dovrà perciò profondere il massimo impegno nel suo raggiungimento: l'esperienza di una condizione di ordine e concordia costituisce una sorta di beatitudine relativa, un assaggio della felicità eterna.

Alici propone infine una lettura per unità tematiche. In primo luogo, indaga la dialettica tra fede e ricerca razionale, quest'ultima paradossalmente stimolata dalla conversione: Agostino non si arrocca sulle sue posizioni, ma si pone in un atteggiamento dialogico con i pagani contro cui polemizza, per certi versi ammettendo addirittura un pluralismo etico (si pensi per esempio alla possibilità di scelta tra stile di vita attivo, contemplativo o misto). In secondo luogo, il curatore del volume esamina l'intersezione tra i filoni tematici dell'origine del male e della dottrina della creazione, in relazione all'ontologia neoplatonica. Alici evidenzia che Agostino non ipostatizza il male: al contrario, lo definisce come disordine, cioè assenza di ordine, che è valore intrinseco comune alla natura e alla storia. A seguire, sottolinea l'importanza assegnata da Agostino alla concordia civile, che è lo strumento atto al conseguimento della pace nella città terrena. Il valore unificante della concordia è riconosciuto a tutti i livelli, dalla *domus*, il gruppo familiare, al *mundus*, l'intero universo creato. La pace e l'ordine sono tanto più instabili quanto più è ampio il contesto considerato: perseguire la concordia diventa il compito – in proporzione sempre più impellente – del cristiano. Un altro paragrafo è dedicato al superamento e alla trasfigurazione del paradigma della giustizia in quello dell'amore comune. Agostino riformula la definizione ciceroniana di stato (*res publica* come *res populi*, basata sullo *iuris consensus* e sull'*utilitatis communio*), come "unione di una moltitudine (...) concorde nelle cose che ama": il fondamento dello stato non è più la legge, ma la concordia nell'amore, che compagina le componenti sociali e ne assicura la coesione. Agostino riconosce nell'amore, che peraltro lega tra loro anche le persone della Trinità, il fattore di aggregazione che salva dal disordine e costituisce il collante della società. L'accusa mossa ai cristiani di indebolire le istituzioni con il loro impianto etico è qui rigettata e capovolta: il paradigma cristiano

ha al contrario una potenza generativa e costitutiva della vita comunitaria. Da ultimo, Alici esplora la dimensione della "doppia cittadinanza" del cristiano nella *civitas peregrina* e nella *civitas Dei*. Dato che l'ordine perfetto non si realizza in questo mondo, il cristiano è costretto a vivere in una condizione provvisoria di beatitudine imperfetta. Agostino non vuole cristianizzare le istituzioni, né concepisce la politica in senso teocratico: la *civitas peregrina* è una comunità spirituale, soggetta in questo mondo alla *lex temporalis*. La nuova traduzione italiana di Alici è corredata da un utile apparato di note esegetiche, dove sono suggeriti anche i riferimenti bibliografici per l'approfondimento di singoli aspetti e tematiche. Chiudono il volume gli indici dei nomi propri e dei concetti.

Marina Giani

BALDUCCI, Ernesto, *Agostino: L'umanità e la grazia. Un commento alle "Confessioni"*, San Paolo, Cinisello Balsamo (Milan) 2019, 285 p.

This book puts together the lectures on Augustine's *Confessions* which Fr. Ernesto Balducci (1922-1992), member of the Scolopi Order and one of the most brilliant minds of the Catholic intelligentsia in the last century, delivered between November 1961 and May 1962 at Marquise Lina Trigona's house, in Florence, to a group of friends and colleagues interested in theological issues. Balducci's interpretation of the *Confessions* focuses on the spiritual content of this writing, without ignoring its theological, philosophical, and literary aspects. Two characteristics of Balducci's reading of Augustine are pivotal: on the one hand, Balducci understands the biography of Augustine, as the latter himself describes it, as the interior journey in which the grace of God leads him from the corporeal passions and the desire for philosophical and scientific knowledge to unconditional faith in God and to the trasfiguration of Augustine's own life in service to the Church; on the other hand, Balducci's exploration of the *Confessions* is systematically a comparison between the spiritual condition of Augustine and that of the contemporary person, with the objective of presenting the spiritual development of Augustine as accessible to everyone in the contemporary world.

It is worth noting that Balducci's investigation of the *Confessions* dwells on some of the most meaningful steps in Augustine's process of spiritual formation. In chapters 1-3 (pp. 9-77), Balducci

devotes particular attention to the Augustinian view of "confession" as a self-narrative, an acknowledgment of God's fatherhood, and an expression of gratitude towards him, as well as to Augustine's notion of "interiority" as the ideal place in which every person can have access to God. Chapters 4-7 (pp. 79-170) concern Augustine's youth, with a focus on his inclination to Manichaeism and especially his relationship with his mother, Monica, who plays a key role in Augustine's life of faith. Chapters 8-12 (pp. 171-283) analyse the phase immediately preceding his conversion, in particular the discovery of the so-called Platonic books and his inner conflict between the will for good and the will for evil; these chapters also shine a light on the phase following Augustine's conversion, that is, on his return to Africa and his episcopal commitments in Hippo.

Finally, the method of inquiry carried out by Balducci is worthy of consideration: he selects from the *Confessions* the most important passages in relation to the topics examined in each lecture and, after underscoring the existential and spiritual background of every step in Augustine's itinerary, Balducci stresses the contribution of Augustine's personal experience to contemporary readers.

Vito Limone

BALZARETTI, Ross, *The Lands of Saint Ambrose: Monks and Society in Early Medieval Milan* (Studies in the Early Middle Ages 44), Brepols Publishers, Turnhout 2019, xvii + 640 p.

Studying early medieval Milan is notoriously challenging because of a distressing lack of primary evidence, especially when we compare the city's surviving source record to that of richly documented cities such as Ravenna and Rome. By deftly drawing as much information as possible from a corpus of several hundred charters from Sant'Ambrogio in Milan, Balzaretti manages to reconstruct in unprecedented detail how lay donations of rural property to the monastery sustained and in some respects also transformed the urban economy.

In the first part of the book, the author surveys the available documentation and discusses how it has been interpreted in the older historiography; he considers the evolution of Milan's urban society from the time of Ambrose up to the eighth century and looks at what structural and functional elements of the late antique city survived into the early medieval period; finally the author also addresses the origins and early development of the Sant'Ambrogio. In this reviewer's

opinion, Balzaretti successfully argues that the monastery crucially contributed to the survival of an urban society into the high medieval period, thanks to its role in connecting the city with the surrounding countryside. The second part of the book investigates the social and economic infrastructure that made this linkage of the rural and the urban possible; the author provides a detailed analysis of the ownership structures and economic management in six villages where the monks held rights or property. A notable observation that emerges from these chapters is that the monks did not hold back from intervening in these structures and management practices, and that they did so with a view to supporting Milan's development. The third and final part looks at how these monastic strategies fed back into urban society, for example, by driving the expansion of a hosting infrastructure for pilgrims, visitors, and the needy.

Through minute analysis of Sant'Ambogio's charter records, Balzaretti makes a strong case for the notion that in some places at least, early medieval monastic institutions could be a driving factor that helped sustain and in some respects even expand late antique urban societies. Exactly how this monastic influence might have affected the self-understanding and perception of the monastery as a religious institution, the cult of their patron, and a sense of shared identity among Milan's inhabitants remains to be investigated. However, any future studies that address these issues will definitely be indebted to the findings in this outstanding monograph.

Steven Vanderputten

BARBERA, André, *On Faith, Works, Eternity, and the Creatures We Are* (Reading Augustine), Bloomsbury, London/New York 2020, 166 p.

'[…] nous confondons le temps et l'éternité' (p. 11).

Est-ce que je peux être certain d'avoir la foi? La question a troublé notre auteur, qui y a dédié un livre. Un livre difficile à aborder, si l'on n'a pas d'abord examiné méticuleusement son chapitre d'introduction, non sans une certaine perplexité, je l'avoue. Au départ, la question apparaît claire. Toutefois, elle se complique immédiatement, car l'auteur la met en relation avec le rapport entre foi et œuvres. Ainsi se dessine déjà une distinction entre la foi-confiance en un Dieu qui justifie et qui pardonne, et ma propre fiabilité dans la foi. Est-ce que

je peux être certain d'avoir la foi – quelle foi? Est-ce que je vis en conformité avec ma (la) foi? À cette dernière question, l'auteur répond non, dès son introduction. Je ne suis pas fiable. C'est son vrai point de départ. Cette perplexité le fait retourner à Kierkegaard, à Saint Paul et à Saint Augustin. D'autres encore passeront la revue.

Ces premières questions amènent Barbera à une autre. De la Bible, nous disons qu'elle est la Parole de Dieu. Il cite Augustin, *Conf.* XI.7.9: la parole est dite de toute éternité. Mais la Bible est une parole d'hommes. Est-il suffisant de citer un passage de la Bible pour se munir en théologien d'une vérité divine? La parole de Dieu nous transcende (p. 4). Comment la vérité divine peut-elle alors percer à travers des paroles d'homme (Karl Barth)? La première condition est de ne pas domestiquer la Bible. Les affirmations bibliques et les paroles de Jésus ont en propre qu'elles nous outragent. Cela me dit 'qu'elles me parlent'. Je ne suis pas fiable, et je me sens mis en question par quelque chose qui perce à travers des paroles d'hommes. Le ton est donné pour la suite. Est-ce à dire que nous serons régalés d'analyses existentielles pétillantes?

C'est au lecteur de juger, car l'auteur s'excuse d'avoir à limiter son sujet, ce qui se comprend. Toutefois, il s'agit d'autre chose. Il va imposer une grille de lecture aux idées et aux attentes qu'auraient pu susciter ces remarques préliminaires chez ses lecteurs. 'En fin de compte, toute question et tout problème en théologie peut se réduire à des questions à propos du temps' (p. 5); c'est-à-dire, des questions qui jaillissent de notre condition temporelle. Et ce n'est pas tout. 'Je me propose de parler de l'éternité, et l'enquête sur la foi émerge de la tension, peut-être faut-il dire la contradiction, entre éternité et temps' (ibid.). Autrement dit, les questions concernant la foi se rapportent à une tension, voire une contradiction entre éternité et temps. C'est cette tension-contradiction qui va nous éclairer maintenant sur la question initiale 'est-ce que je peux être certain d'avoir la foi?' Le postulat de l'auteur étant que Dieu n'est pas lié par le temps (p. 13), il s'en suivra que le questionnement sur la condition temporelle de la foi montrera cette condition comme étant paradoxale (p. 5). Nous voilà partis pour une investigation sur ce qui est en soi paradoxal, contradictoire, et donc impossible à réaliser: la foi. Et ce n'est pas tout. Notre auteur ne s'intéresse pas tant au temps comme appartenant à ce que Dieu a créé bon, comme l'affirmait Augustin. Il considère le temps du point de vue de notre souffrance, pour autant que le temps et la foi sont liés. 'Vue de telle manière, le temps apparaîtra comme ayant plus en commun avec le péché qu'avec la bonne création de Dieu' (p. 6). Considéré ainsi, le temps est tantôt de même origine que

nous, tantôt il apparaît être extérieur comme quelque chose qui nous a été imposé et que nous subissons. On peut discuter longuement du temps en y distinguant plusieurs facettes. Cependant, le temps y apparaît encore toujours comme un. Ce n'est plus le cas quand le temps apparaît comme introduit par le pécheur qui en souffre. À ce moment, le temps n'est plus 'un' (p. 13). Or, si le temps n'est plus 'un', il faudrait en déduire que la tension-contradiction entre l'éternel et le temps ne l'est pas non plus. L'auteur ne va pas si loin. Il se contente de dire que, si Dieu n'est pas lié par le temps, cela implique qu'il n'est pas un 'étant' ni un 'objet de foi'. À la place de cela, il met que le créateur est 'ce qui est suprêmement' (p. 6). Est-ce que ce Dieu (le 'suprême') est un 'objet de foi'? Il l'est, mais en fait parmi une variété d'objets et de désignations. Il s'ensuit qu'il n'y a pas quelque chose comme un parfait athéisme et que le monothéisme est pratiquement impossible (p. 6). C'est au fond parce que Dieu dépasse tout objet de foi possible, mais l'auteur ne l'affirme pas encore ainsi.

Il s'agira donc de naviguer à travers 'quelque sorte de turbulence de contradiction' (p. 7). 'Si la foi est une vertu, même divinement inspirée, elle est une vertu mondaine comme la prudence qui est soumise au temps et formée selon la circonstance'. Son but peut être transcendant, éternel, mais sa poursuite est embrouillée et remplie de ce qui, vu de l'extérieur, ressemble le compromis. Les êtres humains sont à plusieurs degrés fidèles, infidèles, prudents et imprudents. Une bonne conscience pèse sur la balance (p. 7) .

Un certain patron commence ainsi à se dégager, qui s'apparente même à un des paradoxes de Zénon. Achille s'élance vers son point d'arrivée, mais s'enlise d'emblée dans le nombre infini de points à parcourir avant d'y arriver, voire pour se mettre en marche. Ainsi la foi s'élance vers l'éternel, mais s'enlise tout de suite dans des essais de connaissance (théologies) qui ne sont jamais la vision béatifique elle-même. D'où l'auteur conclut: on n'est jamais certain d'avoir la foi. Le double emploi ici du mot 'foi' est évident, mais d'où provient-il? D'une prise à la lettre de Hébr. 11, 1: 'La foi est une manière de posséder déjà ce que l'on espère, un moyen de connaître des réalités que l'on ne voit pas' (p. 11). Hébr. 11, 1 semble autoriser l'auteur à ne pas distinguer la foi comme élan vers l'éternel (ce que l'on espère, mais ne voit pas) de nos essais de 'posséder' et de 'connaître' déjà maintenant la vérité éternelle au moyen de connaissances temporelles. Cependant, l'Achille de Zénon ne commence à se rendre compte de l'impossibilité d'atteindre le but (donc du mouvement) que dans la mesure où il se met réellement en mouvement. Ainsi la foi, pourrait-on dire, ne commence à se réaliser l'impossibilité de la possession de la

vérité dans le temps que parce qu'elle s'élève vers ce qui transcende le temps. Sans cet élan, on identifie la foi à ses acquisitions temporelles, dans une situation où vraiment tout peut être objet de foi. Or c'est exactement ce dernier que l'auteur semble se proposer, comme nous l'avons vu. 'Dieu, bien sûr, n'est pas le seul objet de foi' (p. 6). Une fois qu'on en est là, toutes les prises de position de Barbera commencent à tomber dans les plis. 'Centrale pour l'argument propagé dans cette étude est la compréhension de la foi comme une quête de connaissance ou de sagesse'. 'La foi relève de la connaissance et de la lutte impliquée dans cette quête de connaissance'. C'est ici que l'auteur recourt à des arguments d'Augustin, de Thomas d'Aquin, de Jean Calvin et d'autres. Tous ces auteurs nous montrent d'une manière persuasive que la finalité de la foi, c'est la connaissance (p. 7). Il y ajoute Jn 17,3, que la vie éternelle est la connaissance du vrai Dieu. Saint Paul, Thomas d'Aquin et Calvin le confirment. La foi est la quête de la vie éternelle (p.7). Si la foi est une quête, pourrions-nous dire, la connaissance est dans la quête elle-même (connaissance comme co-naissance, la foi comme renaître d'en-haut), mais elle ne s'identifierait pas à nos résultats distincts dans le temps. Dans ces conditions, y a-t-il lieu de dire 'que je ne puis pas être certain d'avoir la foi'? Que la connaissance puisse se trouver dans la quête, l'auteur ne semble pas l'accepter. 'Je maintiens que la connaissance de la vie éternelle, du moins en tant qu'éternelle, est indépendante du temps' (p. 7). Il le soutient 'pour pouvoir explorer la tension et le conflit qui suivent nécessairement de la poursuite de l'éternel'. Si on met l'accent sur la vie plutôt que sur l'éternité et si c'est la vie réelle qui est importante ici, alors le temps entre à nouveau dans nos considérations (ibid.; il se met même au premier plan). 'L'Incarnation, un affront à la compréhension, incorpore la confusion vers laquelle pointe la vie éternelle' (p. 7). Nous apprendrons plus tard que la source de cet affront réside dans le fait que 'ce qui est suprêmement' a été 'confiné et défini' (p. 10).

La personne de foi cherche un niveau de connaissance au-delà de sa compréhension, dit l'auteur. Je vais examiner la possibilité d'atteindre une connaissance pareille dans notre vie ici-bas. Étant donné cet état de choses, la quête de la vie éternelle (la foi) est au mieux une lutte et est peut-être futile. D'ailleurs, la personne de foi se trouve doublement dans le noir (p. 8). Elle ne cherche pas seulement la connaissance de l'objet de sa foi, mais aussi au sujet de sa propre fidélité ('faithfulness'). Notre fiabilité est toujours concernée. La question est d'abord de savoir en quoi nous croyons. S'il s'agit d'une personne, est-ce que nous croyons que cette personne dit la vérité, ou croyons-nous simplement qu'elle prend soin de nous? Mais pour

l'auteur, il y a plus encore. 'La contradiction inhérente entre le mode de la foi et l'objectif de la foi conduit à l'anxiété' (p. 8). Contradiction et anxiété se trouvent partout où il y a foi, 'parce que nous sommes des créatures de foi et pareillement des êtres qui souffrent du temps'. C'est dans cet état qu'une personne, pécheresse, doit agir. Mais d'abord, en quoi réside cette contradiction entre mode et objectif, et pourquoi nous rend-elle anxieux? Selon notre auteur, cette contradiction est à situer au niveau du rapport entre la foi et ses œuvres. Les œuvres appartiennent au mode de la foi, pas à son objectif (qui est de connaître l'objet de foi, ou d'avoir la vie éternelle). La personne de foi, en plus pécheresse, fait des œuvres et obéit, et, dit l'auteur, j'examine le caractère d'évidence de ces œuvres et de cette obéissance. Elles peuvent être signe de foi, mais pas de vie éternelle (p. 8). Que signifient alors vraiment les œuvres? Mon anxiété me sert de motif. Luther et Saint Paul disent que personne n'aime vraiment le Seigneur de tout son cœur. Il faut accepter la théologie du tout-ou-rien de Paul et rompre avec les accommodations plus pragmatiques de beaucoup de théologiens. Nous sommes donc tous des idolâtres, et nous le savons (p. 9). C'est la raison pour laquelle une personne de foi, pécheresse et qui en est consciente, devient particulièrement anxieuse, et pour elle, cette anxiété se manifeste en œuvres. Même sans conscience de péché, une personne pose des actes et obéit (nous sommes tous des êtres de foi). Dans une approche 'libérale' de la théologie que l'auteur soutient, 'the person of faith who betrays does not sin against God but "sins" against god' (p. 9). La phrase est plutôt difficile à comprendre. Ce que Barbera veut dire est que la personne divisée et infidèle est anxieuse devant (son) dieu, sans qu'elle ne décrive sa situation comme pécheresse (c'est pourquoi il met des guillemets). Autrement dit, le soi-disant péché ("sins") se réduit à un acte d'anxiété. On peut souhaiter que les œuvres et l'obéissance soient une évidence de fidélité (dans une situation où tous sont fidèles-infidèles). Nous ne pouvons cependant pas être certains (de nous-mêmes). Et maintenant la thèse: 'les œuvres *sont* une évidence d'anxiété' (p. 9). J'avais cru, naïvement sans doute, que je posais ces actes pour Dieu, par amour ou par crainte, ou en vue de l'édification de la communauté. L'auteur m'enlève cette illusion en m'apprenant qu'en réalité, je les pose pour moi-même, parce que je suis anxieux. Après une démarche qui fait penser à Zénon au niveau de l'objectif de la foi, vient maintenant celle du psychanalyste au niveau de sa modalité. Est-ce que ces œuvres sont également un signe pour le croyant lui-même (se rend-il compte du fait qu'il veut se donner un signe), se demande Barbera. Pour le Premier Commandement (du décalogue) un signe n'est pas nécessairement

fiable, parce qu'il s'agit ici d'un acte intérieur. Or 'la foi est mondaine' (p. 9). C'est-à-dire qu'elle se joue au niveau du passage du temps, de l'attente et de la souffrance. (Le premier commandement y semble avoir peu d'importance). Nous attendons quelque chose que nous ne pouvons pas recevoir d'une manière temporelle. Mais au fond ce n'est pas là l'essentiel pour notre auteur. 'À quel point l'essence de l'homme est-elle proche de son existence?' Ce qui compte, c'est notre manière de fréquenter notre condition temporelle elle-même (avec une brève allusion à Augustin, *Conf.* XI,15,32). Or, tout être humain a, d'une manière ou d'une autre, une certaine compréhension de l'éternel et/ou du nécessaire. C'est pourquoi il cherche une consistance et une intégrité dans un monde changeant, en accord avec ses croyances (beliefs). Ici, on ne s'accorde pas tellement à 'dieu', mais à son propre désir de cohérence ensemble avec sa croyance (cf. pp. 9-10). C'est cela qui nous amène à un code de conduite. On remarquera donc le même recentrage sur le temporel (et sur nous-mêmes) que dans le cas de la quête de connaissance. Peut-être qu'avec ce code, nous attendons secrètement une progression dans la foi. 'Mais la construction d'une vie de foi, correctement comprise, se compose d'une lutte sans fin', l'auteur corrige (p. 10). Cela ne fait que croître notre anxiété.

Certes, l'auteur ne nie pas que la personne de foi est à la recherche d'une vie intégrée et juste. Elle cherche à être digne du bonheur qu'elle espère. Mais sur ce point, c'est son estime de soi qui est en jeu. Elle veut paraître juste ou justifiée devant elle-même, ce qui ne peut pas être complété dans cette vie (la lutte ne prend pas de fin). Ce qui plus est, cette quête 'ne peut même pas savoir avec certitude si elle y a vraiment commencé' (p. 10; encore Zénon). Selon Barbera, c'est une manière de se projeter dans l'objet que l'on tient en estime et d'en assumer l'intégrité. Soit dit en passant, nous sommes loin ici de la question paulinienne du rapport entre foi et œuvres. L'auteur fait cependant une brève allusion à la justification par la foi (p. 10): Calvin parle de l'absolution des péchés comme récompense pour la vraie foi. Mais tout de suite il passe à Augustin: Augustin prétend d'aspirer à une condition de repos. Or le repos est une condition temporelle. A-t-il un sens de la projeter dans l'éternel? Et est-ce qu'elle peut être atteinte dans une vie mouvementée pleine de luttes comme la nôtre? L'auteur passe donc à autre chose. La personne de foi cherche à s'entourer de personnes de même opinion. Selon le pape François, la foi est communautaire et relationnelle. C'est une solution temporaire au problème de la vie dans le temps comme une lutte constante et blessante, où l'on est d'ailleurs confronté avec le péché. Or, le péché nous aliène. Alors, le confort donné par la

communauté des croyants ne va guère plus loin que l'amitié d'aliénés entre eux (p. 11). Le temps et le péché testent la foi religieuse à tout égard. 'Sans le temps et le péché, la foi n'a pas de sens'. À l'exception de quelques signes révélateurs, le pécheur vit quasi totalement dans le noir, quoiqu'il jouisse de la compagnie d'autres pécheurs. Il ne nous est ni possible ni permis de tester le Seigneur. La seule chose qui nous reste alors est de faire de nous-mêmes des serviteurs fidèles, dans l'espérance que nos efforts ne seront pas en vain. Y a-t-il un autre sens au jeûne que de montrer à Dieu, et peut-être aux autres, que nous sommes fiables? Cependant, nous ne sommes même pas capables de prédire d'une manière vraisemblable notre futur inconstant. Comme dit saint Paul, notre meilleur désir et notre connaissance certaine se trouvent en conflit. Suit alors une petite phrase qui semble être le résumé de toutes les thèses soutenues par notre auteur: 'again, we confuse time and eternity' (encore une fois, nous confondons le temps et l'éternité) (p. 11).

L'acte de foi, l'obéissance, constitue une évidence, mais l'interprétation de ces signes est une affaire compliquée. Reste alors la prière. Mais c'est encore une fois confondre l'éternel et le temporel. Il faudrait d'abord savoir comment le pouvoir de la prière met en œuvre le plan éternel du développement des choses dans le temps. Comment distinguer alors le miracle de la magie? (p. 12).

Finalement, si nous confondons à chaque pas l'éternel et le temporel, alors nous ne pouvons reconnaître dans le Christ qu'un homme comme nous, notre frère à tous égards, un enfant de Dieu comme nous tous. Le cercle du recentrage de la foi sur le temporel est ainsi bouclé. Certaines choses ont été tuées sur le chemin. Au lecteur de juger si dans ce livre il peut saluer une purge anthropologique bienfaisante au sein d'une théologie de la foi, ou bien une démarche plutôt brouillée qui nous rappelle Zénon, comme un scepticisme paralysant la dynamique même d'une foi vivante. Peut-être un peu les deux à la fois.

Ignace Verhack

BERNET, Anne, *Monique, mère de saint Augustin*, Éditions Artège, Paris-Perpignan 2019, 169 p.

Après avoir consacré des biographies à plusieurs figures de la chrétienté (Bernadette Soubirous en 1995, saint Martin en 1996, saint Ambroise en 1999, saint Jérôme en 2002, saint Grégoire le Grand en 2004 entre autres), Anne Bernet nous propose une vie de sainte

Monique, mère de saint Augustin. Si l'on reconnaîtra à l'auteur un art consommé de la vulgarisation et un style alerte et romancé, force néanmoins est de reconnaître que le lecteur érudit risque de rester sur sa faim. En effet, l'auteur n'apporte ici aucune vue nouvelle sur la vie de Monique et se contente, la plupart du temps, de gloser, certes avec talent, les quelques rares indications qu'Augustin a pu nous laisser sur sa mère. En outre, lorsque l'auteur évoque souvent des travaux érudits sur lesquels elle se fonde, mais sans jamais en donner les références. Si l'ouvrage peut donc décevoir un public érudit, l'on peut toutefois reconnaître à Anne Bernet le mérite d'offrir un ouvrage de vulgarisation qui pourra sans doute toucher un public plus large.

Comme il se doit pour une biographie, l'ouvrage suit une trame chronologique. Le chapitre 1, « Une fille de Numidie » (pp. 7-22), trace à grands traits la situation historique et religieuse de l'Afrique romaine dans les années 330, avant d'évoquer l'adolescence de Monique en se fondant sur le témoignage de *conf.* IX. Le chapitre 2, « L'épouse de Patricius » (pp. 23-35), évoque son mariage avec Patricius, là encore en se fondant sur le témoignage de *conf.* IX. Le chapitre 3, « Le 'petit empereur' » (pp. 37-47), traite de la naissance d'Augustin le 13 novembre 354 – et plus brièvement de celle de son frère Navigius et de sa sœur – en se fondant sur *conf.* I. Le chapitre 4, « La ruée des passions » (pp. 49-59), évoque l'adolescence d'Augustin à Thagaste, à partir de *conf.* II, tandis que le chapitre 5, « La friteuse [sic!] des honteuses amours », les péripéties sexuelles d'Augustin à Carthage, et notamment sa rencontre avec celle qui sera la mère d'Adéodat, sa rencontre avec les manichéens et les réactions de Monique (pp. 61-75). Le chapitre 6, « Un dégoût de la vie » (pp. 77-94), évoque les années 373-374, où Augustin revient s'installer à Thagaste avec sa concubine au grand désespoir de Monique. Le chapitre 7, « Le fils de tant de larmes » (pp. 95-108), évoque le retour d'Augustin à Carthage à l'automne 374, puis son départ à Rome. L'auteur émet ici l'hypothèse que Monique accompagna son fils lorsque celui-ci revient à Carthage pour prendre son poste de rhéteur municipal. Le chapitre 8, « Milan » (pp. 109-120), traite des évolutions spirituelles d'Augustin durant son séjour milanais que nous content les livres V à VII des *conf.*, et de l'arrivée de Monique dans la capitale impériale auprès de son fils. Le chapitre 9, « L'ombre d'Ambroise » (pp. 121-137), évoque les relations complexes entre Ambroise, évêque de Milan, et Monique – et l'on regrettera ici que la visée hagiographique l'emporte sur la dimension historique. Il aurait été sans doute plus intéressant de relever que ces relations complexes prennent leur source dans les différences de pratiques liturgiques

importantes qui distinguent l'Église de Milan de l'Église de Carthage. Le chapitre 10, « La délivrance » (pp. 139-152), évoque la fameuse scène du jardin de Milan où Augustin revient à la foi catholique, mais aussi son séjour à Cassiciacum. L'auteur s'appuie ici à la fois sur le témoignage du livre VIII des *conf.* et sur celui des *Dialogues* écrits durant cet *otium liberale*. Le chapitre 11, « Départs » (pp. 153-167), s'appuie sur le chapitre IX des *conf.* pour évoquer le baptême d'Augustin à la Pâque 387, le séjour prolongé à Rome et Ostie, l'extase d'Ostie vécue par Augustin et sa mère, enfin la mort de Monique. L'ouvrage constitue ainsi, par bien des aspects, un récit hagiographique où l'auteur tend surtout à souligner le rôle spirituel de Monique dans le processus de conversion d'Augustin. Sans nier cette dimension évidente, reconnaissons cependant qu'aurait pu être plus pertinente une approche plus historique qui soulignât, par exemple, les motivations socio-économiques de Monique dans son rejet de la concubine d'Augustin et dans les projets de mariage qu'elle avait en tête à Milan, comme ont pu le faire des historiens comme Cl. Lepelley ou P. Brown, ou encore la confrontation de traditions liturgiques et religieuses différentes entre Carthage et Milan, comme a pu le souligner l'ouvrage récent de P. Boucheron consacré à saint Ambroise et à la tradition ambrosienne au Moyen Âge.

Jérôme Lagouanère

CLAVIER, Mark, *On Consumer Culture, Identity, the Church and the Rhetorics of Delight* (Reading Augustine), Bloomsbury, London/New York 2018, 168 p.

This thin volume brings "together the two main strands" of the author's research. Indeed, Clavier has previously published a book on each of these strands – rhetoric and delight in Augustine's theology on the one hand and a critique of consumerism with an explanation of how the church should adapt to consumer culture on the other. The primary connection between the two is the role that persuasion and delight play in both. The book is divided into three parts following an introductory chapter. "Worldly rhetoric" offers an analysis and critique of consumerism. "Heavenly rhetoric" describes an "eloquent God" and the Christian's experience of being drawn to both the worldly and the divine rhetoric. Part Three elaborates on the "church as a rhetorical community" and the need for better Christian orators.

The book argues that advertising persuades people to make purchases by promising delight and that Augustine's understanding of rhetoric provides the church a way to understand and combat this narrative. Christians must learn to communicate the spiritual delights of Christianity more persuasively. The book does not specify how they are to communicate more persuasively, as the author acknowledges in the conclusion: "I suspect some will be disappointed that I've not clearly laid out more precisely what it means for the church and her ministry to express wisdom and delight." At one point, he discusses art, music, worship, and ritual as ways of bringing delight and thereby persuading people. Nonetheless, he also argues that churches "should have long ago given up on trying to out-entertain consumerism." The focus on oratory and rhetoric throughout the book suggests that the answer has more to do with homiletics and catechesis. The Christian orator should be able to "instruct, delight, and persuade people toward God's saving wisdom."

However, might not this call for delightful and persuasive speech be but a different way of trying to "out-entertain consumerism?" Salvation, according to the author, is a battle between two orators: "The contest between the two cities [the earthly city and the city of God] is the rhetorical contest between God and the devil writ large. They're two rhetorical communities, manifesting different loves and governed by different forms of delight." The assumption is that the Christian orator is speaking truth, but if the truth is to be accepted, it must be presented in a way that delights the listener. This sounds a little like saying that Christians have the best product but need better spokespeople – a conclusion that certainly runs counter to the thesis of the book.

The underlying issue lies with the treatment of freedom, which along with identity serves as a central theme of the book. The author persuasively argues that consumerism promotes a false understanding of freedom as merely having many choices. Yet the role of rhetoric and persuasion may indicate a similar misunderstanding. The would-be convert must be persuaded to choose the city of God over the earthly city. The book's treatment of delight certainly complicates the idea of free choice here, as one does not choose what brings one delight, but the same could be said about whether the consumer has a choice when buying a particular product. Regardless, the consumer and the convert are both being led to believe they are free to choose. If instead grace is purely a gift from God, then it need not be packaged by Christian orators to make it more appealing. God is the giver and the gift itself. The packaging, the delivery, and even the delight

experienced by the recipient of the gift are all given by God. God can tailor the good news to the ear of any listener. If beautiful language aids the reception, the listener will hear such language. If the recipient finds such language haughty or frivolous, the gospel will be presented in humble language. Paul, the great Christian rhetorician, experiences his own radical conversion after hearing very few words. At Pentecost, the people hear their own languages spoken by the disciples. The recipient does not choose grace; God chooses the recipient. If the message is not sufficiently persuasive, it can only be because God has not chosen it to be.

The end of the book again calls for the formation of more eloquent teachers. After explaining the lack of more specific advice, the author says that his "chief hope at the conclusion of this book is that you've been inspired enough to consider how to help nurture your church as a community of delight." Perhaps then the greatest need is not orators who can explain the spiritual delights more persuasively but a church that embodies and is a visible manifestation of those delights. The unity of the body of Christ and the love of the Holy Spirit speak more eloquently than any rhetorician.

J. Burton Fulmer

COHICK, Lynn H., BROWN HUGHES, Amy, *Christian Women in the Patristic World: Their Influence, Authority, and Legacy in the Second through Fifth Centuries*, Baker, Grand Rapids (MI) 2017, xxxviii + 292 p.

In their new book, Cohick and Hughes rewrite early Christian history with women as its primary agents of change. The volume covers almost every major aspect of the period in the Roman Empire. The authors flip the typical church history script of theology, councils, and "great men" with the occasional examination of women on the side; instead women's history is church history, and readers learn of figures such as Constantine and Augustine through the histories of women such as Perpetua, Felicitas, Helena, Monica, Macrina. The authors present nuanced readings of their sources, clearly laying out in each chapter their methodologies, the value (and challenges) of the evidence for constructing a history of women, and different views in the field.

Cohick and Hughes take a chronological approach, focusing on key figures or texts to illuminate broad themes and trends as they progress across the centuries. In Chapter 1, Thecla as protomartyr,

ascetic, and apostle serves as "avatar" of an early church identified with conflict with the dominant culture as it simultaneously spreads across the Mediterranean. In addition to the expected theme of "martyrdom," Chapter 2 on Perpetua and Felicitas examines motherhood and sanctity. Cohick and Hughes analyze childbirth and familial obligations for the imprisoned women, one free and one enslaved. They also explore gladiator culture and charismatic religious leadership. Catacomb art is treated in Chapter 3, where the authors deconstruct popular catacomb mythology and, through contextual interpretations of images, foreground the importance of material culture for the history of women. Chapter 4 charts two transitions of the fourth century: imperial Christianization and the rise of asceticism. Helena's role in imperial patronage of the church is addressed in Chapter 5, concentrating on Helena's leadership as patron, rather than on her symbolism as a model of individual piety. The authors also unpack the narrative of Helena's "discovery" of the "true cross", explaining how the account emerged and its importance for advancing Christian imperial ambitions. The pilgrim Egeria, in Chapter 6, provides the opportunity to analyze a woman-authored travel narrative alongside male-authored critiques of pilgrimage. The book pays attention to the colonizing effects of a Christian "Holy Land" travel as one aspect of the increasingly important materiality of holiness in the post-Constantinian era. Chapter 7 focuses on Macrina and Monica. It opens with a review of scholarship on representation and history writing of women based on male-authored sources. In the Macrina section, Cohick and Hughes convey her leadership and towering influence on the Cappadocian Fathers – and indeed on the social, economic, and religious environment of Cappadocia itself. Chapter 8, on Paula, Marcella, Melania the Elder, and her granddaughter Melania the Younger, attends to these elite women's founding roles in the monastic movement as well as to their stature as teachers of scripture and champions of different theological positions during the sharp controversies of their age (e.g., the Origenist controversy). Chapter 9 examines imperial women's power – particularly during moments of political instability or theological upheaval, such as the times of the fifth century Church Councils – through the lives of Aelia Pulcheria and Empress Eudocia.

A few aspects of early Christian history are absent from the volume. As the authors note in their Introduction, the book does not consider Gnosticism or monasticism (especially in Egypt, Syria, and Palestine) in depth. Additionally, it covers the more traditional Latin and Greek speaking geographies of early Christianity, omitting Egypt, Syria, Persia, and other Eastern regions.

In some ways the book carefully threads a needle, seeking neither to characterize early Christian (male) authors and the church as irredeemably misogynist nor to excuse away their sexism with the cover of "historical context" (pp. xxiv-xxvi). At times, the prose feels a bit protective, as in the appeal to read ancient writers known for their "silencing or oppression of women" with "charity" (p. xxvi). On the other hand, the book is built on a solid foundation of critical feminist scholarship. After reading it to completion, one cannot help but come away with the conviction that "patristics" is a misnomer for the period, that women formed, shaped, and influenced early Christian communities and traditions.

This book will be welcomed by many seeking a comprehensive (or at least near-comprehensive) textbook on women in early Christianity. The primary audience will be classrooms in seminaries and other religiously identified institutions, lay Christian audiences, and researchers in early Christianity. At times in the Conclusion, the prose speaks implicitly to a Christian reader. Nonetheless, this volume has much to offer to all, and anyone teaching the history of Christianity or the history of women in Christianity should consider its adoption. The book's structure makes it easy to pair chapters with specific primary sources on a syllabus. It contains relevant illustrations (images as well as a timeline), an index of ancient sources, and a detailed subject index. Both nuanced and engaging, *Christian Women* is an insightful and much-needed contribution to the field.

Caroline T. Schroeder

COLLIER, Jay T., *Debating Perseverance: The Augustinian Heritage in Post-Reformation England* (Oxford Studies in Historical Theology), Oxford University Press, Oxford 2018, 229 p.

This book shows every sign of being the published edition of a PhD thesis. It comprises seven distinct and even disparate chapters which discuss various aspects of the Anglican reception of the Reformed doctrine of perseverance ultimately adopted at the Synod of Dort: an introduction, the Lambeth Articles of 1595, the English delegation at Dort, Bishop Richard Montagu, baptism, the Puritans, and a fine and concise conclusion. There is an adequate bibliography, although with only three extended sources concerned with Dort, and a helpful index. The summary of the book's purposes and thesis on p. 195 is excellent.

Collier is not exempt from grammatical and academic solecisms; indeed the book is littered with them to the extent of revealing poor editing. Chapter 1, on the doctrinal identity of the independent Church of England, is simplistic, reading not unlike a BA student essay. The section "Identity and the Church of England" beginning on p. 1 is particularly weak, with a number of inadequate footnotes. For example, n. 2 on p. 2 does not take us to any scholarship after 1938; n. 8 has no academic apparatus, and the same criticism applies to n. 2 on p. 60. Notes 21-60 on pp. 67f refer without exception to a single source. The reference to "Peterhouse College" on p. 25 is an elementary mistake. The phrase "Dilemmas, dilemmas, dilemmas" on p. 90 is not one I would expect to read in any academic context, nor the casual term "stocks and blocks" on p. 116. It is astonishing to read in a book published by Oxford University Press the word "confessions" without the apostrophe it needs on p. 114. Although p. 120 is part of Collier's personal conclusion, extra academic support in the form of footnotes would really have helped his argument. These points are a plea for better and more finessed editing.

Collier's thesis is that interpretations of Augustine are not just important but indispensable to understanding the Reformed and Anglican debates surrounding the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Augustine's twin doctrines of a divine sovereignty which precludes human rejection of divine grace, and of a human collaboration with divine grace which makes falling from such grace in apostasy conceivable, shape early Protestant arguments about the perseverance of the saints. In general, and accepting that Protestant denominations have always represented a wide doctrinal spectrum, Lutherans accepted the possibility of apostasy and therefore rejected absolute perseverance, whereas the Reformed at Dort rejected any hint of semi-Pelagianism and adopted a strict belief in perseverance. Anglicans – I write as an Anglican priest – were confused, initially keen to place themselves in the Reformed camp, but nonetheless ingenious in crafting highly ambiguous doctrinal formulae, and ultimately rejecting the rigorism of Dort in favour of a deliberate blend of Catholic and Reformed possibilities. Collier walks us competently through the history of this debate: his schema on pp. 53f of the contrast between Archbishop Matthew Hutton's teaching that some reprobates temporarily possess saving grace, and William Whitaker's teaching that reprobates by definition never possessed saving grace, with both Hutton and Whitaker extensively leaning on Augustine, is lucidly presented. These poles of permanent perseverance versus potential apostasy constitute

a leitmotif in Elizabethan, Jacobean and Caroline Anglican debate in particular about an approach to semi-Pelagianism and in general about an approach to independent Anglican identity.

This is definitely an area worthy of research, and I would encourage Collier to take it further. As he does this, he might reflect on two factors, one presentational and the other more fundamental.

With this thesis and its attendant examination of Protestant texts, it would be of great use to have some appendices which offered to the reader the full texts discussed: the relevant Church of England Articles, Canons of Dort, relevant passages from Richard Montagu and his opponents, and so on. Much discussion around these documents occurs in the book, and an easily-consulted compendium of relevant texts, aided perhaps by a timeline of the texts' publication, would be helpful.

Such an appendix might profitably include some of the pertinent texts from Augustine, and this leads us to a fundamental point about the book's argument. Whilst Collier illlustrates the Reformed–Anglican debates about perseverance with reference to plentiful sources in Augustine, he does not properly show that Augustine is anything beyond the material cause of such debate: that Protestant theologians deployed the terms of debate and vocabulary furnished by Augustine. But Collier's thesis is that Augustine was the formal cause and efficient cause of these debates, and at no point does he prove this. Did Augustine design and create Protestant debates about enduring saving grace, or were these debates simply reflected in Augustine? A procedure which might tip the balance in Collier's favour would be to examine contemporary Roman Catholic handling of Augustine and perseverance, but he concentrates solely on Protestant theology and so deprives himself of potentially decisive comparisons and contrasts. For example, we are naturally biased in Leuven towards Robert Bellarmine, but Collier's passing reference to him on p. 129 could have been extended to demonstrate the ways in which Reformed and Anglican reliance on Augustine was actually more systematic than what pertained in Catholic theology in the same period. Although Collier does extensively describe Protestant receptions of Augustine in chapter 6, we are nowhere taken beyond the contingent to any necessary connection between Augustine and the Protestant debates.

I would like to end on a very positive note, and Collier provides this in chapter 5, on baptism. This is a delightful piece of work, which on its own justifies reading the book. We are taken through the detail of the Anglican debate about sacramental and spiritual efficacy in baptism, the reasons for the practised ambiguity of formal Anglican

declarations on this sacrament, the systematic versus pastoral debates which shaped Anglican baptismal liturgies, the ways in which two Augustinian theologies of sacramental grace and sacramental signification shaped (or reflected?) Anglican thought and practice. This chapter was a tour de force, and merits further research.

Jack McDonald

DAVIES, Horton, *The Vigilant God. Providence in the Thought of Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, and Barth* [second edition], Peter Lang, New York 2018, 170 p.

The *Vigilant God* was published for the first time in 1992. The present publication is an unaltered, second edition in honour of its author, the late Horton Davies, professor of church history at Princeton Theological Seminary (1956-1984). Davies intends to explain and compare the thought of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Calvin, and Karl Barth on God's providence, with a special focus on the doctrines of sin, grace, and predestination. As a first introduction to the thought of these theologians on these topics, the book can be of some help, but one should not expect more of it than that.

With regard to Augustine, Davies expresses the often-heard critique of his doctrine of original sin as unjust, his view of postlapsarian sexuality as determined by his own biography, and his understanding of predestination as presenting us with an arbitrary God. Despite admitting that Augustine intended to be an expositor of Scripture, the author does not consider in a deep way the extent to which Augustine's appeal to Scripture is valid. This failure of analysis makes the author's evaluation of Augustine's theology, and the author's preference for Barth's doctrine of double predestination, arbitrary and subjective.

It seems to me that the decisive reason to prefer Barth to pre-modern theologians, such as Augustine, is that Barth's concept is more acceptable to the sensibilities of modernity, since that concept subordinates God's justice to his saving love in Christ and holds open the possibility of universal salvation. The book would be more interesting if it engaged in a real *conversation* between pre-modern theology and Barth's theology (with attention to their presuppositions), comparing the appeal of each approach to Scripture.

Bart van Egmond

DELMULLE, Jérémy, *Prosper d'Aquitaine Contre Jean Cassien: le Contra collatorem, l'appel à Rome du parti Augustinien dans la querelle postpélagienne* (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 91), Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, Barcelona 2018, xliv + 381 p.

Jérémy Delmulle's study of Prosper of Aquitaine's attack against John Cassian in *De gratia et libero arbitrio liber contra collatorem* is a revised version of the author's University of Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV) dissertation. Delmulle also edited the critical edition of *Contra collatorem*, *CCSL* 68, in 2019. No one is more familiar with the text and scholarship of *Contra collatorem* than Delmulle, who has produced the first book-length study of this controversial text, which was largely responsible for the Western reception of Cassian as a "semi-Pelagian." The text was composed in order to convince the new pope, Sixtus III (432-440 AD), that those who opposed Augustine's doctrine of grace in southern Gaul, the *doctores Gallicani*, shared Pelagian views. Delmulle's modest thesis is that the *Contra collatorem* critique of Cassian's *Collatio* XIII is much more "Roman-centric" than previously thought. While not exactly groundbreaking, which Delmulle readily acknowledges, the study offers several new insights and questions that present a more nuanced reading of an influential work by the mercurial Prosper.

The introduction and chapter one ("Asceticism and Post-Pelagianism"), contain a *status questionis*, a brief discussion of Prosper's and Cassian's backgrounds, and a summary of events leading up to the writing of *Contra collatorem*. The brief summary of literature since 1901, when L. Valentin published his lengthy and influential study of Prosper, is an elegant bibliographical essay that traces the developments in the study of the text and its author. Of course, as with every work that deals with this topic, the author is obligated to provide a disclaimer to the reader about the historical misnomer, "semi-Pelagianism," which Delmulle suggests should be called "post-Pelagianism" and "*doctores Gallicani*" in place of "semi-Pelagians." Delmulle's summary of the history of the term "semi-Pelagian" is a succinct introduction to the complex events and persons spanning many centuries (pp. xxiv-xliii).

Chapter two provides the immediate context for *Contra collatorem*. Delmulle begins by making a convincing case for a more precise dating for the completion of the work, placing it between mid-August 432 and September 433 (pp. 51-53). He then introduces the theory that it was composed in two stages: Prosper began to write a

general defense of Augustine's legacy in the wake of his death in August 430, and by the following year had what was essentially a rough draft. Then, when Prosper heard of the election of Pope Sixtus III, mid-August 432 at the earliest, he edited the text to fit the situation: an appeal for a definitive papal endorsement of Augustine against the *doctores Gallicani* (pp. 53-57). Delmulle speculates that Prosper had not presented this work to the previous pope, Celestine (422-432 AD), when he had an audience with him back in 431, because Prosper had decided at that time to wait for a more favorable reception at the Lateran (p. 65). This argument assumes that Prosper had the necessary foresight and restraint, which is hard to reconcile with what is known about the outspoken defender of Augustine and self-identified "intrepid lover of perfect grace" (p. 36).

This chapter concludes with a discussion of Prosper's audiences: Cassian and his supporters, Christians concerned with salvation of the simple-minded, and, primarily, the newly elevated Pope Sixtus. Although Pope Celestine had issued a general defense of Augustine's orthodoxy when Prosper appealed for a papal endorsement in 431, Prosper and the Augustinians were eager for another chance to lay out a case for the Apostolic See to unequivocally declare Augustine's orthodoxy against the errors of the *doctores Gallicani* (p. 82).

Chapter three is where Delmulle is at his best. He begins with a formal treatment of the text by analyzing the relationship of *Contra collatorem* to Cassian's *Collatio* XIII, which Prosper quoted and critiqued. *Contra collatorem* has usually been read as another example of Prosper's intensely partisan attacks, which it certainly was, but what I and others have failed to fully appreciate was just how much thought and care went into its composition and editing. For example, Delmulle draws attention to the significance of the obvious, but overlooked, word *liber*.

Delmulle argues that the choice of *liber* and the technical vocabulary of book production was part of Prosper's goal to entrap Cassian with his own words. Prosper pointed out that Cassian, the *auctoris sui,* was alone responsible for every word at every stage of book production: *scriptae*, *purgatae*, and the *editione* (p. 101). However, the quotes copied from Cassian, as Delmulle rightly observes, were not Cassian's words, but those of Abbot Chaeremon (p. 102). *Contra collatorem* gave the reader the false impression that the quotes reflected Cassian's own beliefs.

The second section of chapter three contains a detailed comparison between the original text of *Collatio* XIII and Prosper's

quotes; the purpose of the comparison is to reveal what Delmulle refers to as a manipulation of the contents of the quotes. The third section of the chapter looks at the structure of the work with a helpful outline of its contents, accompanied by a brief but informative commentary. The rest of the chapter continues to skillfully lead the reader to Delmulle's brilliant observation that *Contra collatorem* was above all a legal document. By means of this document, Prosper had prepared a legal "brief," a formal list of indictments, with words drawn directly from Cassian's own printed book, not rumors or second-hand testimony. However, as Delmulle explains, because Prosper did not possess authority to make a legal judgment against the *doctores Gallicani*, he prepared the charges and evidence necessary for a papal condemnation (pp. 156-157).

Mentioned briefly in the previous chapter (pp. 80-81), the fact that Sixtus was once a Pelagian sympathizer and that Augustine had written a letter instructing him on how the church should deal with Pelagians (*Ep*. 194) could have been another reason for the care and precision of the work. As Delmulle notes, Sixtus was not just any new pope, but someone with known connections to Pelagians and to Augustine. *Contra collatorem* ends with a review of papal precedent for supporting Augustine and concludes with a quotation from Augustine's letter to Sixtus instructing him on how to deal with Pelagians (p. 137).

Chapter four is a meticulous treatment of Prosper's method and use of authoritative sources, mostly from Augustine, even though Augustine is only mentioned by name at the beginning and at the very end of *Contra collatorem*. Delmulle proposes an interesting theory for the absence of Augustine's name in Prosper's argument; by removing Augustine's controversial name from Prosper's theological arguments, it made it appear that his accusations against the doctors of Gaul were less partisan and more objective than they in fact were (p. 201).

Chapter five, the last chapter, details Prosper's Augustinian theology in *Contra collatorem* and also contains a balanced summary of Cassian's theology of grace. The chapter ends with Delmulle's interpretation of Prosper's theological views on the major theological themes in the controversy: *initium fidei*, *bonae voluntatis*, *semina virtutum*, prayer, conversion, predestination, and, finally, God's salvific will.

A wonderful gift to the small circle of Prosperian scholars, Delmulle's book will, no doubt, inspire further research. Scholars of Augustine can see how his theology was interpreted in southern Gaul

subsequent to the Pelagian controversy. Cassian scholars will find the specific details of Prosper's interpretation and appropriation of his words illuminating, offering a window into the reception of Cassian by Augustinians. In an ideal world, Delmulle would have had access to two recently published books on Pelagius by Stewart Squires (*The Pelagian Controversy*, 2019) and Ali Bonner (*The Myth of Pelagianism*, 2018); as it is, this book will serve as the foundational study for scholarship on *Contra collatorem* going forward. If only Delmulle would do the same for all of Prosper's works!

Alexander Y. Hwang

DENECKER, Tim, *Ideas on Language in Early Christianity. From Tertullian to Isidore of Seville* (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 142), Brill, Leiden/Boston 2017, xv + 501 p.

Das vorliegende Buch ist aus einer 2015 an der KU Leuven angenommenen Dissertation hervorgegangen. Ihr Verfasser Tim Denecker, der sich in den letzten Jahren durch unzählige einschlägige Publikationen einen Namen auf dem Gebiet linguistischer Forschung gemacht hat, legt mit diesem Band eine systematische Zusammenstellung von Ansichten christlicher lateinischer Autoren von Tertullian bis Isidor über das Phänomen Sprache vor.

Dem Buch geht auf ca. 20 Seiten eine Einleitung voraus, die als Ziel „to provide a history of the linguistic ideas held by early Christian Latin authors" definiert und einen Blick auf die Forschungsgeschichte wirft. Waren frühere Abhandlungen auf einzelne Autoren oder spezielle Themen linguistischer Realitäten beschränkt, zielt Denecker auf eine umfassende und systematische Studie ab, die den gesamten Bereich abdeckt.

Das Buch ist in drei Hauptteile gegliedert Language History, Language Diversity und Language Description, die gesamt 10 (3 – 3 – 4) Kapitel, von denen jedes wieder in einige Unterkapitel zerfällt, enthalten. Den roten Faden des ersten Hauptteils bildet die biblische Geschichte von Genesis 1-11, entlang der der Ursprung und das Wesen von Sprache (Kap. 1), der ursprüngliche Sprachzustand (Kap. 2) und der Ursprung der linguistischen Diversität beleuchtet werden, die mit dem Turmbau von Babel einsetzt und teils als Strafe, teils als providentielle Unterstützung gedeutet wird (Kap. 3). Es folgt, daran logisch anschließend, als zweiter Teil der aktuelle Zustand der Sprachenvielfalt (Language Diversity) mit den

drei Kapiteln zur Bewertung der Sprachenvielfalt (Kap. 4), zur Bewertung der Mehrsprachigkeit, deren prominentestes Beispiel der *vir trilinguis* Hieronymus abgibt, (Kap. 5) und der Deutung von wundervoller Mehrsprachigkeit, allen voran dem Pfingstwunder (Kap. 6). Während die beiden ersten Teile vorwiegend im Zeichen spezifisch christlicher Themen stehen und eine Zusammenschau verschiedenster christlicher Exegeten und Übersetzer bieten, steht der dritte und letzte Teil (Language Description) mehr in der Tradition lateinischer Grammatiker und berücksichtigt daher vorwiegend Autoren wie Hieronymus, Cassiodor und Isidor. In den vier Kapiteln wendet sich die Perspektive von Sprachen im allgemeinen, ihrer Klassifikation und Verwandtschaft (Kap. 7) über die besonders im Zusammenhang mit Übersetzungen diskutierten Phänomene von Syntax (Kap. 8) und Wort (Kap. 9) hin zur Ebene des einzelnen Buchstabens (Kap. 10).

Die Behandlung linguistischer Probleme durch christliche Autoren lässt sich, wie Denecker im abschließenden Überblick ausführt, in vier Phasen einteilen (p. 392): Die erste präaugustinische Phase sah eine relative Freiheit in der Behandlung linguistischer Fragen, die zweite Phase unter Hieronymus und Augustinus bringt eine Art Systematisierung und Kanonisierung linguistischen Denkens, in der dritten Phase mit dem späten Augustinus der *Retractationes* und einer Reihe von ihm abhängiger Autoren wie Quodvultdeus oder Cassiodor setzt eine simplifizierende Kodifizierung ein, in der vierten wird das augustinische Modell von Isidor in seinen Etymologiae fixiert und an das Mittelalter tradiert.

Das Buch ist überaus reich an Beispielen und Belegen, kaum ein Phänomen bleibt unbehandelt. Trotz unzähliger Beispiele, die behandelt werden, entsteht nie der Eindruck, dass es sich um eine bloße Aneinanderreihung von Einzelepisoden handelt. Wenn man etwas vermisst, dann ist es die Diskussion der berühmten Stelle aus den *Confessiones* (1,14), an der Augustinus den Spracherwerb im Kindesalter, insbesondere das mühevolle Erlernen der griechischen Sprache erwähnt, eine Stelle, auf die sich die in moderner Sekundärliteratur häufig postulierte geringe Kenntnis des Griechischen bei Augustinus stützt. In diesem Zusammenhang sei auf zwei meines Erachtens überzogene Deutungen Augustins hingewiesen, die aus dessen Texten so nicht ablesbar sind. Zum einen ist es aufgrund zahlreicher Zitate von Varianten des griechischen Bibeltexts kaum wahrscheinlich, dass Augustinus wenig griechisch konnte, was Denecker zwar nicht aus der *Confessiones*-stelle, wohl aber aus *Contra litteras Petiliani* 2,38,91 ableitet (p. 177) und mehrmals als unverrückbare

Wahrheit präsentiert (pp. 14. 177. 255; zu Augustins Griechischkenntnissen s. zuletzt das ausgewogene Urteil von D. Hadas, *Augustine d'Hippone. Commencement de Commentaire sur l'Épître aux Romains. Introduction, edition critique, traduction et commentaire par D. Hadas*, CSEL Extra Seriem, Berlin 2019, 204-209). Zum anderen halte ich die Gleichsetzung von Punisch = Donatistisch für zu kurz gegriffen (pp. 218. 246f.: „the preference for Punic is a typical trait of Donatist African particularism"). In seinem umfangreichen antidonatistischen Oeuvre wirft Augustinus den Donatisten nie die Verwendung der punischen Sprache, wohl aber deren Abspaltung von der katholischen Kirche vor. Die oft in Zusammenhang mit Pfingsten geäußerte augustinische Formel „unitas omnibus linguis loquitur" plädiert in keiner Weise für einen Vorrang des Lateinischen gegenüber dem Punischen.

Denecker füllt mit seinem vorzüglich recherchierten, detailreichen und mit Ausnahme von Kleinigkeiten fast fehlerfreien Buch eine Lücke. Er ist für dieses Buch, das für lange Zeit den Gang der Forschung bestimmen wird, zu beglückwünschen. Zwei Kritikpunkte, die den Lesefluss beeinträchtigen, seien erlaubt: Zum einen sind in die englisch übersetzten Belegstellen die relevanten Phrasen des lateinischen Originaltexts eingelegt; hier hätte eine Präsentation des Texts in beiden Sprachen, sei es in Tabellen oder in Fußnoten, was aktuell nur in Ausnahmefällen geschieht, für größere Übersichtlichkeit gesorgt. Zum anderen sind die zahlreichen Angaben zur Sekundärliteratur in den Lauftext eingelegt; auch hier wäre ein Nachweis der Fundstelle in den Fußnoten günstiger gewesen. Geteilter Meinung kann man auch zu den Zusammenfassungen (Summaries) am Ende eines jeden Kapitels sein. Für raschen Informationsgewinn sind sie gut geeignet, bei fortlaufender Lektüre des Buches stößt man z.T. auf ermüdende wörtliche Wiederholungen der jeweils im vorangegangen Kapitel präsentierten Argumente.

Clemens Weidmann

DILLEY, Paul C., *Monasteries and the Care of Souls in Late Antique Christianity: Cognition and Discipline*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2017, xii + 350 p.

In this minutely documented and expertly written monograph, Paul C. Dilley has authored a systematic survey of the late antique monastic care of souls, understood as the "training of thoughts". Dilley

posits (Introduction, pp. 1-20) an intimate relationship between interiority, bodily practices, and the cenobitic community. The primary aim of bodily ascetic practices was the disciplining of the mind (evaluating and reorienting one's thoughts) for which monasteries provided distinctive institutional support in "an elaborate process of instruction, discipline, and ritual" (p. 2). Drawing on insights from cognitive sciences (especially cognitive anthropology), Dilley presents the monastic care of souls as a metacognitive effort practiced in a complex social context: "As highly structured environments, cenobitic monasteries were also 'Cognitive Communities', in which disciples were taught how to monitor, evaluate and regulate their thoughts and emotions, guided by the advice, support, and discipline of their superior" (p. 12). Thus, monasteries fostered the acquisition of a specifically monastic theory of mind. The acquisition of the monastic theory of mind began already at the gate; it was sustained through a systematized teaching of what Dilley terms "cognitive disciplines" – "a group of related practices intended to develop the mental, emotional, and imaginative capacities of disciples" (p. 15), consisting in the study of Scripture, the "fear of God", and prayer, as well as in collective rituals of commemorating the monastic founder, and in repentance.

These steps of cognitive reconfiguration Dilley follows in three parts, dedicated to recruitment practices, cognitive disciplines, and group rituals, respectively. He articulates his observations starting from a core of ancient sources related to the Pachomian Koinonia and to the White Monastery Federation, but the scope of sources analyzed extends far beyond these two, comprising ascetic, monastic, and hagiographic literature as well as imperial legislation from the fourth to the sixth centuries A.D. (as outlined in the Introduction to Part I, pp. 21-38). Some of the recurrent sources alongside Pachomian and Shentoutean literature include the works of Cassian, Basil, Augustine, John of Ephesus, the *Regula Magistri*, and Justinian's *novellae*.

Part I, *Evaluating Postulants* (pp. 21-96), addresses monastic suspicions related to the motivation and aptitude of candidates for the monastic life, in light of the radical cognitive turn that was expected after joining. Chapter 1, *Discerning Motivation I: Status and Vocation* (pp. 39-66), shows that motivations varied by gender (male or female), age (children, young adults, elderly), and status (elite or poor, married, wage laborers, slaves, criminals). These factors generated corresponding anxieties related to the capacity to endure the monastic regimen, respecting the requirement of absolute obedience, or withstanding external opposition for joining (from families, owners, state authorities, or even the ecclesiastical hierarchy). Candidates

were expected to freely, fully, and irrevocably commit to monastic life, and to take measures to secure the consent of external parties. Commitment narratives, approached in the second part of the chapter, were meant precisely to reassure monastic recruiters of the postulant's vocation.

In Chapter 2, *Discerning Motivation II: Trials of Commitment* (pp. 67-96), Dilley examines late antique monastic entrance protocols (initial interview, false rejection, hazing, preliminary instruction, property renunciation, oath, investiture, and tonsure) as institutional strategies that tested the character and commitment of postulants (p. 69) and as costly initiation rituals that impressed on the candidate the alterity of monastic identity. Monks were made aware that they entered a perpetual state of liminality (p. 93): their subsistence was entirely dependent on the monastery, and absolute obedience was required from them indiscriminately (loss of social capital). Efforts to legalize property renunciation as permanent (especially when it was donated to the monastery) and the monastic oath, with the accompanying threat of damnation for breaking it, also discouraged novices from harboring ideas about turning back to the world. The habit, in turn, represented a positive marker of this new, monastic, identity and the expectations that accompany it.

Part II, *Cognitive Disciplines* (pp. 97-219), focuses on the progressive learning of the monastic theory of mind. While constant inner vigilance and regular personalized thought-counseling were part and parcel of monastic life, Dilley explains that monks also learned how to discern the source and moral significance of their thoughts and reorient their cognitive stream through the study of Scripture, the fear of God, and prayer. Institutional structures such as instruction in basic literacy and the application of discipline fostered the acquisition of these "cognitive disciplines".

Accordingly, in chapter 3, *Scriptural Exercises and the Monastic Soundscape: Writing on the Heart* (pp. 110-147), Dilley shows how new monks learned to internalize Scripture and incorporate it into their cognitive stream. This process began with memorizing key scriptural passages through attentive copying, reading, and reciting. But Dilley draws attention to the equally important auricular aspect of internalizing Scripture: monks murmured biblical verses in meditation, while on the move, and during work (which involves both speaking and attentive listening), but also listened to the recitation of the Bible in a variety of disciplinary, liturgical, and catechetical contexts. The "rhetoric of ekpathy" that monastic leaders and instructors employed in these contexts also sought to associate biblical passages

with certain emotional dispositions and bodily habits. Taken together, these strategies created an "ethical soundscape", in which monks gradually framed their lives according to a biblical script, which they could then call upon in situations of cognitive turmoil. Dilley identifies two modes "talking back" to unwanted thoughts using Scripture: the oracular mode (presenting out-of-context scriptural verses as commandments to follow) and the prosopoeic mode (assuming the persona of biblical characters).

Chapter 4, *Learning the Fear of God* (pp. 148-185) introduces the "fear of God", that is, meditation on imaginative representations of the divine courtroom and punishment at the last judgment. The fear of God draws on divine omniscience, including of hidden thoughts, and the monk's accountability for sinful thoughts. Dilley argues that the fear of God ritualized punishment to produce adequate emotional responses through a triple correlation between meditating on significant (visual, auditive, and sensorial) images, undergoing public disciplining, and personal practice. Thus, the image of being exposed to the gaze of the divine court, and the corresponding institutional strategies of the monastic surveillance system and public shaming (separation from the community, public repentance), instilled shame, which the monk could cultivate through self-scrutiny. To imagine hearing divine condemnation, instilled guilt, as did admonishment (often framed in biblical language) and rebuke of disobedient or sinful monks, as well as self-blame. The sensorial image of eternal punishment and the associated corporal discipline (beatings, expulsion) produced a sense of pain that monks could foster through voluntarily undertaking a more severe ascetic regimen. The fear of God could be practiced with the aid of the physical environment (the monk's cell, paintings, etc.) and *sententiae*; it could be applied retrospectively as well as preventively.

Chapter 5, *Prayer and Monastic Progress: From Demonic Temptation to Divine Revelation* (pp. 186-219), outlines spiritual progress quantified in the progressive implementation of prayer. Broadly understood as communication with God, prayer framed monastic life both at the individual and communal level. Prayer incorporated the previous two cognitive disciplines, the ubiquitous recitation of Scripture and meditation on the fear of God. As Dilley points out, in the initial stages obedience to the monastic director and, more generally, to the monastic rule, was also construed as a form of prayer. As cenobites progressed, they learned how to discern through prayer the promptings of the conscience and to exercise free will in assenting to it. Dilley illustrates this relation between (scriptural) prayer, discernment, and free action with the monastic struggle against *porneia*. At

an advanced level, monks practiced several prayer techniques which combined bodily postures (standing, with arms extended) aimed at focusing the mind, with prayer scripts directed at God's majesty in order to cultivate a sense of humble joy and thankfulness. Exceptionally, these techniques could cultivate visions and revelations through prayer. Dilley observes that intense visualization of stock-images, such as the divine throne and liturgy, heavenly locations, etc., all in the context of nightly vigils and drawn from apocalyptic literature, facilitated their perception as external visions and revelations. At the same time, monasteries provided informal instruction regarding "techniques of mental image cultivation".

In Part III, *Collective Heart-Work* (pp. 221-291), Dilley shifts the focus from the individual training of thoughts to collective rituals and monastic leaders. The primary locus of his observations here is the Pachomian Koinonia and Shenoute's White Monastery Federation. The grand meetings of these large monastic federations in (commemorative) festivals and rituals of collective repentance afforded leaders an opportunity to fulfill their pastoral obligations towards the entire community, but also to manage conflict, and to promote repentance and group solidarity. Moreover, they provided disciples with instances of privileged insight into the hidden struggles undertaken by their leaders on their behalf.

In chapter 6, tellingly entitled *The Lives (and Minds) of Others: Hagiography, Cognition and Commemoration* (pp. 233-259), Dilley showcases the role of hagiography in the monastic training of thoughts. Dilley approaches this topic from the perspective of the "monastic voyeur", gazing at the hidden life (including thought-life) of hagiographic protagonists. Monastic hagiography went beyond offering models of sanctity for imitation and emulation. Given the paradoxical loneliness of cenobitic life (whereby communicating one's achievements to fellow monks could be construed as vainglory), hagiography also revealed hidden virtue and humility, both among the rank and file as well as the leading monastics. Conversely, commemoration of monastic leaders and founders brought to the fore the otherwise invisible efforts they undertook on behalf of the community – efforts which continued after their death – as well as the motives behind their disciplining actions. The promise of the founder's intercession was meant to combat disobedience by securing renewed commitment to the rule.

Finally, chapter 7, *Shenoute and the Heart of Darkness: Rituals of Collective Repentance* (pp. 260-291), explores Shenoute's *Canons* in the context of meetings for collective repentance in the White

Monastery Federation. Here we see Shenoute at work negotiating conflict and establishing his authority in terms of the monastic theory of mind. The *Canons*, which were read at these meetings, have a similar function to the Pachomian *Lives*: Shenoute reveals his personal insecurities, the emotional distress caused by disobedience and conflict, the motivations behind his disciplinary actions, and his entreaties to God on behalf of the community. This rhetoric of ekpathy was meant to establish Shenoute as an authoritative leader whose words and actions are divinely guided.

The result of a decade of research, Dilley's approach is grounded in "cognitive historicism", which combines understanding the monastic theory of mind within the world of ancient reflections on cognition, anthropogonies, teaching and learning processes, with modern cognitive-science research and empirical studies. This innovative methodology, the fresh perspective it brings to the monastic care of souls, and Dilley's attentive, comprehensive analysis of the sources render this monograph a must-read.

Hajnalka Tamas

DOUGHERTY, Richard J. (ed.), *Augustine's Political Thought* (Rochester studies in medieval political thought 2), Boydell & Brewer Ltd., Woodbridge 2019, 290 p.

Augustine of Hippo's political thinking has been received and studied intensively throughout the last sixteen centuries, and not only in theological or patristic circles. In the domain of political studies, too, Augustine's intuitions are extensively explored. Previously, within the latter academic field, Augustine was mainly approached in a comparative way, as a source and dialogue partner for current debates. The present volume sets out to fill a double lacuna: (1) to study Augustine as Augustine, how he formulated and answered his own political questions, (2) and to do so not only on the basis of the most-quoted source in this regard, the *De ciuitate Dei*, but also on the basis of other relevant writings, not yet intensively researched with a view to understanding Augustine's politics. The current anthology, then, is the result of a contemporary approach to Augustine – an approach which could be designated 'postmodern' in the sense that it scratches away 1600 years of varnish to retrieve the historical Augustine. So, following the lead of Ernest Fortin, this collection offers us Augustine through the eyes of Augustine; in a holistic way, the book links

Augustine's many ideas and writings together, placing them within the broader intellectual, historical, socio-economic, and political context in which he conceived and wrote them. Richard J. Dougherty sets out this program in his introduction.

The first part of the volume offers reflections on Augustine's notion of politics: What is politics, and how does it contribute to ethics, peace, and mercy – in short, to human happiness? Richard J. Dougherty ('St. Augustine and the Problem of Political Ethics in the *City of God*') opens with Augustine's famous rebuke of Lucretia's suicide. The issue of suicide is, as Dougherty substantiates, a litmus test for Augustine's relationship towards the Stoic moral code. Augustine is of the opinion that though the latter contains valuable insights about the virtuous life, it does not comprehensively or efficiently find (moral) truth – only Christianity is able to do that. The following chapter ('The Other Happy Life: The Political Dimensions to St. Augustine's Cassiciacum Dialogues') consults Augustinian sources that are rarely studied in the context of his political teaching, namely, his early dialogues, composed shortly after his conversion and before his baptism in Milan. Michael P. Foley argues that Augustine's quest for happiness resembles the Ciceronian political program of promoting law and order so as to serve the general human good. Augustine's acceptance of Christian political service is aimed at "avoiding pitfalls of political immersion and antipolitical disengagement" (p. 48). Peter Busch ('Peace in the Order of Nature: Augustine, Giles, and Dante') explains that the different thematizations of the issue of peace – the ultimate objective of any form of politics according to Augustine – in the latter's oeuvre opened a (medieval) debate on the relation between the temporal and spiritual rule: is peace only to be achieved if the spiritual is superior (Giles of Rome) or if the temporal is completely autonomous (Dante Alighieri)? Ashleen Menchaca-Bagnulo ('Deeds and Words: *Latreia*, Justice, and Mercy in Augustine's Political Thought') closes out the first part of the collection. She highlights the intrinsic relation Augustine sees between religion and politics, between true worship and true virtue. Rome's antique religious system resulted in its *libido dominandi*; hence the former needs to be replaced by the Christian Eucharistic sacrifice, or so the bishop of Hippo pleads. Though Augustine clearly distinguishes human from divine justice, it remains unclear how he understands the relationship – the compatibility – between political duties and piety, as Adam Thomas observes in reading Augustine's *Confessions* and *De libero arbitrio* as manuals on justice ('The Investigation of Justice in Augustine's *Confessions*').

Part II considers Augustine's engagement – use, rebuke, transformation – with ancient political philosophies. Augustine opposes the elitist Platonic theurgy – happiness only for the few – to Christ's universal salvation. Thomas Harmon ('The Few, the Many, and the Universal Way of Salvation: Augustine's Point of Engagement with Platonic Political Thought') demonstrates that both Augustine and Porphyry envisage a transpolitical good, but they have a different appreciation of the earthly city. Porphyry holds an indifferent position, while Augustine refuses any such indifference. Augustine believes all citizens of the terrestrial city are potentially members of the divine city. Hence, despite his transpolitical disposition, Augustine remains deeply committed to the cause of political order in this world. Previous chapters in this collection illustrate how Augustine partly agrees, partly disagrees with Stoic and Platonic notions, with Cicero and Porphyry. Douglas Kries ('Echoes and Adaptations in Augustine's *Confessions* of Plato's Teaching on Art and Politics in the *Republic*') shows a similar pattern concerning Plato's thought about art. Both Plato and Augustine, after some initial doubts about problematic aspects of art, concur that art – properly understood – can stimulate virtue. In this agreement, Augustine did not plainly reject Virgil and Terrence, but 'repurposed' them for a higher ideal, preserving them in this way for posterity. An analysis worth reading for many involved in politics today is authored by Ryan Balot ('Truth, Lies, Deception, Esotericism: The Case of St. Augustine'). Fully aware of the power of rhetoric, and having recourse to it himself, Augustine posits that the Christian commitment to truth may not be deserted under any circumstances. Because lying breaks communion with God, who is Truth, lying is always wrong. Hence political leaders may never make use of lies or deception, not even for the greater good. Given that all people are created in the image of God, they all deserve the same truth and ought never be deceived. Veronica Roberts Ogle ('Augustine's Ciceronian Response to the Ciceronian Patriot') demonstrates that Augustine does not mind that Rome prospers. Rome, the earthly city, may and indeed should prosper, yet within the correct perspective. Rome may not be idolized. The city of God is always the correct objective and perspective. Moreover, the latter guarantees the correct earthly citizenship. Augustine argues in *De ciuitate Dei* that religion and politics in Rome were symbiotically intertwined. Daniel Strand ('Augustine's *City of God* and Roman Sacral Politics') in this vein clarifies Augustine's position concerning demons: he accepts that they exist but warns people not to worship them, since demons are evil spirits that enslave and have enslaved the

Romans. Daniel E. Burns concludes by showing that Joseph Ratzinger's study of Augustine helps us to grasp how Augustine (partly) processed Platonic philosophical ideas ('Augustine and Platonic Political Philosophy: The Contribution of Joseph Ratzinger').

The eleven erudite chapters of the book under review demonstrate that Augustine endeavored to rethink the old Roman political and religious order so as to find Christianity's place in the new, i.e., transformed order; in other words, Augustine was trying to situate Christianity's transpolitical aspirations within the temporal political reality in which he lived. Though the Cassiciacum dialogues and *De libero arbitrio* are the subject of one chapter each, and the *Confessions* of two chapters, unavoidably *De ciuitate Dei* is the most-consulted source. This observation is not a critique, but rather an invitation to initiate a second volume, in which Augustine's sermons and letters are examined. There we can find, in addition to his political theory, his own political praxis: how did he himself act as a politician, and how did he concretely relate to the politicians of his age? Skillful artists are impossible to catch in one glimpse, and their pieces of art are even more difficult to rapidly understand or interpret in a uniform way. Such observations are true for Augustine too. Nevertheless *Augustine's Political Thought* succeeds in illustrating the rich and colorful pallet that Augustine masterfully used to paint his own political thought. Indeed, the current volume helps us to understand what Augustine envisaged, and especially how he relates to the preceding rich tradition of political philosophy. That such a study, in addition to its historical-critical validity, is also highly relevant in the times of the COVID-19 pandemic, requires no explanation.

Anthony Dupont

FOLEY, Michael P., *Against the Academics: St. Augustine's Cassiciacum Dialogues*, Volume 1-2, Yale University Press, New Haven 2019, xli + 307 p.; xlii + 184 p.

Michael P. Foley's recently published four-volume series of translations and commentaries on Augustine's Cassiciacum dialogues, namely, *Contra Academicos*, *De beata uita*, *De ordine*, and *Soliloquia*, is a useful contribution in many ways. For scholars of Augustine, the volumes offer a fluent translation of Augustine's earliest dialogues with relevant commentary and notes. The literature Foley has used is extensive, although he could also have benefitted from

Therese Fuhrer's commentary on *Contra Academicos*[1] and Jörg Trelenberg's commentary on *De ordine*,[2] which are absent from the bibliography. For a non-expert reader interested in Augustine, Foley's volumes offer, besides the fluent translation, plenty of helpful tools, such as a thorough introduction to the Cassiciacum dialogues, the genre of ancient dialogue, and Augustine's sources, as well as a timeline of Augustine's conversion, information about the characters in the dialogues, and a translation key for the most important philosophical terms. These volumes also offer approachable explanations of Augustine's philosophical arguments, so that a person unacquainted with ancient philosophy can understand and appreciate them; the explanations include anecdotes, references to well-known people, such as Einstein,[3] Helen Keller,[4] and the famous 'Eureka' of Archimedes,[5] as well as allusions to modern cultural concepts such as the pursuit of the American dream.[6]

In the general introduction, Foley lays down the fundamental principles of his interpretation of the Cassiciacum dialogues: they are to be read together as a coherent unit and in a definite order, which according to Foley is 1) *Contra Academicos*, 2) *De beata uita*, 3) *De ordine*, 4) *Soliloquia*. He sees the Cassiciacum dialogues as spiritual exercises which are intended to lead their reader to a three-fold conversion, consisting of an 1) intellectual, 2) moral, and 3) religious conversion.[7] Because of the goal to read the dialogues as a single, coherent unit, Foley's translations can be seen as a part of an ongoing project in Augustinian studies that endeavours to read the Cassiciacum dialogues in their own right and to avoid the old discussion of Augustine's early Neoplatonism in comparison with his later thought, especially in the *Confessiones*.[8]

[1] Therese Fuhrer, *Augustin: Contra Academicos (Vel De Academicis) Bücher 2 und 3, Einleitung und Kommentar*, Berlin/New York 1997.

[2] Jörg Trelenberg, *Augustins Schrift De ordine: Einführung, Kommentar, Ergebnisse*, Tübingen 2009.

[3] Michael P. Foley, *Against the Academics*, *St. Augustine's Cassiciacum Dialogues*, vol. 1, New Haven/London 2019, 131.

[4] ibid., 177.

[5] ibid., 128.

[6] id., *On the Happy Life*, *St. Augustine's Cassiciacum Dialogues*, vol. 2, New Haven/London 2019, 78.

[7] id., *Against the Academics*, xxv-xxviii, xxxiv-xxxv.

[8] See Erik Kenyon, Review of Michael P. Foley, *Against the Academics: St. Augustine's Cassiciacum Dialogues*, vol. 1, *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 2020.01.36. id., Review of Michael P. Foley, *Translation and Commentary, On the Happy Life: St. Augustine's Cassiciacum Dialogues*, vol. 2, *Augustinian Studies* 51, 1 (2020) 137-140, 137. Concerning the contemporary interpretation of the Cassiciacum dialogues,

Foley explains and comments on the philosophical thought and arguments of the dialogues in a way that clearly shows Augustine's philosophical background. At the same time, however, Foley does not present the arguments as something that would be interesting from a merely historical perspective; he not only explains the arguments but also engages the reader to consider them from a philosophical or theological point of view, as Augustine would have wanted. Sometimes the dialogues inspire Foley to give concise meditations based on the subject matter discussed in the text.[9] In my view, all of this makes the dialogues appear fresh and engaging way, which is certainly not something that can be taken for granted in commentaries on such complex and sometimes rather difficult ancient texts.

An important philosophical aspect of the Cassiciacum dialogues and a point of comparison between Augustine's early dialogues and his later writings, which is still made in the research, is the distinctively negative attitude in these dialogues toward sensible reality and sense-perception.[10] Without taking a stance for or against Foley's line of interpretation in this regard, it seems to me that he tends to emphasize the aspects of Augustine's thought that can be seen to imply a positive view of the sensible (and sense-perception) and to be more cautious with the most negative statements. For example, with regard to a seemingly modest concession that people need things such as fortune, bodily health, and properly functioning senses in order to attain wisdom, just as they need a ship to cross the sea (*Acad.* 3,2,2), Foley comments that Augustine's goal in saying this is to "affirm the value of the senses."[11] When Augustine speaks positively about the Platonists, who think knowledge only concerns the intelligible realm, whereas the sensible things are only a matter of opinion (*Acad.* 3,11,26), Foley insists that "Platonists are not dualists in the sense that they ignore or condemn the senses as illusory or evil and focus only on the realm of the intellect."[12] Foley's preference on this point can

see also Mark J. Boone, Review of Erik Kenyon, *Augustine and the Dialogue*, *Augustinian Studies* 50, 1 (2019) 113-117, 113. Catherine Conybeare, *The Irrational Augustine*, Oxford 2006, 2.

[9] See, e.g., Foley, *Against the Academics*, 128-129. Foley, *On the Happy Life*, 68, 73.

[10] See, e.g., David G. Hunter, "Augustine on the Body," in *A Companion to Augustine*, ed. Mark Vessey with the assistance of Shelley Reid, Malden 2012, 353-364, 355. Peter King & Nathan Ballantyne, "Augustine on Testimony," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 39, 2 (2009) 195-214, 199. Trelenberg, *Augustins Schrift De ordine*, 48.

[11] Foley, *Against the Academics*, 177.

[12] ibid., 194.

sometimes be seen in the translation as well. For example, in Foley's translation of *Acad.* 1,1,3, Augustine says that whatever our bodily senses touch "should be completely held in low regard," whereas in Peter King's earlier translation the tone is considerably more harsh: "Instead, everything of the sort must be despised."[13] Which of these translation choices is closer to Augustine's original intention is, however, a question that cannot be dealt with in this brief review.

In sum, Foley's translations and commentaries on the Cassiciacum dialogues offer a smooth presentation of Augustine's earliest dialogues. As the author has intended, the translations, introductions, and commentaries help readers to see these dialogues as a carefully written unified project that has the definite goal of "intellectually, morally, and religiously converting" its audience.[14] This multivolume work is certainly a contribution that no scholar of Augustine's early works can ignore.

Eetu Manninen

GHILARDI, Massimiliano (ed.), *Il bambino nelle fonti cristiane. XLV Incontro di Studiosi dell' Antichità Cristiana (Roma, 11-13 maggio 2017)*, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Rome 2019, 430 p.

In the last decades, research has largely made up its arrears for the study of childhood in antiquity, including during late antiquity and among early Christians (see most recently C. Laes [ed.], *A Cultural History of Education in Antiquity* [London 2020] and L. A. Beaumont, M. Dillon, N. Harrington [eds.], *Children in Antiquity. Perspectives and Experiences of Childhood in the Ancient Mediterranean* [London 2020]). The topic has become a flourishing field of research across many languages and different scholarly traditions. The Finnish scholar Ville Vuolanto documents this rise in research with a regularly updated online bibliography that now includes over 2300 entries (*Children in the Ancient World and the Early Middle Ages. A Bibliography [Eight Century BC – Eight Century AD]* [*sic*]).

In a stellar introduction to the book under review, Elena Zocca demonstrates profound awareness of these various research traditions.

[13] Foley, *Against the Academics*, 16. Peter King, *Augustine: Against the Academicians and The Teacher*, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1995, 4.

[14] See Foley, *Against the Academics*, xxviii, xxxiv.

She also aptly introduces the subject of hagiography, a genre that continues themes of ancient childhood, yet also introduces new Christian motifs (pp. 7-22). Children and their roles in divination, prophecy, and xenoglossia in early Christianity are at the centre of Luigi Canetti's contribution (pp. 23-29; on this topic, compare J. L. Mackey, "Roman Children as Religious Agents: the Cognitive Foundations of Cult," in C. Laes, V. Vuolanto [ed.], *Children and Everyday Life in the Roman and Late Antique Worlds* [London 2017] 179-197). The next chapter, by Rossana Barcellona (pp. 41-55), explores childbirth and early infancy. Leaning on her rich work on the nativity stories and on child exposure, Barcellona rightfully takes a nuanced position on questions such as the newborn's right to life, accounting for different levels of moral discourse and the practicalities of life. Her chapter could have been enriched by references to other fundamental studies, including that of Judith Evans Grubbs (see J. Evans Grubbs, "The Dynamics of Infant Abandonment: Motives, Attitudes and [Unintended] Consequences", in K. Mustakallio, C. Laes [ed.] *The Dark Side of Childhood in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Unwanted, Disabled, and Lost* [Oxford 2011] 21-36).

Marco Papasidero (pp. 59-68) and Isabella D'Auria (pp. 71-77) focus on child martyrs: the authors aptly deal with themes such as innocence or a child martyr transcending its years (see also C. Horn, "Raising Martyrs and Ascetics: A Diachronic Comparison of Educational Role–Models for Early Christian Children," in C. B. Horn, R. R. Phenix [ed.], *Children in Late Ancient Christianity* [Tübingen 2009] 293-316 and C. Laes, "Teachers Afraid of their Pupils. Prudentius' Peristephanon 9 in a Sociocultural Perspective", in *Mouseion* 16, 1 [2019] 91-108). The contribution by Maria Amodio on the iconography of childhood in early Christian art is beautifully illustrated (pp. 79-92; see also M. Studer-Karlen, "Illness and Disability in Late Antique Christian Art [Third to Sixth Century]", in C. Laes, K. Mustakallio, V. Vuolanto [eds.], *Children and Family in Late Antiquity. Life, Death and Interaction* [Leuven 2015] 53-75). At a time when databases and statistical approaches grow in popularity, the contribution by Danilo Mazzoleni on children in Christian inscriptions proves the enduring value of a qualitative and anthologising approach (pp. 93-111). The author deals with fascinating cases of *neophiti* (on which see also A. Buonopane, "Neophytus nelle iscrizioni latine di committenza cristiana. Alcune considerazioni in margine a una nuova testimonianza da Verona", in *Hormos. Ricerche di Storia Antica* 9 [2017] 8-28), such as a child who all by himself acquired Latin (*ICUR* I 1978), the depiction of playing with a *trochus* (*ICUR* III 7531), a

five-year-old girl who died within six days "because of her wisdom" (*ICUR* III 7856), a brother and a sister, respectively one and four years of age, who died within four days of each other (*ICI* XV 1) (see also C. Laes, "The Youngest Children in Latin Epigraphy", in M. Carroll, E. J Graham [ed.], *Infant Health and Death in Roman Antiquity* [Portsmouth, RI 2014] 131-144).

Childhood as metaphor and image is the subject of contributions on sin and innocence in Antiochene exegesis of Psalm 50 (by Giulio Malavasi, pp. 115-122), on childhood in the *Logoi* of the *Corpus Macarianum* (Francesco Aleo, pp. 123-130), on children in rabbinic literature (Massimo Gargiulo, pp. 131-138, missing out on important work by H. Sivan, *Jewish Childhood in the Roman World* [Cambridge 2018]), and on the Armenian context (Alessandro Orengo, pp. 139-150, an article that could have done with more contextualisation for a field that is not well known to the average reader).

The Cappadocian fathers get a separate section, and readers are treated to an interesting mix of information on the practices of daily life, as well as the imagery and theology of childhood: children in the correspondence of Basil of Caesarea (Manuel Mira Iborra, pp. 153-166), childhood in Gregory of Nyssa's commentary on the *Canticum Canticorum* (Giulio Maspero, pp. 167-176), and spiritual infancy in the same Gregory's *De infantibus premature abreptis* (Ilaria Vigorelli, pp. 177-187).

Law offers a goldmine of information on both concepts of childhood and practicalities of daily life, and it therefore merits a separate fifth section. This section opens with a remarkably rich case study on children in the imperial household of Emperor Zenon (Margarita Vallejo Girvés, pp. 191-208, article in Spanish). Another article on child exposure and the new valuation of children in early Christianity misses out on the fundamental work by Evans Grubbs (M. Amparo Mateo Donet, pp. 209-218, in Spanish) and therefore appears to be cursory. It is followed by a good study on the children of clerics in the councils of the fourth and fifth centuries – the topic was in no way the focus of attention for these councils, but together with some literary testimonies, the evidence points to a reality that was surely there (S. Adamiak, pp. 219-215). A long survey by Angelo Di Berardino (pp. 227-259) on children in Roman legislation and early Christian views is richly documented (though on p. 247 n. 98 an article by C. Laes is attributed to a certain T. Riklius, while on p. 258 n. 145 a contribution by V. Vuolanto is wrongly assigned to C. Laes) and provides good thoughts on vital issues such as the question of continuity and change (though the matter of pederasty is touched upon all too

briefly; see, e.g., J. W. Martens, "'I Renounce the Sexual Abuse of Children': Renegotiating the Boundaries of Sexual Behaviour in Late Antiquity by Jews and Christians", in C. Laes, K. Mustakallio, V. Vuolanto [ed.], *Children and Family in Late Antiquity. Life, Death and Interaction* [Leuven 2015] 169-211).

The Latin Fathers are the topic of the sixth part. First, Tertullian and the importance of becoming a child again (*repuerascere*) (Ivan Bodrožić, Vanda Kraft Soić, pp. 263-273, with striking omission of German work including C. Gnilka, *Aetas spiritalis. Die Überwindung der natürlichen Altersstufen als Ideal frühchristlichen Lebens* [Bonn/Köln 1972] or H. Herter, "Das Unschuldige Kind", in *Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum* 4 [1961] pp. 146-162). Then, Christian mothers and their (ascetic) daughters (Roberta Franchi, pp. 275-293; now to be supplemented by V. Vuolanto, "Single Life in Late Antiquity? Virgins between the Earthly and the Heavenly Family", in S. Huebner, C. Laes [ed.], *The Single Life in the Roman and Later Roman World* [Cambridge 2019] 276-291), followed by a rather succinct chapter on children and faith in the works of Ambrose (Marcin Wysocki, pp. 295-303, article in English). The chapter by Silvia Georgieva (pp. 305-316, again in English) on Jerome's Letters 107 and 128 is merely descriptive and largely omits the rich bibliography that exists on this topic. Vittorio Grossi on the terms *infans* and *puer* in Augustine (pp. 317-336) is a rich and most detailed lexicographical study that also entails important conclusions for sociocultural research. Blood and milk, and baptism in both, turn out to be themes of importance with Chromatius of Aquileia in his *Tractatus in Matthaeum* (Calogero Cerami, pp. 337-345).

With a chapter on the still-moderate encratism of the first and second century and its concepts of *isoangelia* and *isopaidia*, Jerónimo Leal (pp. 349-360, in Spanish) opens a section on childhood from reality to metaphor. Francesco Berno (pp. 361-371) deals with the multifaceted aspects of childhood in Gnosticism. The 'original innocence' of Adam and Eve is the topic of a good chapter by Sincero Mantelli (pp. 373-385), aptly followed by a detailed study on Adam described as a child in the *Ad Autolycum* by Theophilus of Antioch (Lásló Perendy, pp. 387-395, in English).

An outstanding chapter by Mario Iadanza (pp. 399-418) on child oblation and the Benedictine Rule opens the eighth section, called "Prospettive". One wonders whether its place should have been in the fifth section on laws and rules. The concluding chapter by Paul Mattei (pp. 419-424), written in French, offers rich thoughts on both the contributed chapters and future research.

There can be no doubt that this is an important volume. It contains a goldmine of new information which simply cannot and should not be overlooked in the Anglophone world. A subject index would have further enhanced the work's value.

Christian Laes

GÜNTHER, Jutta, *Musik als Argument spätantiker Kirchenväter. Untersuchungen zu Laktanz, Euseb, Chrysostomos und Augustinus* (Philippika – Altertumskundliche Abhandlungen 132), Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden 2019, x + 384 p.

Jutta Günthers Arbeit über „Musik als Argument spätantiker Kirchenväter" ist eine (zurecht mit dem Philippika-Preis) ausgezeichnete Arbeit. Ihre „Untersuchungen zu Laktanz, Euseb, Chrysostomus und Augustinus" wählen vier Autoren aus, die nicht nur in sich bedeutend und interessant sind, sondern zudem verschiedene Epochen abdecken und signifikant unterschiedliche Perspektiven und Zugänge zum Thema Musik bieten.

Laktanz ist als Einstieg gut geeignet, da seine Schriften eine protreptische Brücke zwischen christlichem Glauben und paganer Kultur schlagen. In seinen Aussagen zur Musikpraxis wird der Zusammenhang zwischen Theater, Kult und Musik deutlich (S. 44). Ähnlich wie die Rhetorik, erscheint die Musik bei Laktanz als ambivalent, da beide als „Transportmittel" (S. 59) von Inhalten dienen, die schädlich oder nützlich sein können. Entscheidend ist der Bezug auf Wahrheit und Tugend, Laktanz fordert (und erlaubt) daher für die Christen rechten Gebrauch von Musik (S. 61). Schon bei ihm, wie bei den anderen Autoren, steht der Gesang über der Instrumentalmusik; die menschliche Stimme ist von Gott selber zu seinem Lobe geschaffen (S. 66, 68).

Eusebius von Caesarea gilt der Autorin als „Angelpunkt für die Darstellung der frühchristlichen Musikkultur" (S. 70). Bei ihm tritt nun der Psalmengesang als Charakterististikum schlechthin hervor (S. 71), wobei damit nicht immer nur die Psalmen der Bibel gemeint sind, etwa bei den sog. „Therapeuten" (S. 77). Für Euseb besonders wichtig ist der Zusammenhang zwischen der Einheit von Gott, Kaiser und Reich und der christlichen, einstimmigen Psalmodie, die Einheit und Identität stiftet (89f). Nach Günters starker These sieht Euseb den Psalmengesang als etwas, durch das die Christen sich definieren und ihrer selbst vergewissern (S. 97f). Wo Euseb sich mit der paganen

Musikkultur auseinandersetzt, wird die Musik einerseits (v.a. im Kybelekult) als irrational, ja verrückt verurteilt (S. 99f), andererseits in der Erziehung als Vermittlerin des moralisch Richtigen akzeptiert (S. 112). In der antiken Musiktheorie sieht Euseb keinen Nutzen, „da die Erkenntnis der mathematischen Grundlagen keine Gotteserkenntnis vermitteln kann" (S. 116). Interessant ist der Abschnitt „Musik und Neuplatonismus: Die Seele als Musikinstrument des Schöpfers" (S. 117-123). Hier wäre philosophisch und theologisch noch schärfer herauszuarbeiten, wie sich die stoische und (neu-) platonische Auffassung vom „Geist als immateriell" unterscheiden, und worin die jeweils beschriebene Harmonie (im Körper und/oder zwischen Körper und Geist) genau besteht (S. 288, 301). Über das Alte Testament rezipiert Euseb auch jüdische Musikkultur. Günter bietet dazu eine ausführliche Übersicht zu den 49 Psalmen, die Musikinstrumente nennen (S. 124-128), jeweils mit hebräischem (MT) , griechischem (LXX) und lateinischem (Vulg.) Namen. Davon legt Euseb 12 in seinem Psalmenkommetar aus (1 S. 29-136). Darin finden sich zwar Hinweise zur Musikpraxis (Davids), doch Eusebs Exegese ist allegorisch, die genannten Instrumente sind ihm Veranschaulichungen des Bibeltexts: die althebräische Praxis ist Metapher (nicht Vorbild) für den christlichen Gottesdienst, in dem *una voce* gesungen wird.

Das Chrysostomus-Kapitel beginnt mit einer besonders gelungenen Einführung (S. 139-142). Erhellend sind die Ausführungen dazu, wie Johannes Alltag und Arbeit der Christen durch geeignete Musik mit dem Glauben durchdringen will (S. 145, 166). Ähnlich wie bei Euseb rückt die Eucharistie ins Zentrum, wo der einstimmige Gesang gepflegt wird (S. 147-149). Die Musik der rechtgläubigen Kirche dient auch der Abgrenzung von den Arianern, ja wird zum Mittel der öffentlichen Auseinandersetzung (S. 152-158). Andererseits setzt sie Himmel und Erde, Engel und Menschen in Verbindung, vor allem das Trishagion der eucharistischen Liturgie (S. 160-163). Die großen Vorbilder für rechte Musikpraxis findet Chrysostomus in der Bibel bei Aposteln und Jünglingen im Feuerofen (Dan 6), dann bei den Mönchen seiner Zeit, die einerseits die Apostel nachahmen, andererseits die Musik des Himmels auf die Erde holen; damit werden sie ihrerseits Vorbild für die christlichen Gemeinden (S. 171-175). Durchgehend kritisch sieht Chrysostomus instrumentale Musik, schon in Auslegung von Dan 6 (S. 177f), dann erst recht im Theater (S. 186f), auch als Symbole für den gefährlichen, aber in Antiochia offenbar immer noch attraktiven jüdischen Kult (S. 191-194). Bibelstellen, die von verschiedenen Instrumenten sprechen, werden daher durchgehend allegorisch ausgelegt, so dass Salpinx und Kithara dann

Symbole für durchaus positive Dinge werden (S. 195-211). Musik ist bei Chrysostomus ein häufiges Thema, dient dem Lob Gottes, spendet Trost und hilft zu einem moralischen Leben, wie Günter zusammenfassend festhält. Der Mensch erscheint als Instrument, auf dem Christus selber spielt, so die Spitze der metaphorischen Deutung von Instrumentalmusik in der Bibel (S. 212f). Chrysostomus erkennt, dass Musik Menschen stark beeinflussen kann. Sie lässt uns Inhalte leichter aufnehmen, kann aber auch zu abartiger Ausgelassenheit verführen, bleibt also ambivalent. Auch bei Chrysostomus ist das Kriterium des *rectus usus* zentral und praktisch dominiert die Vokalmusik (S. 213f).

Augustins Äußerungen zur Musik heben sich von den anderen Autoren dadurch ab, dass sie auch die eigene Lebens- und Entwicklungsgeschichte betreffen. Häufig nimmt Augustinus indes auch auf die christliche und kirchliche Musikpraxis Bezug, wie er sie in Italien und v.a. in seiner nordafricanischen Heimat kennen und lieben lernte, etwa zum Psalmengesang in der Messe (S. 217-222). Besonders eindrucksvoll sind seine Erklärungen zum Gesang des Alleluia und den Hymnen des Ambrosius (S. 217-246). Augustinus spricht auch darüber, wie er selbst diese Gesänge der Gläubigen erlebte. Gewiss geht es ihm dabei (bei aller *iubilatio*, S. 249-254) nicht nur um ein religiöses „Gefühl" (S. 234), sondern darum, dass die Gläubigen die Botschaft und die Gnade der Auferstehung in ihr Leben aufnehmen, eingeschlossen den rechten Glauben über Christus selber und ein entsprechend geläutertes Leben (S. 240). Mehr als alles andere ist das „neue Lied" ein *canticum gratiae* (S. 262), dies wäre noch stärker zu betonen. Christliche Musikpraxis muss darauf zielen, dass Stimme, Herz, Verstand und Leben übereinstimmen; wo dies geschieht, spielt der Heilige Geist sozusagen auf dem Menschen als Instrument (S. 264f). Hier zeigt sich, dass Augustin mit seinen Äußerungen zur Musik Themen behandelt, die für sein ganzes Schrifttum charakteristisch sind. Überraschenderweise sagt er wenig zur reichen Musikkultur der Manichäer (S. 267-271), dagegen viel Kritisches zur Musik der Heiden, v.a. zur Zügellosigkeit im Theater und (wie schon Chrysostomus) im Kybele-Kult. Musik *sine ratione* ist für Augustin etwas Gefährliches und Verwerfliches (S. 280f). Typisch Augustin sind die Aussagen zur Musiktheorie, zumal in *De musica*, insbesondere über die zahlenmäßige Ordnung (v.a. im Rhythmus) und ihr Zusammenspiel mit der sinnlichen Seite der Musik (S. 287f): hier wäre zu fragen, ob/wie sich dies mit seiner Theologie von der Inkarnation in Verbindung setzen lässt. Augustins Ausführungen zur Kunst des *bene modulandi* lassen klassische Auffassungen zum *aptum*/*decorum*

anklingen. Insgesamt entspricht Augustins Theorie vom Rhythmus seinen Auffassungen zum Aufstieg aus dem Sinnlichen über das immer Geistigere hin zu Gott (S. 294-297). Aus *De musica* und Buch 11 der *Confessiones* lassen sich als zentrale Aspekte von Augustins Musikauffassung festhalten: Vorrang des Gesangs; moralische Rechtfertigung von Musikpraxis und -theorie, wobei letztere höher steht, da sich hier die rationale Ordnung der Musik zeigt (S. 300f). Wo Augustin in der Bibel auf Musikinstrumente trifft, werden diese durchgehend allegorisch ausgelegt: so etwa die zehn Saiten der Kithara als die Zehn Gebote, die aus Metall gehämmerte Trompete als Bild für den durch Leiden gebesserten Menschen (S. 302-314). Augustins Exegese ist hier radikal allegorisch. Wie schon in den vorausgegangenen Kapiteln ist das zusammenfassende Fazit auch über Augustinus sehr gelungen (S. 314f), dasselbe lässt sich über das „Resümee" der ganzen Arbeit sagen (S. 317-320).

Im Rückblick auf das ganze Buch ein paar kritische Anmerkungen zu einzelnen Punkten und Formulierungen, v.a. aus theologischer Perspektive: Um die starke Auffassung von der Wirkung christlicher, v.a. liturgischer Musik zu betonen, greift die Autorin immer wieder zum Wort „Realpräsenz" (S. 145, 163, 171, 315). Angesichts der technischen Bedeutung dieses Begriffs in der kirchlichen Lehrtradition ist das problematisch. Die Art und Weise der Gegenwart Gottes/Christi ist in Psalmodie und eucharistischen Gestalten nicht dieselbe und sollte terminologisch auseinandergehalten werden; dennoch bleibt richtig, von einer starken Gegenwart Gottes im liturgischen Singen zu sprechen.

Die Übersetzung von *en. Ps.* 150,6 ist ungenau (S. 306): *de superioribus*/*inferioribus* bezieht sich auf die Gegenstände, über die wir Gott loben (*de caelestibus et terrestribus*), und dafür werden die oben/unten angelegten Klangköper von Psalterium und Kithara allegorisch ausgelegt.

Terminologisch ist die Rede von „der omnipotenten Gottesperson" (S. 268) nicht geglückt bzw. unklar und sicher nicht augustinisch; Ähnliches gilt für die Gleichsetzung von „Gottes Stimme" als „höchste Instanz der Welt" mit „der Schöpfung selbst" (S. 281), noch mehr für die Rede von der „Dreifaltigkeit der göttlichen Person" (S. 150), die dem Glauben Nizäas widerspricht.

Für Chrysostomus und Augustin ist das Singen der Psalmen gewiss etwas Heiliges und gehört zum „täglichen Brot" der Kirche; die Psalmodie kann als besonders intensive Form von Lesung/Gebet verstanden werden, steht aber nicht „auf derselben Stufe" wie die Eucharistie (S. 217; 144, 226). Der (liturgische) Gesang offenbart/steigert nicht nur religiöse Gefühle, die sicher eine Rolle spielen,

sondern ist Ausdruck der Liebe zu Gott und Antwort auf seine Gnade/Offenbarung (S. 234, 250) von Seiten derer, die gesegnet sind „durch das Wort Gottes und seine Gnade“ (S. 253); dies wäre gerade für Augustinus deutlicher hervorzuheben (S. 262, 266), denn sonst droht eine implizite Reduktion dessen, was besungen wird, auf Gefühl und Verstand. Für Augustinus wollen Gottes Offenbarung und Gnade das Herz (*cor*) ansprechen, d.h. die ganze und innerste Existenz des Gläubigen: dort, jenseits von Gefühl und Verstand, zeigt sich Gott als *interior intimo meo et superior summo meo* (*Conf.* 3,11).

Im Blick auf die Tatsache, dass die (behandelten) Kirchenväter Musik als ambivalent beurteilen, man sie daher „recht gebrauchen“ muss, wäre interessant, noch genauer zu untersuchen, ob/wieviel hier stoisches Denken übernommen wurde (S. 27f, 190, 207, 276f), über die zutreffenden Hinweise auf Cicero hinaus (S. 33, 46f, 277). Theologisch hochinteressant wäre schließlich eine weitergehende Untersuchung über die Bedeutung der Inkarnation für ein christliches Verständnis der Musik (S. 288, 301, 309, 320), da die Musik ja sinnliche und geistige Elemente zusammenbringt, und da christliche Theologie gerade nicht die Überwindung des Körperlichen schlechthin fordert. Für Arbeiten in dieser Richtung legt dieses Buch eine hervorragende Grundlage.

Hans Feichtinger

GÜNZEL, Peter, *Christologie im Kontext. Zur rhetorischen Struktur christologischer Texte bei Augustinus von Hippo* (Cassiciacum 55), Echter, Würzburg 2019, 432 p.

Something that tends to strike modern readers of Augustine as strange is that while his thought about God, the world, and human salvation is clearly focused on the person of Christ, very few of his works are centrally devoted to what post-Reformation theologians would call “Christology” – to a focused, systematic theological discussion of the person and identity of Jesus. Human society and its welfare, the individual’s quest for God, the grammar and rhetoric of Christian preaching, the principles of catechetics, the nature and working of divine grace in human life, the Mystery of God itself, all are treated at length by the fourth- and fifth-century bishop of Hippo, but explicit, extended reflection on the who and the what of Jesus Christ is, curiously, much harder to find in the great mass of his writings. It must be sought out, for the most part, not as the particular subject of treatises, or even of

large-scale discussions within other works, but in cameo-like passages inserted at key points in longer, more ambitious writings: usually in concise, carefully-wrought distillations of what Augustine regarded as the heart of Catholic teaching on the person of the Savior.

This gives to Augustine's statements on Christ's person the distinctive character of being like carefully-set jewels in a larger crown: clearly meant to be passages of importance, but scattered sparingly, as summaries of what is presumed familiar, over a larger argumentative landscape. One reason, surely, is that precisely during the period of Augustine's prodigious literary activity – from his months preparing for baptism in Cassiciacum, in 386-387, through his ceaseless years of oral and written activity as priest and bishop, beginning in 391, until his death on 430 – he lived almost entirely outside the sphere of serious controversy, within the mainstream Christian community, about who and what Christ is. The struggle with various forms of Arianism was largely over by 381 – although Augustine did encounter a few representatives of it, in writing and in person, around 418, mainly through Visigothic immigrants – and the debates between Cyril of Alexandria and the school of Antioch were only just beginning, in the Greek-speaking world, in the last few years of Augustine's life. The person of Christ must have seemed to him, in a way, to be both crucially important and largely uncontroversial; the short, highly-wrought summary passages where he does sum up what he saw as Christian belief in the Savior seem to exude a serene, unquestioning sense of balance, anticipating the language of Pope Leo and Chalcedon, and the controversies of the late 440s, by a few decades.

All of this gives Augustine's relatively rare, short passages of concentrated reflection on the person of Christ a distinctive character within the flow of his longer works – a rhetorical role, as both signpost and summation, that is distinctive. Peter Günzel's *Christologie im Kontext* is an attempt to study precisely that distinctive, curiously formal role. Originally Günzel's doctoral dissertation for the department of classical philology at the University of Würzburg, and submitted in the fall of 2017-2018, the book is not primarily a theological analysis of how Augustine understands the person of Christ, but an examination of the literary force and meaning of some of the most important of these short, summary passages on Christ, within their literary contexts, asking what their effect and role within a larger literary setting might be. Difficult as it always is to convey in words the power and effect of other words, let alone of sentences and paragraphs, Günzel succeeds admirably in analyzing the structures and literary strategies with which Augustine sums up and contextualizes

– in a few carefully chosen places – the classical, shocking paradox of the Nicene profession of faith: the confession of a savior who is "of the same substance" as the one he called "Father," the God of Sinai and Zion, but who is also fully human, fully vulnerable to suffering and death.

Günzel's book is essentially a straightforward analysis, in painstaking detail, of some of the most notable major passages on the person of Christ in Augustine's *oeuvre*: Books VII-X of *De Civitate Dei*; the two most explicitly "Christological" books of *De Trinitate*, Books IV and XIII; Books VII and X of the *Confessiones*; and two sets of Augustine's Letters: his early letters to his friend and fellow convert Nebridius, especially *Epistulae* 11 and 12, and his exchange of letters with the aristocratic and cultivated Roman expatriate Volusianus, who had a number of Christian relatives and who was himself baptized shortly before his death in 437. Günzel's overall point is that in key passages in each of these texts, Augustine draws on aspects of the distinctive Nicene understanding of Jesus as fully God and fully human, as the core of a larger strategy of argument for the Christian faith in Christ as savior of humanity; Augustine does this in clearly intended contrast to pagan religious practices, to Platonic understandings of mediation between the divine and human realms, and to the endemic pride resulting from any religion based on human efforts to reach out to God.

So in the first section of text he analyzes, *De Civitate Dei* VII-X, Günzel leads the reader through the steps of Augustine's argument, as he maintains that the pagan gods are incapable of leading humans to eternal life (Bk. VII); contrasts Platonic philosophy – as essentially polytheistic – with the unique mediatorship of Christ (Bk. VIII); insists that a true mediator must unite in his own person both human mortality and divine creativity and deathlessness (Bk. IX), and heal our death by his own immortality; and shows the God-given fulfilment of human attempts at sacrificial mediation in the death of Jesus and the continuing Eucharistic sacrifice of the Church (Bk. X). With Christ, especially in the Eucharist – as forming what Augustine likes to call the *totus Christus* – the Christian community becomes a sharer in his work of mediation.

Chapter 3 of the book is devoted to the main Christological sections of the *De Trinitate*: Books IV and XIII. In Book IV, Augustine concludes the first section of that work, which sets out the broad contours of the Church's scriptural belief that God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, by reflecting on the distinctive revelation of what God has done for creation in the life and teaching, even the very person,

of Jesus Christ, who is the unique mediator between God and a sinful humanity. Günzel emphasizes that Augustine stresses here – famously in IV, 4 – the striking paradoxes that lie at the heart of his conception of Christ's person and work, contrasting the humble, obedient style of Christ with the self-congratulatory tendencies of the bishop's presumably sophisticated, Platonist audience (pp. 195-201). In Book XIII of *De Trinitate*, where Augustine returns to a reflection on just how Christ has worked the salvation of the human race, his emphasis is initially on the contrast between *scientia*, knowledge based on historical witness, and *sapientia*, the transformative wisdom humans can acquire that is based on a contemplative encounter with God. Again, Günzel argues, his real argument is with the cultured critics of Christianity and the philosophical underpinnings of their objections. Here, however, as in some other texts, the bishop conducts his argument in the form of a "three-pole" rather than a "two-pole" conversation: making his points on the assumption that the addressee of the text is not his anti-Christian critic but a potentially sympathetic third party, to whom Augustine's exposition of Christian faith is directed. This subtle shift in rhetoric allows Augustine to direct his presentation of the saving work of Christ to an audience presumed to be more sympathetic, and so to build a more convincing case for the unique reality of the God revealed by Jesus.

In his next chapter, Günzel analyzes two books of the *Confessiones*, in which the flow of Augustine's reflections centers on God's role and presence in the world, and on Augustine's own internal experience, where the distinctive identity of Christ is most strikingly developed: Books VII and X. In Book VII, the heart of Augustine's introspective journey, he tells of his crucial discovery of the saving reality of the Christian God in Christ: initially through a decisive contact with Platonist philosophical reflection on the nature of immaterial reality and the negativity of evil; then by the realization that the Christian Scriptures – especially the prologue to John's Gospel – speak of that same ultimate Mystery, by affirming that the divine Word has become flesh in Jesus; and finally the discovery that this news of the Word's Incarnation was a proclamation of the saving humility of God, and so a call to the human humility that is the beginning of faith. There, Günzel suggests, and much more briefly in the concluding chapters (cc. 67-69) of *Confessiones* X – written again as a "three-pole" rather than the more usual "two-pole" conversation – Augustine uses the challenging paradox of Nicene Christology, as discovered in his own experience of conversion to active Christian faith, to build a moving and convincing alternative to the Platonic

view of religious growth and fulfilment: one based not on cultural status and learning, but on the humbling acknowledgement of a God who has united himself with sinners, and who continues to offer himself for them as priest and victim (pp. 306-307).

In the two sets of Augustine's letters that Günzel considers, the first is *Epp*. 11 and 12, from his early correspondence with his boyhood friend Nebridius: these letters are from the early years after the return of both to Africa. Here the style is informal and direct, the letters relatively brief, the questions the kind that one new, intellectually curious Christian would be likely to ask another: How is it, for instance, that the Son, who became human, can be thought of as truly divine and as included in the Trinitarian life of God, if the Father and the Holy Spirit are not believed to have become flesh? In his exchange of letters with the aristocratic Roman exile Volusianus, from shortly after 411 (*Epp*. 132-137), on the other hand, Augustine's style is considerably more formal, the tone deferential; the questions discussed here seem to presume a common education in the liberal arts, especially in Platonic philosophy, and a common, sophisticated level of culture. Volusianus, a pagan who has a number of close relatives who are Christian, asks central questions about Christian faith that seem to represent troubling issues for people of his status and background: How can one believe the seemingly mythical doctrine of Jesus' virginal conception? How can one regard Jesus' relatively modest miracles, reported in the Gospels, as proof of real divinity? Günzel shows at some length that Augustine's attempt to answer Volusianus's questions, notably in the extended argument of *Ep*. 137, represents a different literary genre altogether from that of the letters to Nebridius. Epistle 137 amounts to a small treatise, written in graceful prose and with incisive arguments, which suggests its addressee and its author are men of similar culture and interests, even though they have not yet personally met.

Günzel's sustained attention to the rhetorical structure of all these celebrated passages dealing with the person of Christ may surprise some readers, in that his main concern is less with content than with form, less with theology than with its literary presentation. His book is careful to present all of these key Christological passages in detail, and he points out repeatedly that Augustine's understanding of the person of Christ is based on the by-then standard orthodox faith of Nicaea: Jesus, the unsettling rabbi from Nazareth, is truly the Son of God, "of the same substance" as the eternal God he addresses as "Father", and truly the son of Mary. The key passages in his works that present this central Christian perspective – the passages Günzel

analyzes here, and a few others like them, in places such as *De Doctrina Christiana* I, *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, the *Contra Sermonem Arianorum*, even other passages in *De Civitate Dei* such as XXI, 15 – polished and provocative as most of them are, are really dense presentations of the underlying paradox of the Christian understanding of Jesus, rather than reflections of how this confession might be made more intelligible philosophically. What we, with Chalcedonian hindsight, might call central "Christological" texts in Augustine tend to present the person of Christ more as the central core of Christian faith – challenging and perplexing to some, irresistibly consoling to others – than as a theme for philosophical explanation.

For this very reason, I think, Günzel's book offers the reader of Augustine's works a refreshing new perspective. The book is written in a readable, non-technical German style and without using literary-critical or rhetorical jargon. The scholarly authorities Günzel cites are almost entirely other German scholars, which perhaps distances the book from what might be a wider international conversation. But it makes a solid, plausible contribution to the study of an ancient author who certainly does not lack scholarly attention – and who was known, throughout his life, as much for being an expert rhetorician and a compelling writer of Latin prose, as for being a profound theologian. For that reason alone, *Christologie im Kontext* is a valuable and thoughtful work of interpretation.

Brian E. Daley

HALL, Mark David, CHARLES, J. Daryl (eds), *America and the Just War Tradition: A History of U.S. Conflicts*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 2019, XVI + 321 p.

One of the issues that has received and continues to receive robust attention today is the contentious debate on the moral justification for war. That the just war tradition (JWT) is a field of prodigious interest is attested by the exponential rise in the amount of literature on the subject in recent times. Made up of twelve chapters with an insightful foreword by Johnson, one of the leading experts in the field of just war debate, Hall and Charles' *America and the Just War Tradition* critically assesses some of America's wars and conflicts through the lens of the JWT.

In the introductory chapter, "The Just War Tradition and America's Wars," co-written by Hall and Charles, the historical overview of the JWT, including Cicero, Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas,

Francisco Suarez, Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius, Gratian and the like, considerably reassures readers that the book does not ignore the wisdom embedded in the tradition. Hall and Charles categorically make the point that the tradition "does not merely consist of a checklist of immutable rules" (8). It is not some kind of a mathematical formula that can be rigidly applied to a set of problems._

Following the introductory chapter, John D. Roche offers an incisive historical background to what could be regarded as America's first armed conflict, which eventually led to the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776. In his essay titled, "'Fear, Honor, and Interest': The Unjust Motivations and Outcomes of the American Revolutionary War," Roche argues that while the Continental Army conducted itself in an honorable way during the war, the causes of the war did not follow the *ius ad bellum* requirements. He insists that because Britain was ready to right the wrongs done to America, the war was not fought as a last resort.

With Jonathan Den Hartog's chapter "The War of 1812," it is striking to note that America's Revolutionary War of 1775 was an unfinished one. Grievances against Great Britain still lingered on. Den Hartog finds America's declaration of the 1812 war under President James Madison as completely objectionable and unnecessary, since British authorities had repealed the cause of the offense even before the U.S. started the war. Den Hartog explicitly makes the point that although the U.S. saw just war principles as ideals, they nevertheless flouted *ius ad bellum* considerations. The war was, to his mind, an offensive war, imprudently fought, not in justifiable self-defense, but out of sheer quest for vain honor.

In his chapter on "James K. Polk and the War with Mexico," Daniel Walker Howe sees the American war with Mexico as an oft-ignored one; yet in terms of the number of casualties recorded, it was one of the deadliest wars the U.S. has ever fought. He claims that it was the grandiose ambition of President James Knox Polk for territorial expansion that led to the war – the annexation of California clearly attests to this. Howe argues that the reasons adduced for waging the war were completely unjust, illegitimate, and weak as grounds for war. However, he sees the *ius post bellum* condition, wrought through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, as a step in the right direction.

Gregory R. Jones' "The Fractured Union and the Justification for War," offers a provocative analysis of what led to the American Civil War. In Jones' view, one of the hotly debated issues that engineered the Civil War was slavery, whose volatility made the Northern and Southern contenders lock horns. Jones asserts that the American

Civil War fulfils the *ius ad bellum* criteria, since the sole reason for the war was to preserve the Union. However, given the pervasive brutality that characterized the war, he forthrightly avows that both *ius in bello* and *ius post bellum* requirements were starkly defied. Even the Lieber Code, Jones maintains, could not stop the exponential rise in humanitarian abuses. This, for him, is at great odds with just war as proposed by Augustine.

That the U.S. has always found herself in the crucible of war, fought both within and outside her climes, is attested by Timothy J. Demy's "Just War and the Spanish-American War." Unlike other contributors who point out some of the missing elements in their application of the just war moral principles to America's wars, Demy argues differently – he insists that the American-Spanish War was a just war and met most of the standards of JWT, save for little postwar lapses. He exculpates America in intervening to free Cuba from Spanish maltreatment and cautions that no war should be regarded as a game of chess.

The often-discussed World Wars I and II, usually assessed by different scholars from a variety of perspectives, have not been overlooked in this analysis. In the seventh chapter titled "The Great War, the United States, and the Just War Thought," Jonathan H. Ebel offers astonishing insight into the apparently intricate provenance of the First World War (1914-1918) and compellingly argues that the U.S. waded into the war to stop German hostilities against Belgium and France. He highlights the efforts made by Pope Benedict XV's *Ad Beatissimi Apostolorum* in calling for the cessation of hostilities. Interestingly, Kerry E. Irish's "The United States and Japan in the Second World War: A Just War Perspective" in the eighth chapter complements Ebel's assessment in the seventh – both dealing with two of the most pernicious wars in the history of humanity. Irish makes the point that, even before Adolf Hitler's racial campaigns, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was still fresh in the minds of Americans. While Ebel sees the weak consideration given to *ius post bellum* conditions as the missing link in World War I, Irish affirms that the U.S. waged a just war and adhered to just war conduct in World War II. He inculpates American authorities, however, for the incessant bombing of civilian targets – especially the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Laura Jane Gifford's chapter on "America's Ambiguous 'Police Action': The Korean Conflict" draws our attention to yet another military intervention by the U.S. She adeptly argues that although the row between South and North Korea was a civil conflict, fought

within Korean borders, the U.S.'s intervention was justified. However, while acknowledging the *ius ad bellum* criterion of right intention on the part of America, Gifford considers the Korean conflict a complicated one, especially when assessed from the prism of the JWT. In Gifford's eyes, the U.S.'s treatment of civilian noncombatants sometimes diverged widely from the governing criteria of *ius in bello*, and this eventually made *ius post bellum* provisions a charade.

Mackubin Thomas Owens' "Vietnam and the Just War Tradition" clearly shows that, when reexamined within its historical context, the Vietnamese war was fought in keeping with the principles of the JWT. Aware of the reactions of many critics of the war, Owens insists that the war adhered to both *ius ad bellum* and *ius in bello* requirements, since certain violations in the war were identified and punished. With his chapter on "The First and Second Gulf Wars," Darrel Cole contends that, while the First Gulf war was launched with just war moral standards in mind, the reasons adduced for the Second Gulf War still remain open to vociferous debate. Cole believes that the Second Gulf War lent itself to enormous criticism partly because there was little correlation between the U.S.'s intention and action. Though both the First and the Second Gulf Wars were marred by insufficient planning and untimely pullout on the part of America, considerations were given to *ius post bellum* principles.

In the concluding chapter, Rouven Steeves looks at "The War on Terror and Afghanistan," and raises stark concerns about the constant dangers posed by modern terrorism across the world. In his view, America's military campaigns against terrorist formations, especially in Afghanistan and around the world, have not fallen short of the traditional just war requirements of *ius ad bellum* and *ius in bello*. Thus, in order to rid the world of terrorism, Steeves calls for a sincere "civilizational introspection."

The unanimity of the contributors in their sharp excoriation of war, whether just or unjust, evinces their contribution to the JWT. Notwithstanding some of the avoidable typographical errors that exist, this volume largely meets its target. Not only would scholars find this collection of essays a helpful companion, but policy-makers, conflict-resolution experts, politicians, military personnel, and in fact, people from all walks of life who are interested in the just war debate would find this a handy resource and a reliable treasure trove. Besides the extensive notes provided at the end of every chapter, the index at the end of the book is quite illuminating, and the concise notes on the contributors are helpful. On the whole, Hall and

Charles deserve a high praise for their dauntless efforts in collating the goldmine of incisive essays contained in this resourceful volume.

Isaac Augustine Vasumu

HUTCHINSON, Danny Muñoz, *Plotinus on Consciousness*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2018, viii + 209 p.

Plotinus on Consciousness by Danny Muñoz Hutchinson consists of six chapters, with an introduction, conclusion, appendix, bibliography, and indices. Already in the introduction, the author boldly confesses his intent to dispel a modern philosophical model of consciousness, which is usually associated with Descartes, and which Hutchinson labels the "Inner Theatre Model". The modern view is that the self is an internal observer who watches thoughts (or objects of consciousness) entering and exiting the stage of consciousness as actors, while, obviously, those thoughts or objects are distinct from the observer, who has "epistemic authority" over them: these thoughts or objects are infallible, incorrigible, and transparent to the observer.

Hutchinson proposes to look in Plotinus for a different, older, but relevant model, which is much richer and more interesting. The purpose of this book is clearly a reconstruction of the main tenets of this model, as found in the *Enneads*. The author rightly points out that Plotinus' view of consciousness is integrally linked to his view of the self: both are multilayered. Among various conceptualizations of the levels of the self and consciousness (existing already in the *Enneads*, but also in the scholarly literature), Hutchinson picks a tripartite model, including the physical, the dianoetic, and the noetic level of the self or consciousness.

In the first chapter ("Self"), the author introduces an important distinction within the realm of the embodied or lower soul in Plotinus, namely, the distinction between the soul-trace, which is *in* the body, and the lower soul, which is not in the body but present *to* it. The concise clarity of this presentation concerning the lowest reaches of human consciousness as well as the importance of what it implies, are, however, only a foretaste of what is to be found later. Hutchinson makes a brief excursion into the practical dimension of Plotinus' philosophy (which is not Hutchinson's main object of study), mentioning the process of purification facilitated by spiritual exercises – a Plotinian metaphor which Hutchinson chooses here and will return to later is the image of a sculptor working on his own statue.

The author has an excellent grasp of the Plotinian conception of the self. The true self is at the noetic level, in Intellect. It is realized by the exercise of chiseling away all the false identifications with what is not our self; this process of chiseling away, however, is certainly not to be understood as a loss of personal identity, since the latter is not rooted in some "characteristic features" of personality. Hutchinson rightly criticizes here, *en passant*, Raoul Mortley's fairly recent reading of Plotinus[15], in which the body belongs to the realm of the human self because it is "ours".

The argument could be strengthened here even more by clarifying the difference between the personal sense of self as the subject of experience and what might be called personality or personal identity. Those are not the same from a psychological and philosophical point of view, and a useful distinction can be found in Richard Sorabji's division of the self terminology into "thin" and "thick" terms.[16] Personal characteristics which make us different from other people and which are measurable by psychometrics and other psychological instruments can be reduced to traits of personality or stable behavioral patterns. There is no reason why they should be eliminated in the course of Plotinian purification – for example, the sage can be an extrovert or an introvert, an indoor or outdoor person, regardless of the fact that the sage does not identify anymore with the embodied existence in which those personality features manifest.

What Hutchinson seems to focus on, however, is rather the individuality of the self, which is rooted in Intellect and is not the same as personality differences, which also distinguish one person from another. This is an ontological claim that every human being has a distinct "I" as the subject of one's experience which is the core of consciousness and which becomes opaque through the "accretions" resulting from the fall of the soul. When it comes to the individuality of the subject of experience, Hutchinson gives a very refreshing analysis of the relationships between the individual and the universal Intellect in the *Enneads*. He uses the Plotinian simile of the mutual relationships between science, sciences, and theorems and so arrives at a well-documented thesis that for Plotinus the individual intellect

[15] R. Mortley, *Plotinus, Self and the World*, Cambridge 2014.

[16] R. Sorabji, *Self: Ancient and Modern Insights About Individuality, Life, and Death*, Chicago 2006, 20-21. The now classical distinction between "the total personality" and "the ego-consciousness" in Plotinus was made by E.R. Dodds ("Tradition and Personal Achievement in the Philosophy of Plotinus", *Journal of Roman Studies* 50, 1 (1960) 1-7, on 5).

is both ontologically and epistemologically distinct from the divine Intellect. What makes it different is a perspective – an idea already present in the scholarly literature, but here presented by means of a robust and, again, concise argument. Hutchinson places himself briefly within a debate about the Forms of individuals in Plotinus, siding with Kalligas, *pace* Armstrong[17], by identifying the Form of an individual with the individual's higher soul living in Intellect.

What differentiates the individual subject from others in the noetic realm and from Intellect as a whole is the primary focus that the individual subject has on a particular Form or groupings of Forms. This does not mean, Hutchinson rightly emphasizes, that there is some spatial or temporal sequence present within the noetic realm; on the contrary, it is all a simultaneous, eternal, all-encompassing spiritual gaze, but in the case of human intellects the awareness of the whole intelligible net of Forms is, as it were, in the background, while certain particular aspects of this net appear more in the forefront. This presentation can be juxtaposed with the recent, also excellent, work of Damien Caluori.[18] The latter focuses, however, not on consciousness, but on the ontology of the soul, and this difference of – *nomen omen* – perspective leads both scholars to slightly different conclusions. Distancing himself quite nicely from Caluori's position on the matter, Hutchinson's presentation seems to be even clearer than Caluori's and has more explanatory power in terms of Hutchinson's project.

The chapter ends with a brief description of the views of Descartes, Locke, and Sartre on consciousness, which is a nice reminder of the author's attempt to purify, in a somewhat Plotinian vein, the modern self-limitations in thinking about consciousness. Here I have two reservations.

Descartes has traditionally been seen as, paradoxically enough, the embodiment of the modern view of the self as pure mind divorced from the body and the physical reality of spatially extended things. Sometimes he is even seen as a culprit with respect to the modern sense of alienation from the world and to our self-encapsulation. There is no place in the present review for a more detailed discussion, but I do not think that what is implied in the "Inner Theatre Model",

[17] See A.H. Armstrong, *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus: An Analytical and Historical Study*, Cambdrige 1967, 79-80 and P. Kalligas, "Forms of Individuals in Plotinus: A Re-Examination", *Phronesis* 42, 2 (1997) 206-227.

[18] D. Caluori, *Plotinus On the Soul*, Cambridge 2015.

as Hutchinson calls it, that is, the separation of the mind from its cognitive objects, is what we really find in Descartes' epistemology. In his *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, in the first chapter of the third meditation, Descartes argues that the externally existing physical things should not be confused with the contents of our consciousness, because even if physical things did not exist at all, one would still be able to have the same experience of the world. This is so because what we experience in our consciousness is not things in themselves, but their "ideas", which are perhaps similar to things in themselves. And Descartes gives his definition of ideas (including *sensus et imaginationes*) as the "modifications of thinking" (*cogitandi modi*). He concludes that "insofar as they are merely the modifications of thinking, I am sure they exist in me" (*quatenus cogitandi quidam modi tantum sunt, in me esse sum certus*).[19]

Descartes is and has been criticized for his vague terminology, but it seems that there is an intimate connection between the *res cogitans* and its *cogitationes*, which constitute the totality of its experience. The famous split between the mind and the world does not exist within the mind for Descartes – it is precisely between the mind and what is external to it, while the ideas which constitute experience are not external to the mind. On the contrary, as he emphasizes, *in me esse [sc. modos cogitandi] sum certus*. Even though Descartes is not clear on the precise relationship between the thinker and his thoughts, the metaphor of the "Inner Theatre" suggests a greater distance between the observer and the "actors" than we find in Descartes' *Meditationes*, where our experience seems to be intimately close to ourselves, since it consists in modifications of our activity of thinking. Maybe we are not the world, but, certainly, the world is in us, when we experience it. As far as Locke and Sartre go, it seems that their view of consciousness is much more remote from Plotinus.

The second thing is that, at the very end, the author criticizes Christopher Gill's claim that the modern view of subjectivity has been imposed on antiquity, especially because of the popularity of Michel Foucault's musings about ancient practical philosophy, to the effect of obfuscating the meaning of terms such as "self" and "person". Hutchinson in his brief polemics tries to downplay Gill's objections, by pointing out, very reasonably, that what Gill is fighting is not the very idea of individual subjectivity, but rather its anachronistic and unconscious projection onto ancient culture.

[19] https://www.thelatinlibrary.com/descartes/des.med2.shtml, accessed 10/1/2019.

Gill is describing two competing models which he calls subjective-individual and object-participant views of the self.[20] The first is, obviously, dear to us, emphasizing the autonomy and self-reliance of the sovereign self, which is absorbed in its own internal life. Gill associates this model particularly with Descartes, a move about which I have my reservations, but it is hard to deny that the general outlook of modernity is based on what he calls the subjective-individual concept of the self. Gill argues that this concept of the self was not the view of any ancient philosopher or poet, even though we tend to read this concept into the literature of, particularly, the Imperial period.

The second model, objective-participant, is *the* ancient view of the self as a part of the human community, with identity grounded in the moral law and in duties towards others and towards the whole *polis*. It is not the internal life that is here paramount, but rather the interaction of the internal with the external. I do not think that Gill's concerns are to be overlooked, but, again, the problem seems to be that Hutchinson is focusing on individuality in a different sense than Gill. Hutchinson writes about the individuality of the subject of consciousness at the noetic level, which has nothing to do with the subjective-individual or objective-participant views of the self; Gill is writing about a "thicker" meaning of the self (using Sorabji's terms), including personality and the whole dianoetic level of existence. I do not say that in Plotinus there is no link between the individuality of intellect in the noetic realm and the personal life of emotions, desires, and opinions at the embodied, sensible level, but this is an area which has not been explored in Hutchinson's book. It has to be noted that the relationship between Plotinus and modernity is not the focus of the book; those controversies only show the contemporary relevance and importance of its subject.

Chapter Two ("Consciousness Terms") is a short discussion of the Greek words used by Plotinus to refer to consciousness. Here Hutchinson continues the existing work of Warren, Blumenthal, Violette, O'Daly, and most recently Remes, by pointing out the four terms used by Plotinus to talk about consciousness: *antilepsis*, *parakolouthesis*, *sunaisthesis*, and *sunesis*. The chapter is excellent, and definitions are precise. Hutchinson also offers English terms for the Greek terminology of Plotinus: *antilepsis* is "apprehension", a mediated form of consciousness, grasping objects by means of images;

[20] See C. Gill, *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy*, Oxford 1996, 1-18 and also his *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought*, Oxford 2006, 328-344.

parakolouthesis is "consciousness", a mediated and dualistic form of consciousness (when we read and, at the same time, think about the fact that we read); both *sunaisthesis* and *sunesis* are rendered "awareness"; the first of these is the unifying consciousness of one's parts and activities, the second, "the most honorific of the terms" (as Hutchinson points out), is a non-discursive, direct intuition connected to love and beauty.

In Chapter Three ("First Layer: The Soul-Trace"), the author deals with the lowest form of consciousness, connected to the power of the soul which is immersed in the body. He discusses close relations between an objective phenomenon of *sumpatheia* in the universe and its subjective correlate, *sunaisthesis*, about which he says, "the most basic form of consciousness in the sensible world is an awareness of the bodily parts that belong to oneself". Hutchinson points out that this form of consciousness is also shared by animals.

The next chapter ("Second-Layer: The Lower Soul") is focused on *antilepsis*, on the "dianoetic apprehension", which makes us aware of three realms of experience: (1) affective states, (2) intentional activities (sense-perceptions, thoughts), and (3) the activity of Intellect. The main part of the chapter is devoted to imagination. This is the most original and important contribution of Hutchinson to Plotinian literature and, more generally, to the literature on ancient philosophy. He argues that in Plotinus imagination is not simply a power of making internal images of sensible objects. It is a far deeper concept. Practically, imagination in the *Enneads* is a power of "representational awareness". Hutchinson shows that for Plotinus perception, as a registration of some external impact on sense organs, is sharply distinguished from the purely spiritual power of the soul which, as a result of this impact, becomes aware of images of external objects. In general, Plotinian images arising within the power of imagination are much more "spiritual" than "sensible"; they resemble thoughts, not things, even in the case of the lowest form of apprehension, that of sense-perceptions. Actually, it seems that here we can find a meeting point between Descartes' theory of consciousness and "ideas" and the Plotinian one. In the latter, imagination is closely connected to the noetic level, because imagination is a mediated contemplation of the Forms. Hutchinson emphasizes the very interesting claim of Plotinus that sense-perception seems to come very close to reasoning, not being a distinct power, in the first place, but deriving "its ability to judge by drawing on discursive reason" (p. 95).

In this chapter we also have a very good discussion of the *logoi*, the "unfolded" images of the Forms, which are activated during the process of sense-perception and which mediate between, on the one

hand, the external things that come into contact with the sense organs, and, on the other hand, the internal qualities of images apprehended. The *logoi* are intellectual measures or standards (*kanones*) through which we perceive the sensible images. Hutchinson's treatment of imagination consequently moves towards the conclusion that Plotinus' concept of imagination goes far beyond what we find in Aristotle; and as an awareness of a whole range of bodily and psychic activities, it is a most interesting model of imagination.

Hutchinson shows how the "unfolding" of the *logoi* at the objective level (the Forms and the material beings) takes place at the subjective level of apprehension, while the *logoi* present in the soul unfold into definitional statements about apprehended images. In both cases it is about unfolding something simple and unified at the noetic level into something multiple at a lower level.

Hutchinson discusses only very briefly (pp. 111-112) *Enn*. 5.1.12, where Plotinus mentions the *aisthesis* of the "voices from above", that is, the noetic realities. The author rightly points out that Plotinus means here "imaginative" apprehension by *aisthesis*, but what is unsatisfactory about this discussion is that Hutchinson does not deal with a significant problem of this chapter and some other places in the *Enneads*, where Plotinus suggests that we can either be aware or not aware of the highest part of our soul, which lives in the noetic realm and doesn't descend. The whole theory of the fall of the soul is built on the assumption that our true identity and what is "up there" escapes our awareness; but how is this possible, since, as Hutchinson himself demonstrates very accurately, awareness is inherent in the noetic realm, and its degree is much higher than in our daily activity at the dianoetic level? In other words, how is it possible that we are not aware of our intellects, if our intellects are inherently self-aware and aware of the divine Intellect at the same time? How can all this light go unnoticed?

Hutchinson inclines towards the Plotinian distinction in 5.1.12 that something can reach either "the whole of our soul" (through *aisthesis*), or a part of it. But if so, it seems that there is some split in the individual subject of experience. Is the "I" which is aware by intellect of the noetic realm the same "I" which is fallen and completely oblivious to it? Or are there two "I's"? It is easier to talk about the objective soul, which can be partially or totally aware of something, than it is to face the subjective "I" here, whose split into two endangers the whole Plotinian model of the purification and return to the One. It is a pity that Hutchinson did not devote more time to clarify his position on this subject.

The author also discusses *parakolouthesis* as the "weakest" form of consciousness in Plotinus that impedes activity: the more I am conscious right now that I am writing, the more difficult it becomes, because my attention is split; I can be perfectly aware of the screen, my hands, and what I am writing without thinking that I am doing it. Hutchinson points out that, surprisingly, Plotinus ascribes this sort of consciousness to Intellect, which is completely atemporal and non-discursive in its activity. However, Hutchinson demonstrates that this is not the same kind of consciousness, even though the term *parakolouthesis* is used. Plotinus claims that Intellect always thinks that it thinks, but not in the same manner as we can. The first-order and second-order content of this consciousness at the noetic level is completely united, so there is no impediment or split in Intellect's "attention". Hutchinson also points out that Plotinus here simply wants to emphasize the difference between the qualified simplicity of Intellect and the absolute simplicity of the One.

Towards the end of the chapter, the author discusses the apprehension of noetic activity, as it were, "from below". He points out that imagination or rather what he calls "higher imagination" is able to turn inward and upward and become aware of the noetic activity, without downgrading that activity in any way. The noetic intuition of intellect is self-aware, but we can also be aware through the dianoetic *antilepsis* of intellect, without impeding it, but, running the risk of "spilling it out into sense-perception". Again, the problem of one subject being at the same time aware and not aware of the noetic activity (by two distinct types of awareness) is not discussed by Hutchinson at any length.

Chapter Five ("Third Layer: The Higher Soul") focuses on the noetic level of consciousness or the individual intellect, never fallen, but always living within the divine Intellect. As I have already mentioned, the core of Hutchinson's interpretation of the higher soul lies in its identification with the individual intellect whose individuality is rooted in contemplating the noetic world from a particular point of view and under a certain aspect. In this chapter, the author elaborates on the implications of the ontological and epistemological individuality of the human noetic self. He criticizes Eric Perl for blurring the distinction between the divine, universal Intellect and the human intellect.[21] For Hutchinson it is too far to say that, for Plotinus, in the act

[21] E. Perl, "The Togetherness of Thought and Being: A Phenomenological Reading of Plotinus' Doctrine That the Intelligibles Are Not Outside the Intellect", in *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 22 (2006) 1-26.

of *noesis* or union with the divine Intellect, the human higher soul simply becomes Intellect's own consciousness of its own self and the Forms.

Hutchinson tries to elucidate the language of union and unity, which is used by Plotinus to speak about the human intellect's participation in the noetic realm. The author refers to Aristotle's concept of numerical identity as a way to understand what it means for the human noetic self to *become* or to *be* Intellect. Hutchinson points out that in the noetic act the human intellect (or any kind of intellect, for that matter) and its object (which can be the totality of the Forms or the whole real Being) are in a sense "one thing", but he insists that there is still a "sufficient degree of otherness" (p. 133) if there is to be thinking or *noesis* at all. The subject of intuitive thought has to be directed towards something, and there has to be some real kind of distinction between the subject and the object, even though it is not a separation or a split of subject and object into two "things", which we experience in our fallen, embodied experience. Hutchinson rejects Sorabji's conclusions that the full identity of subject and object in the noetic act postulates a thinking which is not intentional, which has no "aboutness".[22] Hutchinson quotes Plotinus to demonstrate convincingly that intuitive thought certainly is "of something", and it possesses a positive content distinct from the subject of the thought.

This line of interpretation also leads the author to question Ian Crystal's claim that for Plotinus there are no real parts in Intellect[23]; Hutchinson points out that there certainly are parts, if only we understand the difference between the divisions we encounter in the material realm on the one hand and the subtle distinctions inherent in Intellect on the other. Hutchinson shows that if we are to think of any internal structure of Intellect, we have to accept that there is otherness and distinctions, both between the intellect and its objects, and between different noetic objects; such distinctions do not compromise the profound unity of this "holistic, transparent system" (p. 134). The rejection of any otherness would essentially eliminate the Platonic theory of ideas as well as Aristotle's theology and psychology, which Plotinus tries to incorporate into his own conception of Intellect.

[22] R. Sorabji, "Why the Neoplatonists Did Not Have Intentional Objects of Intellection", in D. Perler (ed.), *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality*, Leiden 2001, 105-114.

[23] See I. Crystal, "Plotinus on the Structure of Self-Intellection", *Phronesis* 43, 1 (1998) 264-286.

Another important point of the chapter is the inherent self-awareness of intellect in the act of *noesis*. Even though Plotinus uses *parakolouthesis* here to point out that intellect not only thinks the Forms, but thinks that it thinks, he does not suggest in the least any duality or separation, as is present in the lower, embodied forms of *parakolouthesis*. On the other hand, Plotinus, as Hutchinson shows, tries to emphasize very strongly that it would be absurd to assume that noetic activity could not be self-aware and self-transparent to its subject (quoting *Enn*. 2.9.1). Hutchinson points out that the view that reflexive awareness and thinking are two things and that the first can compromise or limit the other, is a modern bias (but, again, not Descartes' view). He suggests that for Plotinus awareness is not only inseparable from intuitive thinking, but that *noesis* is a kind of awareness (*sunaisthesis*, 5.3.13), so "Intellect is as much a primary awareness as it is a primary thinker" (p. 137).

Finally, Hutchinson briefly discusses the awareness of the One (*sunesis*). He reminds readers of the basic framework for the mystical experience of the One's presence, which is the removal of all otherness, because the One is totally simple. He claims, however, that Plotinus does not explain how the philosopher attempting union with the One can remove otherness and that the reason for this failure to explain is the inadequacy of discursive thinking or language to describe such a process. We can experience that the removal of otherness, but we cannot describe it. The argument for the inexpressibility of mystical states is, it seems to me, too often used as a reason for not trying to understand mystical experiences in philosophy. It is as if the first chapter of Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit* about "Sense certainty" had never been written, while the same case for inexpressibility could be made for any sense-experience, like sex or riding a bicycle, to someone who has never experienced anything of the sort.

The inexpressibility of the One's nature stems, of course, from its simplicity, which escapes the predicative structure of our discursive thinking and our language (just as the "richness" of sense-experience escapes inevitably, as Hegel shows, the same predicative structure), but Plotinus tries to describe the removal of otherness or the way to the One in several places. Of course, there is the famous metaphor of "waiting for the sun to rise above the horizon" (5.5), which evokes passive receptivity, but Plotinus also clearly says that the way to enter the presence of the One is to turn attention away from all particular, limited objects of awareness, sensory or noetic, and remain in a state of awareness without objects, where there is only the eye of awareness which does not look at anything. This is already

similar to the simplicity of the One and is the last step before union occurs. In 6.9.7 Plotinus says that after losing the awareness of sensory and noetic objects, the last step is also losing the awareness of the sense of "I", which seems to remain even after all objects are let go of. The real problem at the frontier between Intellect and the One does not lie in the weakness of thought or language, but in a paradox: How to become free from all particular acts and become simple, if any effort to become free and simple is another particular act separating us from the simplicity of the One?

In general, Hutchinson's description of the One's awareness and the human experience of it is certainly too short and unsatisfactory, in comparison to what we find earlier in the book. Some spiritual exercises are described which can be quite adequately analyzed with the conceptual framework proposed by Hutchinson. The mystical silence which falls on this subject in the book may leave the reader with a sense of frustration and disappointment.

The last chapter ("Self-determination") is rather loosely connected to the rest of the monograph. One might even think that the whole book could do without it. Here Hutchinson introduces the problem of the will and freedom, which in itself seems to be one of the crucial contributions of Plotinus. In the meantime, Hutchinson deals with a popular misinterpretation of the Plotinian metaphor of "sleeping Nature"; in this metaphor, the contemplative activity of Nature or its level of consciousness is compared to someone asleep, which in the Platonic tradition of course, is not a good thing to say about anyone's level of awareness. But Hutchinson rightly points to the context of this metaphor. Plotinus is a very practical writer, and his treatises are not a systematic exposition of doctrine, but rather discussions of specific problems, usually arising from discussion at school. So Plotinus speaks about a "sleeping" Nature only to compare her level of awareness to the high, intense forms of consciousness, such as Intellect or Soul-hypostasis. We might add that in comparison to the fallen human awareness it is a pretty advanced state, if the whole visible cosmos is experienced within Nature's consciousness as her beautiful dream – an image that was so dear to the early Romantic followers of Plotinus, most notably Schelling and Coleridge.

But the chapter, as I said, is about the human will. Hutchinson presents Plotinus' view of providence and fate and his use of the topos of the *theatrum mundi*. In the end, the author shows that the free will, choice, or freedom in Plotinus are closely connected with consciousness, but this chapter is not, like the rest of the book, about various forms of consciousness. In the conclusion, Hutchinson sums up his

work: Plotinus' view of consciousness is much richer than the post-Cartesian and modern one. Most interesting is that in those last pages Hutchinson emphasizes the moral, regulative aspect of the noetic realm, or the third layer, as he calls it in the book. What could be emphasized even more is the epistemic or, in fact, contemplative significance of the third layer, where we not only find eternal moral rules, but also experience the presence of the divine Being(s) in an intimate, loving, and transformative way. Philosophy for Plotinus is a soteriological and therapeutic enterprise, aiming at liberation from evil and attaining the "easy life of the gods" (*Enn*. 5.8.4). I am not sure why this dimension is somehow omitted by Hutchinson. Perhaps it is because mysticism and contemplation are still suspicious areas in the serious realm of the philosophy of consciousness and mind. But the whole book questions this assumption and points out that the modern philosophy of consciousness is limiting itself to a very narrow view of the phenomenon.

All in all, the book is excellent and will certainly become a standard interpretation of Plotinus' view of consciousness for years to come. I think that, apart from its inherent value as a study of one aspect of the Plotinian philosophy, Danny Hutchinson's monograph will open up new possibilities of research in at least two fields. One is spiritual exercises, contemplation, mysticism, and the whole transformative and soteriological dimension of Plotinus. Here I expect that the clarity of this presentation will certainly influence the study of those topics and provide scholars with useful intellectual and interpretive instruments.

Another field is Augustinian studies, especially, Augustine's Neoplatonism and his appropriation of Plotinus in the early and the middle period of his philosophical activity. When I was reading Hutchinson's book, I had a recurring thought that this is the Plotinus whom Augustine found so fascinating and useful for building his Christian philosophical anthropology and epistemology. We are not sure, obviously, to what extent Augustine knew the *Enneads* as a whole, and Plotinus is not a systematic, coherent thinker, but there are certain aspects of Plotinus' view of contemplation which Augustine chose to reject, usually just silently omitting them. As Philip Cary demonstrated, this is, obviously, the Aristotelian concept of the identity of the subject and object in the act of knowledge, elaborated by Plotinus in his view of Intellect.[24] Augustine sticks to the traditionally

[24] See P. Cary, *Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self. The Legacy of a Christian Platonist*, New York 2000, 31-60.

Platonic language of seeing (but also hearing, touching, etc.) God and participating in him, carefully avoiding the language of union, unity, or identity, which stems, paradoxically, from such an (apparently) non-mystical philosopher as the Stagirite. In this context, it is quite astonishing that even in the *De civitate Dei* Augustine says about Neoplatonic and Christian contemplation of God: *non est nobis ullus cum his philosophis conflictus* (10.2).

By reading Hutchinson one can understand why Augustine would say that. The careful, convincing demonstration of how Plotinus maintains the individuality of the human intellect, which, at the same time, participates in and becomes integrated into the divine Intellect, while remaining ontologically and even, to some extent, experientially distinct from it, is what should interest Augustinian scholars who deal with Augustine's Neoplatonism. Even the fact that Hutchinson downplays the union with the One in his analyses has an Augustinian ring to it, given that the disappearance of any otherness between the human subject and the One in the highest mystical state was certainly a serious problem for the bishop of Hippo (which he chose, by the way, not to criticize but to treat as nonexistent). Another possibility might be that Augustine simply did not read *Enn*. 6.9 at all, where this unity is emphasized in the strongest fashion, but then we would have to assume that he had also never even *heard* of this particular aspect of Plotinus' mysticism, which seems to me highly unlikely.

Another aspect which might and should be of interest to Augustinian scholars is Hutchinson's contribution to our understanding of Plotinus' concept of imagination. This very broad use of imagination as a power of awareness, integrating both the sensible and intellectual experience of reality and giving it a personal, integrated quality, brings immediately to mind what Augustine did to the notion of memory. Just as Plotinus stretched the Aristotelian imagination to speak about personal, embodied consciousness as a whole, Augustine stretched the meaning of memory and remembering, incorporating into it, for example, an interesting concept of "remembering the present" as well as integrating sensible and intelligible aspects of memory. As Chadwick suggests in his translation of the *Confessions*, in many contexts *memoria* should be rendered as "consciousness" rather than "memory" in order to convey Augustine's meaning.[25]

[25] Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. H. Chadwick, Oxford 2008. Especially, in book ten, chapters 35-37.

This is intriguingly close to what Plotinus did, as Hutchinson shows in his book. One can note that Augustine goes a step further in that he tends to equate *memoria* with *animus* and *animus* with *ego*, which personalizes consciousness to the degree of identifying it with the human self. Plotinus draws a clear line between the human subject and the "imaginative" type of awareness, since the latter is embodied, while the true self is not. But, again, one can see why Augustine would not accept such a view. It would therefore be worthwhile to consider the possibility of influence exercised by Plotinus on Augustine in this regard or at least the possibility of inspiration. And it would be interesting to study parallel to the efforts of these two great Platonists to give a rich and complex theory of human consciousness, which is quite refreshing in the reductionist, modern atmosphere of the "philosophy of the mind". In the contemporary study of consciousness, both the Plotinian, multilayered, and multifaceted structure of human consciousness, reaching from the animal to the divine, as well as the Augustinian *aula ingens* (*conf.* 10.8.14), that immense palace of consciousness-memory, where God can be found, are reduced to a rather cramped room.

Mateusz Stróżyński

JORGENSON, Chad, *The Embodied Soul in Plato's Later Thought* (Cambridge Classical Studies), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2018, x + 217 p.

This beautifully printed book is the result of a dissertation written under the supervision of Filipp Karfik, University of Fribourg, subsidized by a Swiss National Foundation project, "The Embodied Soul: The Constitution of the Ethical Subject in Plato's Later Thought" (01 November 2010-31 October 2013). It begins with the appropriate words, "The *Phaedo* casts a long shadow" (p. 1), and starts from the thesis that, whereas we have a separation between body and soul in the middle dialogues and especially in the *Phaedo*, "[…] in the late dialogues Plato ties the soul more closely to Becoming" (p. 197). This is a reading that stands in contrast to the reading of Plotinus: "Whereas Plotinus stays faithful to the line advanced in the *Phaedo* that our ultimate goal, as humans, consists in the absolute separation of the soul from the body, in Plato we find a general shift away from the metaphor of contamination and purification of the *Phaedo* (pp. 92-93)". The footnote indicates Plotinus, *Enn.*I.4 [16], where

Plato is mentioned on line 10, and *Enn*.VI.8.5, where it is rather hard to see a direct influence of Plato's *Phaedo*. (Perhaps it is a misprint for *Enn*.IV.8.5, 4: *[…] kai to en kakô(i) tô(i) somati einai*).

The book consists of seven loosely connected chapters that try to elucidate this thesis: "*Thymos*" (pp. 6-38), "Appetitive Soul" (pp. 39-59), "Rational Soul" (pp. 60-87), "Measuring Pleasure" (pp. 88-117), "*Eudaimonia*" (pp. 118-140), "The Political Sphere" (pp. 141-163), and "Eschatology" (pp. 164-190). These chapters present a "reconstruction, within my own historical and cultural horizons, of some of the principal currents of thought running through the later dialogues" (p. 5). This reconstruction contains mainly paraphrases of Platonic texts, with discussions of some of the relevant literature, as well as many valuable observations, for example, that the "the therapy of the appetitive soul must be undertaken under the oversight of medicine" (p. 116). The author has himself given a kind of summary in the conclusion (pp. 201-203), and Olivier Renaut has done something similar in his review in *Philosophie Antique* (2019, pp. 178-180), especially by mentioning four forms of mediation between the dualism of body and soul in the *Phaedo*: "le *thymos*, l'immortalité par degré, la politique, les sciences" (p. 179).

If I may be allowed to add three critical remarks: First, there is no summary of the *status questionis* of the confusing secondary literature on this topic, nor any formulation of the remaining open questions. Such a summary would have been a laborious task for the author of the dissertation, but helpful for the reader. Second, the book lacks any comparisons to other conceptions of the "embodied" or "buried" (cf. *Grg*. 493a; *Crat*. 400c) or "imprisoned soul" (cf. *Phd*. 62b), e.g., in Aristotle or Descartes/Brentano (cf., e.g., "Plato as Teacher of Socrates?" In: Tulli, Mauro, Erler, Michael, *Plato in Symposium: Selected Papers from the Tenth Symposium Platonicum*, Academia Verlag, St. Augustin 2016, pp. 443-448).

Third, the main thesis of the book that "in the late dialogues Plato ties the soul more closely to Becoming" (p. 197) seems to be on the one hand true, but on the other hand counterbalanced by the "climax" of the *Timaeus*. It is true that Plato ties the soul more to the body, for example, in the conception of a mixed life in the *Philebus* as the choiceworthy life for human beings (*Phlb*. 21d3). Here the author makes the following interesting remark: "In the rejection of the life of pure thought as not choiceworthy, it is difficult not to hear the echo of a question many readers of the *Phaedo* have no doubt asked themselves about the ideal life of philosophy portrayed there" (p. 124, note 22). Perhaps even Plato has asked himself the question

of whether Socrates' life devoted to philosophy is not a one-sided life when he mentions Socrates' dream: "Socrates, practice and cultivate the arts (*mousikên poei ka ergazou*)" (*Phd*. 60e6-7). But surely the Socrates of the *Philebus* deviates from the Socrates of the *Phaedo* when the former gives the "gold medal" to the orderly mixed life of pleasure and reason, but only the "silver medal" to reason, and the "bronze medal" to pleasure as far it is pure (cf. *Phlb*. 67a-c). In the *Timaeus*, living creatures including the heavenly bodies have their bodies "bound by the ties of soul (*desmois te empsychois sômata dethenta zôa*)" (*Ti*. 38c5), and the whole corporeal world is fashioned within the world soul. In general, one can say that the tripartite soul, for the first time explicitly formulated in the *Republic* (cf. 436a-443a), is an embodied soul. Nevertheless, in the climax of the *Timaeus*, the "*homoiôsis theô(i)*" in the sense of a *homoiôsis noô(i)* is resumed (cf. *Ti*. 90d4-9) and even declared as the "aim" (*telos*) (*Ti*. 90d5) of human beings, which when achieved would be "that most excellent life offered to humankind by the gods, both now and forevermore" (*Ti*. 90d5-7). In the *Laws*, we even read that "union (*koinonia*) of body and soul is no way better than separation (*dialysis*), speaking seriously" (*Lg*. 828d4-5) and further:

> Now we must believe the legislator when he tells us that the soul is in all respects different to the body, and that even in life what makes each one of us to be what we are is only the soul; and that the body follows us about as a reflection (*indallomenon)* of each of us, and therefore, when we are dead, the bodies of the dead are quite rightly said to be our images *(eidôla*); for the true and immortal being of each one of us *(ton de onta hemôn hekaston ontôs)* which is called the soul goes on her way to other Gods (*allous theous*), before them to give an account – which is an inspiring hope to the good, but very terrible to the bad, as the laws of our fathers tell us (*Lg*. 959a4-b6. Transl. Jowett with modifications by R.F.).

The expression "other Gods" (*Lg*. 959b4) we find in the *Phaedo*, 63b7, as well as that the true self of Socrates is the soul (cf. *Phd*. 115c6-d6). Although the definition of man as "a soul" is explicitly mentioned only in the *Alcibiades Maior* (cf. 130c1-3), the remark "what makes each one of us to be what we are is only the soul" shows that the real human being is identified with the soul.

This means that even if Plato ties the soul in the later dialogues more to the body, he still adheres in the *Timaeus* to the separation of the soul from the body as far it is possible for humans, and in the *Laws* to the soul as a separated entity whose union with the body is in no way better than separation. In this sense, the *Phaedo* has already

"cast a shadow" in the *Corpus Platonicum*, although the Athenian does not quote verbatim "the Socrates in the *Phaedo*" (Aristotle. *GC* B9.335b10-14; cf. *Pol*. B.1261a6). Plato's concern with the relation between body and soul, as has been claimed by Arius Didymus, is perhaps rather "*polyphônos*, and not *polydoxos*, as some suppose" (Stobaeus 2.55.5-7, Ed. Wachsmuth).

Rafael Ferber

JOSEPH, P.V., *An Indian Trinitarian Theology of Missio Dei: Insights from St. Augustine and Brahmabandhab Upadhyay* (American Society of Missiology Monograph Series 39), Pickwick Publications, Eugene (Oregon) 2019, 246 p.

The goal of the ASM Series is to make scholarly works in the field of missiology accessible to a wider audience. *An Indian Trinitarian Theology of Missio Dei* is a monograph by Palolil Varghese Joseph, Professor of Theology and Mission Studies at the New Theological College, Dehradun, India. The book provides an excellent window into the development of Trinitarian and Indian Christian theology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In five chapters, the author analyses the rehabilitation of the Trinitarian doctrine, discusses the Trinitarian theologies of Augustine and Brahmabandhab Upadhyay, and concludes with a proposal for an Indian Trinitarian Theology of *Missio Dei*. Although the author develops missiological theology from an Indian perspective, this study places him in a long line of theologians who have tried to highlight the relevance of the doctrine of the Trinity in the mission of the church. In the introduction, Joseph argues that Upadhyay was successful in articulating a balanced Trinitarian theology that respects the tension between the immanent and economic Trinity by using his reinterpretation of the *Advaita Vedanta* of Shankara, especially the concept of *saccidānanda*. Joseph further remarks that the first traces of the notion of mission as Trinitarian activity in the world can be found in Augustine, thus accounting for his decision to draw the bishop of Hippo into a conversation with Upadhyay. Joseph argues that despite their different backgrounds, the Trinitarian thinking of Augustine and Upadhyay can be harmonised to develop an Indian theology of *missio Dei*.

In the first chapter, Joseph's goal is to briefly analyse the historical and theological significance of the renewal of Trinitarian theology in the post- Enlightenment period. Within this framework of

innovative Trinitarian thinking that marked Christian theology, he charts the subsequent shift in how Christian mission came to be perceived. Against an *ecclesiocentric* understanding of mission, Joseph demonstrates how a Trinitarian conception underlines mission as God's activity and reaffirms the church's part in this enterprise. Chapter two provides an overview of the development of Indian Christian theology and the notion of mission in the Indian context. Joseph defends the contextualisation of theology, which alone, according to him, can truly respect local religious and cultural traditions, thus supporting the church's mission endeavour. On the whole, I appreciated the first two chapters where Joseph provides a succinct analysis of pivotal thinkers and movements that contributed to the subject at hand. This, I believe, has laid a strong foundation for the entire project.

Brahmabandhab Upadhyay was many things at once. He was a convert Christian, a pioneer of Indian Christian theology, a Christian monk, a highly influential teacher, and a journalist. After outlining Upadhyay's life and influences, chapter three discusses his Trinitarian theology in similar vein to the previous chapters. It begins with an analysis of *saccidānanda* and progresses to Upadhyay's reinterpretation of the philosophical notion, which presents an indigenised version of the Trinitarian doctrine. Upadhyay used the *Advaita* concept of Brahman as *saccidānanda* to draw an analogy with the inner Trinitarian life. First, the concept allows for the distinction between what God is in himself and what God is for his creation. Second, for Upadhyay, the manner in which *Sat* (Being), *Cit* (Intelligence), and *Ānanda* (Bliss) function within Brahman can be compared to the personal relation within the Trinity; the three persons are distinct, but at the same time interconnected. Thus, Upadhyay underscores the personal and relational nature of the Christian God, addresses local sensibilities, and furthers the advance of Christian mission in India. It would appear that there is a paradox here. Whilst Joseph points out that Upadhyay's dependence on Sanskrit philosophical notions to flesh out his ideas overlooks those who are not part of the majority Hindu population, he persists with Upadhyay as a foil to develop an Indian mission theology. That being said, he justifies this choice by detaching the Sanskrit tradition, and thereby Upadhyay, from the oppressive and problematic Brahminicalism. The question is whether such an argument to support this theologising process helps in creating a sense of inclusivity for all, especially those who have been on the receiving end of oppressive and discriminatory religious systems.

The fourth chapter treats the Trinitarian underpinning of *missio Dei*. With a study devoted to Augustine's *De Trinitate*, Joseph tries to establish that the concept of *missio Dei* is rooted in the bishop's Trinitarian theology. At first glance, the author's decision to choose one particular *oeuvre* from Augustine's vast corpus would appear to be an oversight. However, I feel that his choice is legitimized given that he does not try to channel the bishop's Trinitarian thinking into a certain category, nor does he attempt to make any definitive claim about Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity. Furthermore, in a compact volume such as this one, it would be impossible to analyse all of Augustine's works that are permeated by his thoughts on the Trinity. In the first part of the chapter, Joseph analyses Augustine's understanding of theophanies. He argues that, for Augustine, divine theophanies were not appearances of the pre-incarnate Christ. By quoting from and comparing with early Christian texts, Joseph unveils the intention behind Augustine's shift from earlier tradition regarding Christological interpretations of the theophanies. He clarifies that this rupture from the traditional standpoint was Augustine's polemical strategy against the Arians, who used Christological interpretations to support their subordinationist claims. In the next part, Joseph focuses the chapter on three key ideas: incarnation, Pentecost, and *missio Dei*. Augustine establishes that the incarnation and Pentecost were divine missions in which all three persons of the Trinity were equally active. They were missions of reconciliation to the world that principally revealed the inner Trinitarian life, especially the unity and equality of the three persons. For Augustine, it is this *missio Dei*, laden with divine revelation, that sets up the economy of salvation. In a sense, Joseph has two objectives in this chapter: first, to establish the theocentric foundation of mission, and second, to make a point against modern mission theologies that find their starting point in human experiences and contexts. Personally, reading this chapter was a delight, as it is well-supplied with notes and references to other patristic texts and secondary sources that nuance the arguments presented.

After reasserting arguments from the earlier chapters, Joseph sheds light on the relevance of the Trinitarian doctrine for *missio Dei* in the fifth and final chapter. Using Augustine, he argues that the church constitutes a Trinitarian reality, thereby validating its participation in God's mission. Such an ecclesiological understanding is a critique on two levels: it questions indigenous church movements that attach a merely symbolic role to the church in mission, as well as their partisan pneumatological understanding of mission. Upadhyay and Augustine's relational understanding of the Trinity calls for a fresh

understanding of mission, as something Trinitarian and essentially relational. In a next step, the interrelationship and love of the Trinity serve a social model that human beings are called to replicate in the world, especially in the midst of marginalised groups such as the Dalit and Tribal communities, which have long suffered at the hands of the religious aristocracy. Furthermore, Joseph reads divine economy manifested in the incarnation as a sign of Trinitarian dialogue with creation. He argues that the church's participation in *missio Dei* must be built on the foundations of dialogue with human life and context. I regard this chapter as a success on two fronts: first, Joseph is successful in developing an Indian Trinitarian mission theology; second, his arguments have a wider applicability, going beyond the Indian context which he has in mind.

In general, this work has great clarity, and there is a flow to the subject presentation which makes it pleasant to read. To say that there is a repetition of certain ideas throughout the work is not a criticism, but rather a comment on the stylistic character of the book. Regardless, the work is well structured and provides valuable insights. In a sense, the monograph validates the efforts of indigenous theologians, such as Upadhyay, all around the world and demonstrates how their ideas can be used to address challenges faced by the church in its mission endeavours even now. I feel that the book will be meaningful not only to students of theology but to all those interested in a general understanding of the Trinitarian dogma and Indian Christian theology.

Aashu Alexander Mattackal

KANTZER KOMLINE, Han-Luen, *Augustine on the Will: A Theological Account* (Oxford Studies in Historical Theology), Oxford University Press, Oxford 2020, 464 p.

Augustine's understanding of the will is a subject usually treated by more philosophically interested readers, whose primary concern has been to locate him within the landscape of other ancient and late antique views of what the will is and how it operates. In her *Augustine on the Will: A Theological Account*, a well-revised version of her dissertation, Han-Luen Kantzer Komline brings the perspective and voice of a theologian to the conversation. Her distinctive contribution is to show how Augustine's account of the will is, according to key scriptural events, "theologically differentiated" into the created, fallen, redeemed, and eschatological wills. Consciously blending

chronological and thematic approaches, each of the eight chapters takes on a theme related to Augustine's notion of the will and focuses on a discrete period of his life in loose chronological order.

Following an introduction to previous literature and her operative methodology, the book's first chapter analyzes the created will in Augustine's pre-391 works. The human will (*uoluntas*) is a *motus mentis*, a free movement of the mind for which the human agent is morally responsible. The early Augustine espoused a view of the will as "powerful, autonomous, and active" (56). It is a hinge (*cardo*) by which human persons are free to turn towards good or evil. Though it is typical to ascribe to Augustine's literary corpus a shift from bearing a philosophical orientation to a more exegetical or theological approach, Han-Luen Kantzer Komline contends that Augustine's account of *uoluntas* was both theological and exegetical from the beginning. However, his early view falls short of his later theological precision.

Han-Luen Kantzer Komline addresses in the second chapter the tension between the early Augustine's powerful will and how the will actually seems to function in experience and according to Scripture. In the writings from his ordination through his early priesthood, she tracks the development of Augustine's gradually more intense understanding of the fall's effect on the will. The powerful self-directed will gives way to the post-Gen. 3 fallen will that prevents people from turning to God without God's intervention. The fallen will is as a link in the chain (*ansula catenae*) by which humans are held captive to their sin.

The subjects of the third and fourth chapters are Augustine's developing views, during the Pelagian controversy, of the human and divine parts in human willing, respectively. From beginning to end, Augustine attributed to God a necessary role in good human willing, but by the end of his life God's agency functions as both a necessary and sufficient condition. Han-Luen Kantzer Komline breaks Augustine's engagement with the Pelagians into three periods: (1) 411-417, (2) 417-426, and (3) 426-430. First, Augustine describes the Christian's *uoluntas bona* as within the power of the human agent. He characterizes God's assistance as indirect: God provides knowledge of the good and discloses it as appealing to the person. The second phase leads Augustine to place less stress on the power of the will to bring about proper human willing because God's unmediated agency, as the author of good wills, becomes primary. Finally, from 426 onwards, Augustine asserted that human beings do nothing good in their willing. He excluded the possibility of human resistance to the divine will to save. God works upon the human will directly and independently of the agency of the person.

The fifth chapter explains how Augustine characterizes the redeemed will. In contrast to the hinge of the created will and the chain link of the fallen will, he envisions the redeemed will as a root (*radix*) replanted and nurtured to grow towards God in whom true freedom lies. Augustine's differentiation of the will is his way of reckoning with the numerous co-existing, but distinct images of the biblical text. His description of the redeemed will gives expression to the biblical vision of love, framing it as a participation in God who is love. To Augustine's mind, Pelagius's and Julian of Aeclanum's affirmation of a "universal," "idealized," and "essentialist" notion of the will was a failure to account for Scripture's teaching on the impact of the fall before and after conversion.

The sixth and seventh chapters examine the impact of Christ and the Holy Spirit on the transformation of the human will. Augustine's early implicit affirmation gave way in his later years to a more explicit assertion of Christ's human will. For Augustine, Christ's adoption of a human will made good human willing possible. Christ, more than being an external example, transforms human wills by his internal grace. He unifies the will of his members into a singular, harmonious will. It was by wrestling with the Psalms, the Garden of Gethsemane, and the Lord's Prayer that Augustine arrived at his Christologically informed conception of good human willing. During his engagement with the Pelagians, the relation and interaction of the Holy Spirit to the human will is a topic of increasing concern for Augustine. He gradually comes to specify the Holy Spirit as the causal agent of the divine will in the good human will. His views of the Holy Spirit and human willing are mutually interpreting such that consideration of each sheds light on the other. Insofar as Christ and the Holy Spirit have a formative role in Augustine's account of the will, his view is characteristically Christian, for the will of the creature is defined in relation to the God revealed in Scripture.

The final chapter considers the fourth period of willing, the eschatological will, about which Augustine has the least to say, since it exceeds the realm of present human experience and the Bible offers only limited input. He characterizes the perfected will of the next life as "a fully free will," which exceeds free choice in enjoying delight in willful obedience to God and in being liberated from the experience of concupiscence to which even redeemed wills are subject. He also affirmed its inability to sin as a reward of the redeemed in the afterlife, a sign of the end to sinful desires, an indication that those in heaven praise God eternally by necessity (though without being compelled), and an escalation of true human freedom. Han-Luen Kantzer

Komline frames the gift of the inability to sin as a positive, God-like feature by relating it to God's own freedom and inability to sin. The eschatological will enjoys harmony with the body as it seeks piety and justice and participates in the unending praise of God. Although it remains forever connected to the created, fallen, and redeemed wills by memory, the perfect will also exceeds them all by virtue of these unique features.

In concluding her project, Han-Luen Kantzer Komline highlights Augustine's principal indebtedness to Scripture and earlier Christian authors and describes him as the first to posit a theologically differentiated will, to assert the preeminence of God in its operation, and to connect it to the heart and *caritas*.

Augustine on the Will: A Theological Account is commendable and noteworthy for its historical and disciplinary range, its clarity of organization and prose, and its theological adeptness. Of her many accomplishments, perhaps the greatest is Han-Luen Kantzer Komline's ability to ground Augustine's developing theological account of the will in his ongoing engagement with Scripture. In addition to my deep appreciation for Han-Luen Kantzer Komline's welcome contribution, however, I have a few questions. First, although I share her view that Augustine is concerned more with affirming the biblical vision of the human will than parsing the philosophical particulars, I wonder if her fairly strict division between the will's philosophical and theological aspects, though productive in some respects, is as fully warranted or as useful as the book claims. Second, while her conclusion makes clear her interpretation of Augustine's indebtedness to the earlier Latin Christian tradition, perhaps her treatment would be even more effective if she had more evenly considered biblical, philosophical, and earlier Christian sources? Such consideration may have brought to light more precedent for Augustine's assertion of a differentiated will than Han-Luen Kantzer Komline suggests, such as in Irenaeus, for example. Third, must Augustine's latest writings be read as suggesting such a zero-sum relationship between human and divine willing, as Han-Luen Kantzer Komline asserts (following Patout Burns)? Finally, since Han-Luen Kantzer Komline sought to attend to all the relevant theological corollaries of Augustine's theological account of the will, might she have considered the Church and her sacraments? Notwithstanding these questions, there is much here to be learned by students and experts alike. It is a timely addition to this always interesting conversation.

Alexander H. Pierce

KLITENIC WEAR, Sarah, *Plotinus on Beauty and Reality. A Reader for Enneads I.6 and V.1*, Bolzachy-Carducci Publishers, Mundelein (Illinois) 2017, li + 302 p.

KLITENIC WEAR, Sarah, *Plotinus on Beauty and Reality. A Reader for Enneads I.6 and V.1: Teacher's Guide*, Bolzachy-Carducci Publishers, Mundelein (Illinois) 2017, viii + 131 p.

It can hardly be doubted that Plotinus belongs to that distinguished company of giants of ancient thought. Moreover, the evocative and engaging language in which he expresses himself in the *Enneads* has such great poetic force that few of those initiated into his thought remain unaffected by it. That Plotinus is nonetheless read rather rarely in Greek by students of classics or ancient philosophy is not only due to existing predilections for a selective canon of 'classical' thinkers. Perhaps an even more important reason is that Plotinus' *Enneads* are notoriously difficult to read. This is not just because of their often dialectical character, in which Plotinus' own voice is not always easy to discern, but is also due to his complex and convoluted prose – it is well known that Plotinus, who was a non-native speaker of Greek, suffered from poor eyesight and did not care to correct his texts before circulating them, a defect for which Porphyry's editorial activities have only partially made up.

These considerations should be more than enough reason to welcome this attempt by Sarah Klitenic Wear, a scholar well-known for her publications on Syrianus and Pseudo-Dionysius, to make two of Plotinus' most appealing works – *Ennead* I 6 or *On Beauty*, and V 1, *On the Three Principal Hypastases* – accessible to students, in their original language. The intended readership are indeed students of classics, philosophy, or religion with 'a year of introductory Greek grammar under their belt' (p. ix). To the best of my knowledge, Klitenic Wear is the first to publish a book of this kind for Plotinus. The two texts chosen for this reader are very apt for the purpose indeed: the discussion on beauty in I 6 has a highly protreptic character, taking the reader from considerations about the apparent beauty of sense-objects to the ultimate source of beauty in the One-Good. For readers already familiar with Plato's *Symposium* (and *Phaedrus*), this text may indeed be an excellent gateway to Plotinus' Platonism. The at times rather mystical language with which Plotinus talks about the soul's experience of beauty and its journey to the One has appealed to many generations of readers throughout its reception history and turned this text into one of his most popular works. *Ennead* V 1, in turn, is a classical text in which Plotinus not only discusses the relation

between the three hypostases of Soul, Intellect, and the One, but also and perhaps more importantly tells about the soul's return to its spiritual origin. It contains famous pages in which Plotinus introduces his novel understanding of causation (which tradition has often understood in terms of 'emanation') and notoriously traces back Plotinus' system to Plato's dialogues and to Presocratic thinkers such as Parmenides and Anaxagoras among others.

In the first of the two volumes under review here, Klitenic Wear introduces the *Enneads* with a brief survey of Plotinus' life and philosophy (pp. xv-xxxviii), mainly focusing on the metaphysics of the hypostases and on their epistemological and ethical implications, and ending with a short note on Plotinus' reception and an essential bibliography (pp. xli-xliii and xlv-li). This material is followed by the text of *Enneads* I 6 and V 1, adopted from Henry and Schwytzer's *editio minor* (Oxford 1964-82), with minor modifications. Each chapter of the text is conveniently prefaced with a short introduction, after which the Greek is presented in short portions of text (without critical apparatus), followed by a set of notes. Most of these notes are concerned with grammatical explanations, even though on occasion they also provide references to source texts and parallels or brief philosophical clarifications. In the first three appendices, Klitenic Wear has collected a few additional texts. Diotima's speech from Plato's *Symposium* (210a-211d), which is never far from Plotinus' mind in *Ennead* I 6 (appendix 1), and the famous passage concerning Augustine's 'vision at Ostia' from the *Confessions* (IX 10), which testifies to Plotinus' influence on the great Latin Church Father (appendix 2), receive the same treatment (with short introductions and explanatory notes) as with the main texts presented in this volume. Appendix 3 offers Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus* in Stephen MacKenna's translation (London, 1917-30). A list of Plotinus' technical philosophical vocabulary (appendix 4) and a general word list (appendix 5) complete the first volume. To this the second volume, presented as a *Teacher's Guide* to the first, adds very little. For each stretch of Greek text from *Enneads* I 6 and V 1, the *Guide* provides both a so-called literal translation and the relevant passage from MacKenna's great and inspired translation, which is indeed far from literal, but whose great evocative power and charm capture other important features of Plotinus' prose. The same procedure is repeated for the texts presented in the appendices, where Harold Fowler's translation for the Loeb edition (1925) is provided for the *Symposium* passage, and Edward B. Pusey's translation (Oxford 1876) for the *Confessions*. While no justification is given for the choice of these older translations, one may guess that

copyright issues provide an obvious explanation. For each chapter in the original text a number of 'discussion questions' are also mentioned, and the volume concludes with a very selective list of 'highly recommended works', namely, one or two commentaries for each of the texts discussed and a few general works on Plotinus, nearly all of which were already included in the bibliography of the first volume.[26]

On the whole, Klitenic Wear has turned this first Plotinus Reader into a fairly reliable companion for students who approach Plotinus for the first time in Greek. However, even if in a work like this one could hardly expect the author to deal with Plotinus' philosophy in great detail, a bunch of 'alternative facts' have nonetheless caught my eye in the introduction. For example, Aristotle's *Metaphysics* did not get its title 'one hundred years later' (p. xvi), but only in the first century BC, and Damascius could hardly count as a member of the Alexandrian school of Platonism (as suggested on p. xli). While the grammatical analyses of the *Reader* are certainly not exempt from occasional slips either,[27] it is especially the *Teacher's Guide* which occasioned some puzzlement. Reading it gave me the somewhat voyeuristic feeling of looking over the shoulder of a colleague while she is hastily preparing personal notes for class. It is not immediately clear to me for what purpose the so-called 'literal' translation – I actually doubt whether there can be such a thing – is provided. I wonder whether anyone for whom Klitenic Wear's abundant grammatical explanations and word lists – perhaps combined with one of the excellent Plotinus translations available – do not suffice to understand Plotinus' Greek should be entrusted the task of teaching it to intermediate Greek students. Such a person will hardly fare better with Klitenic Wear's translation. Calling a translation 'literal' usually means

[26] There are only two exceptions: Lloyd Gerson's *Cambridge Companion to Plotinus* (Cambridge 1996) and Stephen Clark's *Plotinus: Myth, Metaphor and Philosophical Practice* (Chicago 2016), but they could easily have been included in the more extensive bibliography of the *Reader*.

[27] I will limit myself to a few examples from the first pages of the commentary on I 6: at 1.6 αὐτό is not a reflexive pronoun (unlike what is said on p. 6), and neither does Klitenic Wear translate it as such in the *Teacher's Guide* on p. 2 ('[this discussion] will show it'); at 1.9 after καλά not εἰσί, but ἐστί should be supplied (p. 7); at 1.11 ἐν ἄλλῳ does not mean 'in another place', but 'in something else'; at 1.12 οὐ does not negate καλά (p. 7), but παρ' αὐτῶν, as the contrast is between παρ' αὐτῶν and μεθέξει (1.13); at 1.26 ὑπάρξει cannot mean 'exists' or 'is' (p. 10), but is rather a future tense expressing the consequence of the assumption that beauty exists in proportion ('inevitably only the compound will be beautiful'). Note that the line numbers mentioned by Klitenic Wear do not actually correspond to the line numbers of Henry and Schwyzer's *editio minor*, to which I am referring here.

that it is written in a clumsy version of the target language, trying to reveal the structure of the source text. Klitenic Wear's translation is certainly clumsy (as she modestly admits on p. vii), yet I doubt whether it really succeeds in bringing out the structure of the Greek any better than the existing translations.[28] My skepticism as to the utility of Klitenic Wear's *Teacher's Guide* should, however, not detract from the merits of the *Reader*, which makes two wonderful texts of Plotinus approachable for students of Greek. With one eye on one of the excellent translations that are now available for Plotinus,[29] and with the other on a commentary that brings out the philosophical issues at stake,[30] a teacher able to make critical use of Klitenic Wear's *Reader* will have everything necessary for embarking on a fascinating journey with Plotinus in class.

Pieter d'Hoine

[28] To mention just a few examples from the first chapter of I 6 where obvious mistakes are made: at 1.9-11, instead of 'or is there one beauty in body in one place and another in another place?' (p. 2) the text should mean 'or is there one kind of beauty in body and another kind in something else?'; at 1.14-16, instead of 'For the same bodies sometimes appear beautiful, but sometimes not, since at one time it is a body, at another time it is beautiful' (p.3), read '…but sometimes not, since it is one thing to be a body, another thing to be beautiful'; at 1.25-26, instead of 'For those [who ascribe to this view] there is nothing simple, and only a composite is necessarily beautiful' (p. 4) read 'For them nothing simple, but inevitably only the compound will be beautiful'; at 1.30-31, instead of 'And the colors that are beautiful for them…' (p. 4), read 'And for them the colors that are beautiful…'; at 1.38-40, instead of 'How must one not say that being beautiful is separate from symmetry according to one principle, and symmetry is beautiful through another principle' (p. 5), read '… that being beautiful is something else than proportion, and proportion is beautiful through something else?'; at 1.45-46, instead of 'For that reason, they are harmonious; and there will be even agreement and harmony of bad ones' (p. 6), read 'If it is because they are harmonious, there will be even agreement and harmony…'. Moreover, at 1.23-25, the sentence 'And it is for these [visible things] and generally for all other things being [considered] beautiful is what is well proportioned and measured' is ungrammatical.

[29] Apart from the excellent translation by H. Armstrong in his Loeb edition (1966-88), which is also used by Klitenic Wear, one now disposes of the new complete Plotinus translation edited by Lloyd Gerson (Cambridge 2017). The two *Enneads* commented on by Klitenic Wear have also been translated for the Plotinus series published at Parmenides Publishing, Las Vegas (by Andrew Smith, 2016, and Eric Perl, 2015, respectively), with commentaries. There is of course also the complete French translation edited by L. Brisson and J-F. Pradeau (Paris 2002-2010).

[30] Apart from the two commentaries mentioned in the previous note, one could also think of Anne-Lise Darras-Worms' commentary of I 6 (Paris 2007) and Michael Atkinson's commentary of V 1 (Oxford 1983).

KNOTTS, Matthew W., *On Creation, Science, Disenchantment and the Contours of Being and Knowing* (Reading Augustine), Bloomsbury, London/New York 2020, 181 p.

Matthew Knotts works at the interdisciplinary juncture of Augustinian studies and contemporary philosophy, offering a scholarly meditation on the epistemic and moral dimensions of human finitude. He challenges his readers to reimagine the human place within the modern world, situating his theological reflections within the contemporary philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer and other twentieth-century thinkers who challenge regnant empiricist and positivist epistemologies. Here Knotts brings forward an intellectually plausible and existentially evocative interpretation of Augustine's account of creation, focusing on the issue of divine illumination, in order to explore the epistemic terrain that we inhabit as spiritual and transcendental creatures.

Though Knotts' arguments wade through complex theological and philosophical terrain, he pitches his analysis to the academic non-specialist and to the educated general reader. Knotts has also made the decision to situate his scholarship within contemporary hermeneutics rather than within the more technical, secondary literature on Augustine's disputed account of divine illumination. In assessing Knotts' contribution to scholarship, we should keep in mind his choice in audience and context, and recognize the nature of his contribution: to bring forward for a modern audience an Augustinian, theological contribution to the human sciences.

Knotts situates his analysis at the intersection of epistemology, ontology, and the doctrine of creation, though the leitmotiv is epistemic given his focus on Augustine's account of divine illumination. Knotts begins from the basic questions of how we come to know ourselves, our world, and God, arguing for a necessary connection between all three. Knotts treats these questions in three parts on: world (part I), God (part II), and self (part III). Given Knotts' epistemic orientation, however, each part unfolds as a practice in hermeneutics that explores the interconnections between the knower and known. Hence, the argument develops not through an abstract analysis of the world and God but rather as a meditation on our being-in-the-world (part I), our being-in-relation-to-God (part II), and the ramifications for self-understanding (part III) that comes through these relations. Part III offers the most detailed constructive work, where Knotts engages most successfully with his contemporary interlocutors – the modern and postmodern critics whom he, as a devil's advocate, invokes in various places in the text.

Knotts characterizes his interpretation of Augustine's account of illumination as a "gradual sense of illumination" in order to highlight the finite and moral dimensions through which we come to know ourselves, the world, and God. In Augustinian fashion, Knotts argues that our progression toward, and digression from, knowledge is partially a result of our created, finite nature and partially due to the way we sabotage ourselves in sin. Though Knotts is interested in the topic of sin and traces Augustine's basic Christological strategy for addressing the problem, his analysis on this issue is less developed than his exploration of human finitude. Knotts' interest in the nature of human finitude balances the Augustinian impulse that frames the intimacy between God and humanity within the difference between them. Knotts maintains the qualitative difference between the infinite, immutable God and finite, mutable humanity that is basic to Augustine's thought. Knotts is aware that such a framework runs afoul of some of his contemporary interlocutors who are suspicious of delineating the divine-human relationship within such categories. To his credit, Knotts maintains an Augustinian line while also refusing a facile bifurcation or dualism between God and the world, spirit and matter, or infinite and finite, such as are common in contemporary misreadings of Augustine on this issue. Knotts charts his path toward a more nuanced account by beginning from a common Augustinian truism on the inverse relation of epistemology and ontology: we come to know that which is furthest from us (the world, finitude) before we know that which is closest to us (God, the infinite). This inverse relation is part of Augustine's gradual sense of illumination that Knotts seeks to highlight. It also underscores that the difference between the infinite and finite opens onto the mystery of their intimate and profound connection. Here Knotts rightly points out that the goal of self-transcendence and union with God toward which Augustine aims his reader is not a movement that leaves the world and self behind (i.e., the finite), but rather a gradual discernment in becoming aware of a relation between God and self that is always there within our created natures as divine images.

This gradual realization leads Knotts to the classical Augustinian inward and upward dynamic – the movement from the outer world of the senses into the inner spiritual soul and upward to God. Knotts frames this dynamic within a hermeneutical model that treats the world as a text. This move is central to Knotts' polemic against the disenchantment of the world, which, following a common postmodern thread, he identifies as the post-Cartesian tendency to assert the universal and hegemonic voice of the observer to define and control an

objectified and empirical world devoid of inherent value or meaning. Against this tendency, Knotts positions the world-as-text as the active (not passive) subject (not object) who calls in a living (not dead) voice to us. This positioning leads Knotts to argue for the re-enchantment of the world, not in a naïve romantic vein, but rather through a hermeneutic that treats the voice of the world as the call of finitude to which we are invited and challenged to respond. At this point, Knotts turns again to Augustine against the hermeneutical tradition of Heidegger and Gadamer on which he is drawing, to identify the world's call as a kind of confessional praise of its finitude that directs us in apophatic fashion – in testifying to its *ex nihilo* roots as the non-source of its existence – toward the infinite, divine source of existence. In this turn, Knotts critically reappropriates contemporary hermeneutics to argue that the confessional voice of praise in Augustine's famed *Confessions* that elevates creation to its creator is not the self in isolation but rather the self in dynamic relation to the world.

Knotts' work stands within the line of contemporary scholarship that demonstrates in myriad ways the vibrancy and significance of Augustine's writings for contemporary inquiries on religion, philosophy, science, and the human place within the world.

Matthew Drever

KOET, Bart J., *The Go-Between: Augustine on deacons* (Brill's Studies in Catholic Theology 6), Brill, Leiden 2019, xvi + 169 p.

After the Second Vatican Council, the diaconate was re-established in the Catholic Church as a separate and permanent order. However, a unified theological view of the permanent diaconate has yet to be reached. On the one hand, the deacon is regarded as a liturgical minister assisting the bishop and the priest. On the other hand, he is the living embodiment of Christian charity towards the poor. And the latter focus mainly determines the identity of the permanent deacon in current ecclesiastical discourse.

Bart J. Koet considers whether this unilateral approach is as authentic and as archetypal as it seems. In other words, does this approach fit the original mould of the deacon as found in historical sources? In order to answer this question, he delves into the oldest literary layers containing the word *diakonos*, i.e., the writings of Plato. Using this literary deposit as a starting point, he explores biblical and ancient non-biblical passages: the book of Esther, Flavius Josephus,

St. John's Gospel, the Epistles of Paul, and the apostolic fathers. These writings show that the archetypal deacon was not so much a submissive servant or slave, but rather an important go-between for two prominent parties – a messenger or mediator as it were. This picture is also reflected in strictly religious interpretations according to which 'the servant of the Lord' intercedes between God and his people.

But the actual topic of this book is Augustine's view of the diaconate. Koet dedicates four extensive chapters to this subject. The church father does not provide us with a systematic analysis of the diaconal order, and therefore the author attempts to reconstruct Augustine's views by exploring the plentiful references to deacons in his writings. Once again these texts confirm that deacons were key figures in the diocesan curia; they acted as messengers, mediators, and representatives of the bishop. As Augustine was a prolific letter writer and sent out an enormous amount of mail, he needed a great many such postmen. Not surprisingly, more often than not these messengers happened to be deacons. The bishop of Hippo was well acquainted with his deacons, and he trusted them. Therefore he could entrust them with the delicate task of delivering his letters in a safe and timely manner. In his writings, Augustine also mentions deacons as liturgical ministers and preachers. Deacons were the ones who formally read the Gospel aloud in church, since most lay people were illiterate. Deacons provided Christian initiation for the catechumens and fulfilled a liturgical role during the baptismal ritual. Lastly Koet zooms in on the holy deacons of the early church mentioned in Augustine's writings, namely, St. Stephen, St. Lawrence, and St. Vincent; Koet's discussion leaves us with a number of insights and considerations regarding the continued development of the diaconal identity in the church of the twenty-first century.

Tim Peeters

LOUDOVIKOS, Nikolaos, *Analogical Identities: The Creation of the Christian Self* (Studia Traditionis Theologiae 28), Brepols, Turnhout 2019, xv + 386 p.

'Portentous' may be the right word for this work, on every page of which we struggle through elongated sentences too often verging on theological bullshit (as per Frankfurt's account of bullshit as a potentially endless set of unfocussed abstractions). Loudovikos's book is

immensely wide-ranging and contains more or less apposite discussion of figures as varied as Epictetus, Origen, Plotinus, Augustine, the Cappadocians, Maximus, Symeon the New Theologian, Gregory Palamas, Aquinas, Descartes, Hegel, Fichte, Nietzsche, Lacan, Levinas, Tillich, Zizioulas: the last's views (like those of others) are regularly and lengthily, if implicitly, targeted as crypto-monothelite. For Loudovikos does not mince his words, his opponents being commonly identified as 'monophysites' of some sort (pp. 116, 117, 124, etc.), their views of the person being accounted basically 'narcissistic' (pp. 15, 85, 202, etc.). However, to do our author justice, we should recognize that his tongue-lashings are directed almost as much against his fellow Orthodox as against other varieties of philosopher and theologian.

More disturbing is a careless and imprecise presentation of facts: thus Loudovikos tells us (p. 68) that 'Ancient thought ignored the will (*thelesis*)', when what he should have specified is that in ancient treatments of the will the word '*thelesis*' is generally not used. Or when he notes (p. 223) that 'Perhaps R. Jensen is accurate when he describes the human soul in Thomas [Aquinas] as an "escape soul"'; here the 'perhaps' may reduce a criticism to an allegation. Or the cavalier treatment (p. 214) of Augustine's relationship with Origen (e.g. p. 10: Ambrose as an early filtering intermediary not being mentioned). Or that Augustine's work can be lumped in (p. 14) with that of the now fashionably despised group of 'onto-theologians'. Or the observation that for Aquinas 'existence is the lack of universality, i.e. of pure existing' (p. 133). And there is a tendency to dismiss problems of detail by exotic phrases such as 'the angst of contemplation' (supposed to link Heidegger with Neoplatonism [p. 138]). In a strange passage (p. 115), Loudovikos attributes to Symeon the notion that because we exist in God's image and likeness we are 'deemed worthy of becoming God' (capital G): thus seeming to suggest that Loudovikos is unaware that Patristic (and often Classical) Greek authors use the word *theos* in its original predicative sense: hence that Symeon here alludes not to becoming not God but divinized. Or where, by a characteristic piece of amalgamating texts from varying ages, we are told that in Plato's *Symposium* 'elevation to the One has been achieved' (p. 137). Or that there is not 'the slightest possibility [for Heidegger] of opening up the Dasein as such to the One, exactly as in Plotinus'. I find that I have scrawled 'No' in the margins of my copy of *Analogical Identities* in over 100 places: a very conservative estimate of my disagreements over minor and less minor presentations and interpretations of data.

Far be it from me to condemn wide-ranging and bold historical sweeps in philosophy and theology, or to disparage those who make them when unavoidably (in the present life) they get details wrong; Loudovikos, though, seems not quite to have grasped what sort of book he eventually wanted to write. At times he seems primarily concerned with the Trinitarian theology of Maximus the Confessor and his Orthodox successors, and with castigating those who have mangled their message; elsewhere his concern seems to be to demonstrate that Augustine is the Founding Father of 'Christian nihilism'; elsewhere again – and here I detect real grain among the chaff – he is arguing that in the history of European theology we should distinguish between those whose spiritual goal is intellectual contemplation (who hence may have bought into too much of what is essentially Neoplatonic rather than Christian) and those who hail the transformation of the whole person: delicate and dangerous territory, unsuited to cavalier pronouncements.

There is much more in Loudovikos's book, but I will let these three themes suffice for now. First is Augustine, for in Loudovikos's treatment of the much-abused bishop of Hippo we can learn how not to do history of theology. To begin with, Augustine himself emerges seriously distorted: not least in that Loudovikos, as already noted, comes close to producing yet another synthesis. Occasionally, it is true, he recognizes that Augustine's thought, despite its continuity, is not all of a piece, but that, as Augustine himself pointed out, his mind developed. But generally, Loudovikos neglects this warning and follows those who do likewise: Madec, and especially Gilson whose still-useful book on Augustine – not to speak of his *Being and Some Philosophers* – is significantly misguided about 'Neoplatonism' in general and Plotinus and Augustine in particular.

Thus, according to Gilson, Neoplatonists are existence-blind, and when they treat of the One as 'beyond being', are telling us that it is beyond existence. Christians in antiquity made no such mistake: Augustine aside, Gregory of Nyssa, for example, realizes that Plotinus wants to ensure that his One is recognized as beyond *finite* being: a distinction Gregory well understood but was able to formulate more powerfully insofar as he could call on the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* to account better for the 'gap' between God (the One) and all else.

Gilson's perhaps even more serious mistake was to accuse Neoplatonists in general, and Augustine in particular, of being intellectualists: of claiming, that is, to be capable of achieving union with the One (or God) by intellectual effort, whether or not supported by grace. Yet it is a fundamental principal of Platonism, and from the time of

Plato himself, that knowledge of the Good is possible only if combined with love of the Good – and vice versa. This means you cannot grasp the Good by reading and thinking about Plato's *Republic* or Plotinus' *Enneads*, though you can learn – philosophically (or theologically) – *about* it by so doing. This basic linkage is nowhere more apparent than in Augustine. Thus, Loudovikos is unwise to follow Gilson's *mis*reading in such a basic respect.

Even more serious than Loudovikos's general unconcern with Augustine's philosophical development – combined as it is with his habit of following out-of-date accounts of the bishop of Hippo – is his methodological habit of reading back into an early thinker deformations of his thought which (in the case of Augustine) were produced first by his fellow Christians, then, in the early modern period, by more secular opponents, culminating in the 'divinization' of the will (accompanied by an exaltation of that very desire to dominate which Augustine himself decried), such as is found in its final form in Nietzsche.

Apart, however, from this star example of *post hoc, propter hoc*, Loudovikos constructs his account of Augustine as the founder of modern (including 'Christian') nihilism in no small part by misconstruing Augustine's *voluntas* as 'will', with scarcely any notice of his understanding of 'will' as the *expression* of love (or hate), and as revealed primarily in the Holy Spirit. Indeed, in Loudovikos's account of Augustine (as also of Plotinus) there is scant mention of love. This mistaken procedure is especially dangerous insofar as it was the very *mis*reading of Augustine's 'love' down the centuries as mere will that caused the 'nihilist' result for which the abused Church Father should hardly be blamed. To say that we are guided by love is – to a modern – very different from saying that we are motivated by some sort of pure will. Calvin (and many others) applied this voluntarist 'deformation' to the Christian God, as their secular successors applied it to human springs of action. Augustine himself did no such thing: thus Calvin and many other Christian theologians are 'voluntarists', something Augustine emphatically is not, being preserved from it in no small part by his Platonizing inheritance.

Augustine aside, the meaning of the word 'will' has radically changed since antiquity, and a scholar neglects that at his peril. The same is true of other words tossed about too cavalierly by Loudovikos: such are 'freedom' (which in ancient thought does not refer normally to a freedom of indifference) as when we are told (without explanation) that Gregory of Nyssa is 'the theologian of human freedom' (p. 220, n. 85). And perhaps especially 'nature', which in Augustine's day –

even among the vitalist Stoics – is far from indicating the mechanistic world of its post-Cartesian transformations. Hence when an author such as Kant (and many post-Kantian theologians) wish to separate the person from nature, it is from a mechanistic, deterministic, god-devoid nature which had little (if any) counterpart in antiquity.

All that said, one aspect of Loudovikos's treatment of human nature *is* important: he emphasizes that Maximus and Symeon (among others) always view human nature in an eschatological framework (pp. 88, 122, etc.); thus the history and nature of every human being is to be understood in terms of their eschatological destiny. That, if true, is important, and necessarily neglected in secular accounts of the person. To imply that Augustine is unaware of it is disproved by the closing books of the *City of God*.

There is no doubt that Augustine was influenced by Neoplatonism, not least in his account of the soul and its possibility of 'deification'. It is also beyond doubt that he learned to recognize that in his early days he had adopted what from a Christian point of view is an unhealthy contempt for the body; he had come too close, as he said, to accepting the notorious axiom of Porphyry that *omne corpus est fugiendum*. Loudovikos, however, regularly ignores all this, as strikingly on p. 22 (note 32) where Augustine's 'fixed position [is] that the essence of the person, his very self, is the soul'. He is far from the only one to do this; as noted, it sometimes derives from attending more to Gilson's would-be Thomistic misinterpretation of Augustine than to the writings of Augustine himself.

For it was precisely his Christianity which drove Augustine to recognize that such a view is incompatible with the Incarnation and the Resurrection of the body. In his mature days, his real problem in 'anthropology' is that he recognizes that he needs a philosophical account of the soul-body relationship but cannot find one. As is true of most Christian writers in and before his day (and contrary to the view of Loudovikos, p. 161), Augustine was suspicious of Aristotle as an anti-providentialist, therefore as an atheist; being misled (perhaps by Plotinus) into concluding that an Aristotelian hylomorphic account of the soul-body relationship was not the way to go. Nevertheless, in his vain search for some solution of the soul-body problem, he came to insist that the body must also be understood as in the image of Christ because of Christ's (and therefore our) perfect bodily nature as originally created.

As for Aristotle, it is strange that Loudovikos has almost nothing to say of his importance in the formation of mature Byzantine theology (e.g. in John Damascene), as also among Westerners in the thirteenth

century, Aquinas in particular. Damascene, with his philosophical approach to the soul-body problem, is the great absence in Loudovikos's account of Byzantine theology, as too is Kant in Loudovikos's reading of supposedly modern 'variations' on traditional Christian ideas. Far from noting the position of Damascene, Loudovikos seems to attribute to 'Greek fathers like Maximus, Symeon and Palamas' the un-Aristotelian view that the soul is 'just the cast' (p. 246) (because of its 'simple and subtle material structure') of the body; that makes the respective Fathers sound (wrongly) as though in the desire to avoid 'spiritualism' they had fallen back on something like the view of Tertullian that the soul is material. Possibly here Loudovikos's problem is merely a confusing use of the English language.

Loudovikos supposes that the 'Neoplatonists' (including, in his view, Augustine) hold that the soul, in seeking perfection and divinization, must despise the body; he calls this 'spiritualizing' or (confusingly) 'transcending'. Yet Augustine's mature view is that the soul naturally rules the body – presumably necessarily, if it is not to be controlled by purely carnal desires. Yet that 'ruling' is not to be identified (as by Loudovikos) as 'dominating'; rather for Augustine the proper relationship between soul and body is that of a 'sweet marriage union'. And the Christian body will come to accept, indeed to 'long for', that relationship. In making misguided claims about 'dominating', and on the responsibility of Augustine for Christian (and neopagan) 'nihilism' with its 'voluntarist' associations, Loudovikos has backed into (and failed to recognize) a genuine problem to which Damascene and Aquinas provide Aristotelian answers better than were normally available to Christians in earlier times.

What I have identified as Loudovikos's second major theme might seem at times like a digression, though it is, as he himself tells us, where he first set out. He wants to correct misunderstandings of the Trinitarian theology of Maximus, misunderstandings which he believes (perhaps rightly) spill over onto Symeon and Palamas. One might regard this as an (extended) digression because the interpretation of Maximus, in and of itself, has little immediate connection with the supposed ill-effects of Neoplatonic philosophy on Christian theology.

While it is inappropriate here to debate Trinitarian theology, what we must do is put Loudovikos's treatment of Neoplatonism, indeed of Greek philosophy in general, into its proper historical and cultural context. The claim that Christianity had been perverted by Greek philosophy goes back at least to Tertullian. In the Middle Ages some thought that the chief culprit was Aristotle, and Luther would share that opinion. In more recent times various forms of Platonism

or Neoplatonism have been identified as the more guilty party, and on the surface this may look plausible, not only in light of the weakness, just discussed, of Platonic accounts of the soul-body relationship, and therefore of the human person, but also in light of the fact that after about 150 A.D. thinking Christians had largely come to believe that if they were to debate Christianity seriously with the pagans – indeed if they were to defend themselves against pagan intellectuals like Celsus, Galen, and Porphyry – some form of Platonism, with its emphasis on a transcendent first principle – was their best philosophical approach.

Yet right from the beginning of this development, with Justin Martyr Christian thinkers recognized that though Platonism could give them substantial metaphysical support, it needed to be purged, especially in its account of the structure and weakness of the human person: thus in the second century Tatian already found it necessary to point out that the soul – immortal by nature according to the Platonists – was immortal only by grace. Such rectification became standard practice among Christian thinkers: Augustine's faces up to it in dealing with Neoplatonic views about corruptions of the soul deriving from the body. Indeed, he comes to believe that far from the body's corrupting the soul, sin derives from the soul's corruption of the body.

The next stage in this history of perversions – and here we get close to Loudovikos – is Harnack's wide-ranging and widely accepted, albeit much disputed, neo-Lutheran thesis that traditional Christianity as a whole had been perverted by Hellenism: that all philosophical material in the early (and later) Church must be purged if we want to erase ever-changing varieties of paganism. Loudovikos's book refreshes this 'Great Tradition', not least where, citing (p. 141) a famous passage of Palamas about two ways of approaching God – philosophically or theologically – he insinuates that the aim of Maximus and Palamas is to promote Orthodox theology while rejecting Western or Augustinian metaphysics as implying either Monophysitism or neo-paganism

Yet Palamas himself, despite his describing the 'philosophical' approach as 'imaginative' (because it is speculative rather than existential), is less radical; certainly he points out the difference between philosophical and theological accounts of how to approach human perfection; yet he does not treat them as mutually exclusive: he is not, that is, a fundamentalist, as Loudovikos seems at times to become. This points us toward the third of my identified features of Loudovikos's book: the claim that whereas the Orthodox tradition

(deriving especially from Maximus, Symeon, and Palamas) proposes an approach to Christian perfection by way of a transformation of the whole person, the 'Westerners' (with some Eastern acolytes) think not of the whole person but of the intellectual activity of the adequately purified soul, in dominating its associated body, as seeking to experience the essence of God in contemplation: normally – to make it worse – contemplation not of God in Christ, but of God viewed purely metaphysically. Thus the core claim of Loudovikos comes down to being that whereas Augustine (and Neoplatonists like Plotinus) are concerned with 'contemplation', true (that is, Orthodox) Christians are concerned with unification with God through liturgical and existential divinization.

But, and leaving Augustine aside for the moment, the aim of the ascent to the One in Plotinus is not contemplation of the One but to be united with it in *henosis*: admittedly not Plato's position. Augustine sees no contradiction between the two activities, namely, between trying to understand the nature of the Trinity and the human person as its image – that is, doing philosophical theology – and living a full Christian life in which body and soul – the whole person – are dedicated to the worship of God. Indeed, after ordination Augustine condemned his earlier self for seeking 'divinization' in isolation and hence looking down on the more 'existentially' Christian lives of the ordinary clergy.

Since Loudovikos's book seems particularly intended to counteract a claimed malign effect of Augustine, my final goal in this review must be to illustrate how misguided such a dichotomy (i.e. contemplative reflection versus transformation) turns out to be in the case of Augustine himself. I start by observing that whether or not the details of Maximus' Trinitarian theology differ from Augustine's is irrelevant; indeed, though I have noted that a major part of Loudovikos's project is to resolve a dispute existing largely among the Orthodox about expositions of the Trinity, I refrain from further comment on details, except only observing that as one struggles though the endless speculative distinctions and elucidations of what Chalcedon basically decrees, it is hard to avoid the feeling that distinctions without differences are rather frequent both in the original Greek and in their English transpositions. That aside, the argument I would develop with Loudovikos concerns whether Augustine needs to accept that intellectual reflection must pass away in favour of a transformation of the self, my answer being that he would accept no such conclusion.

It has often been said (especially and influentially by Anders Nygren) that Augustine's theology is a compromise between the genuine

Christianity of (say) Irenaeus, Athanasius, etc. and the over-hellenized versions offered by figures such as Origen and Gregory of Nyssa. Loudovikos goes further, finding no such compromise in Augustine, whose attitude to 'contemplation' (hence 'deification') is not merely at times vitiated by his failure to propose an adequate account of the soul-body relationship but is in fact radically non-Christian. The compromise view (though inadequate) might seem the better option, since there are countless passages – not least and not only in his Sermons – where Augustine speaks out very strongly in favour of the absolute necessity of belief in the Resurrection of the body, and indeed of the 'new creation' of the whole person. In other words, Augustine's theory of the 'person' emphatically is *not* a theory about person as soul.

I further note that even Augustine's version of the 'cogito' does not cash out as, 'My soul errs, therefore it is (or I am)', but as 'I err, therefore I am'. If the objection be that it is odd to say that we think with our minds, then one might ask what else we think with. Admittedly we might say – with Geach – that we don't think *with* anything, we just think; even so we could hardly deny that the physical brain is an essential part of the action. To put it bluntly, there is a difference – and Augustine well knows it – between trying to think about God and His Christ and living a Christian life as a whole person. Not that the latter displaces the former; rather Christians emphasize the latter while not rejecting the former.

And should anyone still insist that Augustine *substitutes* some Neoplatonic account of an ascent to the One (or God) for a Christian transformation of the self through Baptism and the Eucharist, let that person read the story of the conversion of the rhetor Victorinus in the *Confessions*. There, to Victorinus' question, 'Do walls make a Christian?' – meaning, 'Is 'Church' baptism and formal acknowledgement of one's Christian faith necessary, while philosophical attempts at 'fellow-travelling' are not enough?' – the answer (approved by Augustine) is Yes: there is a sense in which walls do indeed make a Christian, who must become no individualized Neoplatonic sage seeking deification *in otio* but a baptized member of the Christian community.

How then do I summarize Loudovikos's enterprise? Surely as a very worthwhile project badly flawed by a complacent and cavalier *odium theologicum* working – as is the way of *odium theologicum* – through sweeping, exciting, and misleading half-truths, to misinterpret Augustine in particular.

John Rist

MACCARO Alessia, DE BIASE, Riccardo (introd.), *L'agostinismo di Blaise Pascal tra individuo e comunità*, Aracne, Canterano 2017, 208 p.

Come si legge nella breve presentazione della collana *Initia*, ideata e promossa da alcuni Docenti dell'Università Federico II di Napoli (cfr. p. 3), il testo di Alessia Maccaro ne inaugura la storia. La nuova collana è pensata per offrire «l'opportunità a giovani studiosi e aspiranti ricercatori di mettere in mostra le loro potenzialità» (p. 3). I direttori – Alessandro Arienzo, Maria Teresa Catena e Riccardo De Biase – specificano che «è destinata esclusivamente a lavori di pregio scientifico di laureati, dottorandi e dottori di ricerca» (p. 3) e fra questi si annovera anche il lavoro che Alessia Maccaro dedica all'agostinismo di Blaise Pascal. La pubblicazione si inscrive quindi in quel lodevole intento di promuovere la diffusione del sapere e, più ancora, di incoraggiare giovani ricercatori a sottoporre i loro pur acerbi lavori all'apprezzamento critico dei lettori.

Il volume, dopo una *Prefazione* di Riccardo De Biase (pp. 11-15) e l'*introduzione* (pp. 17-31), si articola in tre capitoli. Il primo – *Agostino e la storia della sua fortuna* (pp. 33-81) – affronta *le prospettive storico-ermeneutiche* (pp. 33-42), *lo spirito agostiniano della filosofia medievale* (pp. 42-51), *rinascimento e umanesimo agostiniani* (pp. 51-57), *agostinismo moderno. Risonanze in Lutero, Giansenio e Descartes* (pp. 57-81). Il secondo capitolo – *Pascal, un moderno agostiniano* (pp. 83-119) – si articola in *cultura filosofica e ruolo dell'agostinismo nella formazione spirituale di Pascal* (pp. 83-90); *le* Lettres Provinciales. *Un attacco "misterioso" in difesa del giansenismo agostiniano* (pp. 90-99); *il giansenista eterodosso di Port-Royal* (pp. 99-108); *Pascal tra Agostino e Descartes* (pp. 108-119). Il terzo e ultimo capitolo – *Les pensées. Un'apologia del cristianesimo agostiniano* (pp. 121-198) – è suddiviso in: *l'uomo senza Dio: dal* divertissement *alla vita beata* (pp. 123-138); *sproporzione: pensiero, morte, temporalità* (pp. 138-153); *Le ragioni che la* ratio *non conosce. Dalla conoscenza esteriore all'*interioritas *del cuore* (pp. 154-174); *Agostino e Pascal: il* crede ut intelligas *e la scommessa* (pp. 174-198). Seguono delle *conclusioni* (pp. 199-205). I testo manca della bibliografia e dell'indice dei nomi; poteva utilmente venire arricchito da un indice dei riferimenti di Agostino (mai citato secondo l'edizione critica!) e di Pascal (citato per lo più in italiano).

Come ricorda lo stesso Riccardo Di Biase l'opera da lui presentata testimonia il faticoso e promettente traghettamento dell'autrice «dalla condizione di apprendista a quella di ricercatrice» (p. 11). La sottolineatura è importante perché predispone da subito il lettore

ad una certa simpatia nei confronti della giovane ricercatrice che, nello sforzo lodevole del suo lavoro e nell'audacia di sottoporlo al giudizio del lettore, è consapevole di aver prodotto un testo, seppur non molto originale, sicuramente interessante nel tentativo di fare sintesi di diverse letture di Agostino, dell'agostinismo e della modernità. Sempre secondo Di Biase, voler verificare quanto Pascal sia intimamente legato al pensiero di Agostino rappresenta una vera e propria scommessa «una specie di azzardo teorico controllato» (p. 12). Si tratta di non accontentarsi di verificare le fonti di Pascal o i riferimenti testuali, quanto piuttosto «se e in che misura Pascal sia "agostiniano". E, ancor prima, che significa essere agostiniano» (p. 12). Tuttavia, non si dovrebbe mai dimenticare che il riferimento testuale costituisce un momento essenziale per qualsiasi processo ermeneutico o interpretativo o, ancora, di studio delle idee o del pensiero: il rischio è di rimanere in un orizzonte di comprensione non adeguatamente problematizzato. Se, certamente, non si deve cedere alla tentazione di una conoscenza positivista del pensiero di un autore o della storia degli effetti di tale pensiero, è comunque necessario non sottrarsi alla fatica filologica e testuale, così da evitare che l'intenzione previa di chi indaga – anche se lodevole – sbilanci eccessivamente la ricerca. Nella prefazione, così come nell'intero testo, infatti, si avverte tale fatica a uscire da categorie storiografiche ben sedimentate, per sottoporle ad un'analisi critica, ad una sorta di necessaria decostruzione, per lasciare emergere tratti fisionomici fondamentali celati nei testi, anche se obliati dalla tradizione storiografica. Prova ne è la curiosa articolazione dei capitoli, nei quali l'autrice si lascia guidare più da interpreti contemporanei che dall'Autore stesso o dai suoi lettori medievali o moderni, così da trovarsi di fronte all'agostiniano e all'agostinismo di Pietro Piovani, Agostino Trapè, Étienne Gilson, Henrie-Irénée Marrou, Riccardo De Biasi, Henri De Lubac, François Blondel, Giuseppe Lissa, Philippe Sellier, solo per citare i più presenti.

Sempre nella *Prefazione*, De Biasi, quasi volendo giustificare il testo che da lì a poco il lettore incontrerà, afferma che la vera scommessa «è posta nel tentativo di rispondere alla domanda "che cosa significa modernità?"» (p. 13). Nel prosieguo si troverà la felice assonanza tra Maccari e De Biasi nell'interpretare la modernità alla luce di quell'emergere del soggetto che troverà nella tradizione luterana e giansenista, quindi in particolari rielaborazioni del pensiero di Agostino, una sua esplicitazione privilegiata.

La questione della modernità è tema dominante in tutta la ricerca, tanto che l'ipotesi di partenza consiste nel voler mostrare che «nonostante nel pensiero moderno l'uomo cerchi di sottrarsi al

dominio dell'oscurantismo religioso per ritrovare la propria centralità, ciò che davvero connota la modernità sembra doversi ricercare nel contatto di alcuni autori […] con un passato lontanissimo» (p. 17) e tra questi ci sarebbe proprio Agostino. La modernità sarebbe intimamente pervasa dall'agostinismo come da una forza in grado di animare le stesse istanze rivoluzionarie del pensiero e di quella ricerca che si vuole sviluppare e articolare nell'interrogazione del soggetto e nella sua capacità di inabissarsi nel profondo della propria interiorità. Da qui l'intenzione della ricerca di «individuare la fortuna del pensiero di Agostino» (p. 17) e di evidenziare come sia stato riformato nel corso tempo. L'Autrice dichiara di collocarsi da un punto di partenza prospettico, così da indagare come «nel movimento storico delle idee si sia istituita una grammatica comune tra elementi del pensiero moderno e alcune note dell'agostinismo». Al fine di raggiungere tale obbiettivo «si è scelto, pertanto, di rinunciare ad un'ermeneutica storica intesa come pura e semplice comprensione del passato speculativo, prediligendo l'analisi di alcuni pensatori che più di altri hanno cercato, ciascuno a proprio modo, di rispondere all'appello agostiniano: uomini del loro secolo prima ancora che filosofi, uomini dall'anima inquieta, angosciati al pensiero del giudizio che, consapevolmente o meno, ritrovano nel riferimento ad Agostino degli spunti per i loro dilemmi moderni» (p. 18). Resta da chiedersi se l'alternativa ad un'ermeneutica storica «intesa come pura e semplice comprensione del passato speculativo», non implichi comunque e necessariamente, nelle legittime limitazioni della ricerca, di adottare un metodo di indagine che privilegi il dato da indagare, piuttosto che l'ipotesi da verificare, qui chiaramente dichiarata nella centralità di Agostino in quell'età dell'Umanità attenta a cogliere la drammaticità umana «lacerata […] dal contrasto tra predestinazione ed autodeterminazione» (p. 17). Si tratterebbe, in altre parole, di studiare la storia degli effetti di Agostino o, meglio ancora, di un aspetto del fecondo pensatore di Ippona o, ancora, di una certa sua lettura. Certo, anche questo aspetto è importante: la storia degli effetti non solo dell'autore, ma delle sue interpretazioni. Per fare ciò resta necessario esercitarsi nel difficile equilibrio tra il metodo storico-critico e l'individualizzazione di quella matrice di pensiero che passa da contesto a contesto, contagiando e fecondando, fornendo vocaboli e categorie per esplicitare quanto altrimenti rimarrebbe afono o espresso in altra lingua concettuale ed esistenziale. Se, con riferimento a Emanuele Severino, l'Autrice afferma che «il percorso storico dell'agostinismo […] non deve lasciare intendere che si vuole considerare la storia del pensiero come "lo sviluppo di un germe, che giunge al proprio compimento

attraverso l'esplicitazione delle forze essenziali che lo costituiscono''» (p. 57); bisogna altresì darle ragione quando afferma che il «pensiero agostiniano è come un germe che cresce grazie alla tradizione» (p. 29). Considerato alla luce della categoria dell'eredità, il pensiero di Agostino o l'agostinismo o, comunque sia, il germe di tale esperienza di pensiero, condiziona e sollecita un'appropriazione e riappropriazione che si inscrive nella dinamica stessa dell'agostiniano o dell'agostinismo. Nella prospettiva della storia degli effetti si eviterebbe l'idealizzazione cristallizzata di un pensiero, perché lo si considera nella sua feconda dinamicità di eredità da sottoscrivere, da vivere e da trasmettere: questa è, sicuramente, la sorte di un autore come Agostino o di un pensiero come quello agostiniano o come l'agostinismo.

Posta la questione metodologica, si annuncia l'articolazione del percorso, scandito «attorno a tre ordini di problemi» (p. 26). La prima macro area di indagine è rappresentata dal percorso dell'agostinismo in età medievale, «al fine di sottolineare quanto abbiano inficiato le letture interpretative di quel periodo sull'autenticità del pensiero di Agostino» (p. 26). La questione si presenta alquanto ambiziosa e problematica, sia per le premesse che per il metodo – di fatto – utilizzato. In riferimento a quest'ultimo aspetto è da notare fin da subito che il primo capitolo, dedicato appunto a tale aspetto, è costruito quasi interamente facendo riferimento a letteratura secondaria, inseguendo e intessendo una rilettura e un giudizio dell'agostinismo medievale attraverso la voce di studiosi che, seppure autorevoli, sono pur sempre caratterizzati da precise posture metodologiche se non anche ideologiche. Qui, piuttosto, sarebbe stato più utile limitarsi ad una presentazione più puntuale di alcune letture dell'agostinismo medievale, se, per ovvie ragioni, non si poteva analizzare effettivamente la questione nel ricchissimo patrimonio del pensiero medievale. Non è meno problematica l'intenzione di voler determinare quanto gli autori medievali abbiano inficiato l'autentico pensiero di Agostino. Se per fare ciò non basta certo un capitolo di un libro, si potrebbe, per lo meno, problematizzare in un altro modo, così da sottolineare non tanto il tradimento del pensiero, quanto piuttosto, evidenziare l'interpretazione, la trasformazione, l'attualizzazione e la forma della recezione, la quale, a sua volta, sarà pietra di paragone o sasso di inciampo per le generazioni susseguenti.

Da qui la necessità – secondo ordine di problemi – di «un'indagine della recezione moderna del pensiero agostiniano» (p. 26) in autori e argomenti, seguendo un'impostazione atta a individuare il «nesso tra il piano storiografico e quello dell'elaborazione teorica, con l'obbiettivo

di mettere in luce la poliedricità della riflessione agostiniana e la sua disposizione al sentire moderno» (p. 27). Di fatto nel secondo capitolo l'Autrice ricostruisce il contesto storico-culturale-teologico di Pascal, mostrando chiaramente non solo la presenza dell'agostinismo, ma, ancor più, l'importanza ermeneutica che l'agostinismo esercita sull'inquietudine gnoseologica ed esistenziale dell'umanità moderna: «ora, dopo aver percorso in gran parte della sua multidimensionalità le coordinate del moderno – dai suoi sviluppi scientifici a quelli filosofici e religiosi – si è potuta toccare con mano la *solitudine* di Pascal […]. Egli è il pensatore di tale crisi che, nonostante il suo cristianesimo, non viene superata nell'ontologismo: egli resta all'interno di essa, il che fa di lui un vero moderno. Invero Pascal è pensatore radicale, difficile da collocare in orientamenti ben definiti: in lui l'antica lotta tra religione e ragione assume connotazioni moderne, ma non nuove. Attraverso la riflessione pascaliana è, per questo, possibile per i moderni tornare a misurarsi con un nucleo dell'agostinismo fino a quel momento rimasto ai margini, il che, mentre svela la modernità di Agostino, spiega quella di Pascal» (pp. 118-119).

Infine – terzo ordine di problemi – è indetto un confronto diretto tra il privilegiato Pascal e Agostino. Qui Pascal verrebbe scelto «non tanto per una dichiarata discepolanza, bensì in quanto […] consente di recuperare gli aspetti più taciuti della modernità agostiniana» (p. 27). La giustificazione della scelta è per lo meno problematica e rischiosa, anche se coerente con la postura metodologica dell'intero lavoro: si verrà così a mostrare che la modernità è tale in quanto fecondata – a sua insaputa? – da quelle acute intuizioni di Agostino che il moderno Lutero, Giansenio, Pascal e altri ancora hanno interrogato mentre interrogavano le «proprie situazioni contestuali» (p. 28). Giustamente, allora, si specifica che non si è preoccupati di ricercare il vero Agostino, quanto piuttosto di individuare «quale Agostino arrivò fino ai loro giorni», così che – rifacendosi a De Biase – «il vero oggetto dell'analisi sarà […] quel che si presenta ancora di esso [il passato che Agostino rappresenta] nel moderno; del resto la storia di un pensiero è il suo tempo presentificato» (p. 30). Se, anche in questo caso, si dedica poco spazio al metodo che guida tale indagine, è chiara l'intenzione e la dinamica della narrazione. Partendo dalla premessa che la religiosità agostiniana «è aperta a interpretazioni plurime» (p. 20) e che la sua originalità si manifesta nella forza di scuotere, nonché di attirare l'attenzione sull'individualità e sull'interiorità umana, e sull'importanza del desiderio di conoscere l'uomo e il suo rapporto con Dio (cfr. p. 21), l'Autrice delinea alcune tra le coordinate fondamentali del pensiero agostiniano. Aiutandosi con le

acute interpretazioni di Pietro Piovani, mette a tema l'importanza della speculazione teologica del dottore di Ippona, saldamente articolata a partire dall'uomo, così da riconoscere che «il problema teologico di Agostino è il problema dell'uomo Agostino, della sua inquietudine, dei suoi interrogativi, dei suoi peccati e delle sue confessioni» (p. 22). Le ricerche di Dio e dell'uomo non si sviluppano su due strade parallele o divergenti: «l'indirizzo speculativo è unico: confessarsi, chiudersi nella propria interiorità per aprirsi alla verità di Dio» (p. 22). Di Agostino quindi viene messo a tema il suo dinamismo interiore con il quale mostrerebbe con eloquenza all'uomo il dramma dell'esistenza. Qui sarebbe contenuta, in nuce, la cifra della modernità che, a ben diritto, nel recuperare Agostino, comprende se stessa.

In conclusione l'Autrice ribadisce che la ricerca è una tra le possibili risposte alla domanda circa il motivo dell'attualità e della fecondità del pensiero di Agostino. Quindi dichiara chiaramente che nel rispondere ha cercato di andare oltre la tendenza di considerare Agostino come una semplice conseguenza del medioevo, quasi si trattasse di un suo avanzo o un retaggio non del tutto dissolto alla luce della nuova ragione e soggettività moderna. Tutt'altro: Agostino è il vero «polo magnetico dalla forte carica, attrattiva e repulsiva insieme» (p. 199) che caratterizza la dinamica dell'occidente nel corso di questi ultimi quindici secoli. Per beneficiare di tale vitalità e per comprenderne la portata non bisognerà però limitarsi a considerare le «erudite controversie teologiche ed ecclesiastiche» (p. 199) in cui si trova coinvolto Agostino e la sua posterità. Con un'intuizione preziosa, Maccaro invita a orientarsi nell'immenso orizzonte ermeneutico dell'agostinismo cercando legittime circoscrizioni di indagine e, inevitabilmente, di metodo. In particolare, anche a chiusura dell'itinerario fatto, addita nel Seicento il secolo che, più di altri, è in grado «di farsi interprete dell'autentico insegnamento agostiniano» (p. 200), tradendo, di fatto, la stessa idea di eredità e di pensiero che si presentizza di cui parlava in precedenza, rimanendo in qualche modo prigioniera della ricerca di un autentico insegnamento monotono. Se è sicuramente pertinente riconoscere che la modernità trova «nel lontanissimo Santo di Ippona» (p. 200) un interlocutore di prim'ordine, non è superfluo specificare che la distanza cronologica era già stata ampiamente accorciata dalla vitalità che ha caratterizzato i quindici secoli di cui aveva da poco fatto cenno. Resta, come acquisizione fondamentale, che il pensiero agostiniano, così come è maturato in Agostino e nella storia della sua recezione, rappresenti il *medium*, il codice filosofico e teologico, gnoseologico ed esistenziale ritenuto – in questo caso, dall'uomo del Seicento – estremamente

pertinente ad interpretare, dare voce e corpo a quelle istanze che, quasi carsicamente, percorrono e fecondano la modernità.

In virtù della struttura dialettica presentata nel secondo e nel terzo capitolo, il pensiero di Agostino «trasposto nella modernità riesce a legittimare […] il valore di entrambi i momenti» (p. 200) di quella dialettica che si articola tra la difesa della libertà umana e l'esaltazione della necessità della grazia. È proprio questa tensione che costituisce il bacino di feconda energia al quale attingerebbe la modernità, così da avere le categorie per articolare un nuovo discorso sull'umano, in grado di dare voce sia al radicalismo scettico e mondano, che alla «luminosa evidenza razionale della grazia» (p. 200). Saranno questi due elementi, nella loro intrinseca tensione dialettica, che permettono di riconoscere in Agostino il fecondo interprete della modernità.

In conclusione, l'Autrice, appoggiandosi un po' troppo a Étienne Gilson, ritiene che «al di là delle interpretazioni contrastanti, ciò che unisce i pensatori moderni nel riferimento ad Agostino è la straordinarietà del pensiero di un uomo che muove dall'esperienza individuale per interrogarsi sui dilemmi vuoi teologici che filosofici. Infatti non era un intelletto che soffriva nella notte del giardino di Cassiciacum, era un uomo: lui stesso è l'uomo nella sua volontà di bastare a se stesso e nella sua impotenza di fare a meno di Dio. Tale è la sua dottrina e l'esperienza interiore. Ma poiché le forze oscure donde si origina il dramma che essa narra sono implicate in ogni cuore umano, è l'orgoglio e la miseria di ognuno di noi che essa confessa» (pp. 201-202). Una simile lettura però non si libera di una precomprensione che non è affatto di Agostino. L'uomo di Cassiciacum sente di non poter bastare a se stesso, prova ne è il suo anelito infinito e insaziabile di conoscere sé e Dio. L'impossibilità di trovare quiete e di porre fine a tale ricerca, non è però da leggersi unicamente con le categorie neoplatoniche di quella decadenza che rende più marcata l'impossibilità di giungere là dove si anela: questo anelito – verso l'interiore, il superiore e l'intelligibile – prima ancora che conseguenza del peccato, è il marchio della trascendenza, è quell'*imago* mai estirpata che fa della vita umana una relazione con la trascendenza.

Il testo merita di essere letto e apprezzato per la buona sintesi della ricca storia della recezione agostiniana e per il tentativo – da sviluppare ulteriormente – di mostrare non solo la presenza di Agostino in epoca moderna, ma ancor più il legame profondo tra il moderno e Agostino e, nella fattispecie, tra Pascal e Agostino. Al di là dei risultati della ricerca, resta attuale – non solo per la storiografia – soffermarsi sulla fecondità del pensiero, sulla sua forza fecondante

e generativa e, nel contempo, ermeneutica, come in questo caso, dove si scopre che il vissuto moderno è sia figlio di istanze pregresse, che esperienza nuova che viene ben interpretata e detta da quella antica.

Andrea Bizzozero

MOESCH, Sophia, *Augustine and the Art of Ruling in the Carolingian Imperial Period. Political Discourse in Alcuin of York and Hincmar of Rheims*, Routledge, Abingdon/New York 2020, 245 p.

Il volume prende le mosse dalla tesi di dottorato dell'autrice, che riguarda l'influenza del pensiero agostiniano sulla dottrina politica di Alcuino e Incmaro di Reims, intellettuali di spicco rispettivamente della prima e terza generazione carolingia. Il metodo adottato consiste nell'esame delle citazioni esplicite, completato e affinato da un'analisi contenutistica e dallo studio lessicale. Quest'ultimo comporta l'esame della valenza semantica dei termini-chiave del pensiero agostiniano e delle co-occorrenze degli stessi nelle opere dei due dotti carolingi, in modo da evidenziarne gli echi e i riferimenti impliciti al pensiero dell'Ipponate.

Il volume è strutturato in sette capitoli, tre dei quali dedicati all'analisi della dottrina agostiniana in quanto tale. Il primo verte sul contesto storico e il retroterra filosofico in cui germogliò il pensiero agostiniano; il secondo esamina le posizioni del vescovo di Ippona in merito al potere temporale. Moesch sottolinea l'ambiguità dell'atteggiamento agostiniano nei confronti della compagine statale: se da un lato l'esercizio del potere da parte di governanti cristiani è una condizione auspicabile, dall'altro qualunque forma di governo e organizzazione sociale è destinata in fin dei conti al fallimento, dal momento che la *civitas Dei* non può compiersi nella storia, ma si realizza solo in una dimensione escatologica. Nel terzo capitolo sono analizzati alcuni concetti della dottrina agostiniana particolarmente significativi per il loro impatto sulla riflessione successiva, quali *regnum*, *imperium*, *civitas*, *res publica*, *societas*, *dispensatio*, *iustitia*, *pax*, *felicitas* e *beatitudo*.

Nel quarto e quinto capitolo Moesch esplora l'uso di Agostino nell'epistolario di Alcuino e, in misura minore, in altri scritti dell'Eboracense, quali il carme I e la *Vita Willibrordi*. Gli scritti del vescovo di Ippona sono impugnati nell'epistolario alcuiniano come *auctoritas* indiscussa in materia di fede e dottrina. Non è dunque un caso che Agostino venga invocato in contesti didascalici, per lo più in passaggi

relativi all'istruzione religiosa di Carlo Magno. Le allusioni e i riferimenti impliciti lasciano emergere invece un uso meno tradizionale: Alcuino, accogliendo e al tempo stesso forzando il quadro concettuale agostiniano, dipinge il regno di Carlo come la congiuntura che soddisfa le precondizioni di *pax* e *iustitia* e che dunque porta a compimento la *civitas Dei* nella storia, risolvendo così positivamente la relazione ambigua di Agostino con il potere temporale. Nella visione di Alcuino, Carlo è il primo imperatore di un popolo pienamente cristiano e dunque il responsabile della difesa e della diffusione della fede, investito di una missione provvidenziale.

Il sesto e il settimo capitolo riguardano le opere di Incmaro, in particolare le lettere, le *Expositiones ad Carolum regem* e il *De regis persona et regio ministerio*. Agostino è citato apertamente soprattutto negli scritti polemici, composti in occasione dell'intervento del vescovo di Reims nella controversia sulla predestinazione e nell'*affaire* del divorzio di Lotario II da Teutberga. Le *Expositiones*, che vedono la luce in occasione di una disputa che coinvolge il nipote di Incmaro, il vescovo di Laon, sono un pamphlet sulla difesa dei privilegi ecclesiastici contro le rivendicazioni del potere secolare. L'obiettivo di Incmaro è indurre Carlo il Calvo alla penitenza e persuaderlo a correggere la punizione troppo severa inferta al nipote. A suo parere, i governanti hanno bisogno di essere guidati e corretti da consiglieri appartenenti alla gerarchia ecclesiastica, perché il comportamento dei primi, anche se conforme alla legge degli uomini, potrebbe essere inaccettabile agli occhi di Dio, come nella circostanza citata. La superiorità della chiesa dunque non si esprime solo a livello spirituale, come sosteneva Agostino, ma anche sul piano temporale. In questo contesto, la fonte agostiniana è richiamata non tanto come autorità per dirimere questioni legali, quanto per la sua superiore autorità morale e religiosa, che certifica la legittimità delle richieste Incmaro.

Il *De regis persona* è un florilegio appartenente al genere degli *specula principum*, redatto in occasione di un momento di particolare tensione tra Carlo e il figlio Carlomanno, messo a morte nell'873 per aver congiurato contro il padre, condanna poi mutata nell'accecamento. La fonte maggioritaria dell'antologia è Agostino, in prevalenza il *De civitate Dei*, e il tema principale è la legittimità dell'uso della violenza da parte dei governanti. Incmaro esorta Carlo a non essere codardo e a non farsi piegare dalla *misericordia*, mantenendosi inflessibile nell'applicazione della legge anche nei confronti dei propri parenti: i governanti cristiani sono difatti i soli a poter garantire il corretto bilanciamento tra *iustitia* e *caritas*. Incmaro sostiene che la *iustitia* sia raggiungibile anche in questo mondo, contrariamente a quanto pensava

Agostino, se è autorizzata da Dio e amministrata dai governanti in sua vece. In generale, l'uso della dottrina agostiniana da parte di Incmaro è mosso da motivazioni pratiche: egli non è un pensatore o un teologo originale, ma piega il pensiero del Padre della Chiesa alle esigenze politiche della situazione in cui si trova, osservandola dalla sola prospettiva del sovrano e non della comunità nella sua interezza. Nelle conclusioni del volume l'atteggiamento dei due intellettuali carolingi verso la fonte agostiniana è posto a confronto anche alla luce del mutato contesto storico in cui essi si trovano ad agire.

L'impianto del libro è complessivamente convincente e ben argomentato. Il paragrafo dedicato alla tradizione diretta del *De civitate Dei*, alle pp. 109-10, presenta tuttavia alcune imprecisioni, che naturalmente non compromettono la qualità del lavoro: i testimoni dell'opera datati entro il IX secolo non sono quattro, come vorrebbe Moesch, ma circa quaranta, come è noto a partire dagli studi di Michael Gorman negli anni '80. Tale lacuna non sarebbe di per sé significativa nell'economia di un volume che non vuole trattare di critica testuale, se non fosse che Moesch ne deduce che entro l'VIII secolo sarebbero stati copiati solo i libri I-X dell'opera. La studiosa sembra ignorare l'esistenza del testimone più celebre del *De civitate Dei*, il tardoantico Verona, Biblioteca Capitolare, XXVIII, esemplato al più tardi una ventina di anni dopo la morte di Agostino, che tramanda i libri XI-XVI, noto già a partire dalla seconda edizione di Bernhard Dombart nel 1877, e del frammento Basel, UB, Cod. N.I.4 A, ff. 1r-23v + Freiburg im Breisgau, UB, 483/12, f. 1r-v, del secolo VIII, che testimona parti dei libri XI e XV. Infine, se anche i codici superstiti datati entro l'anno 800 tramandassero solo la prima deca, le abbondanti testimonianze indirette della circolazione della seconda parte del *De civitate Dei* (per citare solo le principali, gli *Excerpta* di Eugippio e la *Collectio* di Beda) impedirebbero di sottoscrivere le conclusioni di Moesch.

Marina Giani

Moss, Candida R., *Divine Bodies: Resurrecting Perfection in the New Testament and Early Christianity*, Yale University Press, New Haven/London 2019, 208 p.

The resurrection of the body, mirroring Jesus Christ's rising from the dead, has always been of crucial importance in Christian thought. In this volume, Moss broaches questions that are both as old as time and

as relevant as current debates and anxieties on the perfect body and on human identity. When the dead rise, she asks, which version of them is resuscitated? Will they enter eternal life as youths or as they were on the day of their death? And what about missing or malfunctioning body parts? Will the people with such bodies be the same as during their lifetime, or will their bodies undergo a process of healing and beautifying – with all the problematic aesthetic and ableist presuppositions this understanding entails? In a carefully constructed dialogue with ancient literature, medicine, and philosophy, Moss provides a nuanced answer to these questions by focusing on different passages from the New Testament in their socio-cultural and religious context. She does not shun complex debates, both ancient and modern. *Divine Bodies* is a compelling and thought-provoking work that will not only appeal to scholars in the field of early Christianity, but also to anyone with a learned interest in the question of life and identity after death.

In the introductory chapter, Moss concentrates on the connexion between resurrection and existential anxieties. She discusses ancient philosophers' belief in the immortality of the soul and Paul's depiction of the resurrection of a glorified spiritual body in 1 Cor. 15. However, the idea of a fleshless resurrection gave way to a concept of psychosomatic resurrection, i.e. both body and soul rising at the end of time. Moss ties the Christian preference for this type of resurrection to a historical context of uncertainty and a sense of impending doom, for instance, during the persecutions. Moreover, she studies the reinterpretation of Paul's "glorified" body as a "glorious" body, and the impact of this view on the way heavenly perfection came to be described.

In the first chapter, Moss tackles the question of identity. She starts from the resurrection of Jesus, since he is the model for all others. The focus lies on the passage in the Gospel of John where Thomas needs to touch the wounds of Jesus to truly recognize him. In this treatment, Moss endeavours to answer the question as to what elements are necessary for a resurrected body to be recognized by loved ones. Moreover, she argues that Jesus does not have wounds at this stage, but scars, and she draws on a variety of ancient sources to demonstrate this conclusion, which brings her to the danger of resurrection as a process of total eschatological healing and perfecting.

This issue recurs in the second chapter, where the integrity of the resurrected body is put under scrutiny. In Mark 9, amputation is advocated for the parts of the body that make humans stumble into sin, for it is better to live in heaven with an impaired body than to be cast whole into Gehenna. This amputation is commonly understood

as punitive and metaphorical, but Moss walks a different interpretative path: she reads it as medical amputation. Despite the stigma placed on unwhole or crooked bodies, this type of amputation was fairly common, accepted, and even viewed positively as a proactive measure of self-preservation in case of gangrene. In contrast with the ruling scholarly consensus, Moss argues that Mark's exhortation for (auto-)amputation in the pursuit of virtue was meant to be read literally, and was indeed interpreted this way by several ancient authors.

The third chapter moves to other questions: What is the purpose of a non-functioning body part in heaven? Since the resurrected are not supposed to marry or to have intercourse, what is the use of genitals or of the womb? Even though ancient authors agreed upon the preservation of sexual difference in heaven, they did not agree as to why it would continue to exist. This debate points to the importance of the functionality of body parts to second- and third-century Christians. Moss brings different authors and their arguments to the fore: she starts with Aristotle and his idea regarding the *telos* or purpose of things, and she continues with Christians such as Pseudo-Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Athenagoras.

In the final chapter, Moss discusses the aesthetics of resurrected bodies and the link between bodily and spiritual virtue in Antiquity. The saints in heaven were depicted as near-identical figures with perfectly symmetrical bodies, pale skin, and pure white clothing. Moss shows how such depictions tie in with ancient ideals of beauty, but also how they were intimately connected with ideas of wealth and privilege. The garments of the saints in heaven, and the type of beauty the saints there exhibit, were garments and beauty of the elite. In contrast, those who bear the mark of the Beast in Revelation are covered in sores and smell bad. It appears, then, that poverty and ugliness do not have a place in heaven.

The conclusion of the monograph takes it all one step further, as Moss shows how saints in modern art look more diverse but still very much conform to a specific, culturally formed aesthetic. She thereby makes the link to disability studies, and she touches upon the rise in the technology of immortality and its insistence on preserving human memory as a vital part of identity. Above all, she shows how Christians' portrait of heaven and those who live there has been and is conditioned by the things they value and the things they fear. In this way, reflecting on the resurrection ultimately signifies reflecting on what it means to be Christian and what it means to be human.

Olympe De Backer

NIGRA, Alberto, *Il pensiero cristologico-trinitario di Giovanni di Scitopoli: tra neocalcedonismo e prima recezione del* Corpus Dionysiacum (Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum 156), Nerbini International/Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Roma 2019, 573 p.

Johannes von Skythopolis war ein universell gebildeter Theologe und Philosoph, dessen Werke zum großen Teil verloren gegangen sind. Erhalten geblieben sind jedoch sein Prolog und seine Scholien zu den Traktaten und Briefen des Dionysius Areopagita (CPG 6852),[31] die er während seiner Amtszeit als Bischof (536-553) verfasste, sowie kleinere Fragmente einer offenbar vor 518 verfassten, mindestens acht Bücher umfassenden antimonophysitischen *Apologie des Konzils von Chalkedon* (CPG 6851; Rorem and Lamoreaux datieren die Apologie in die Zeit zwischen 515 und 518)[32] sowie einer Schrift *Contra Severum* (CPG 6850), die etwa 527 gegen den Monophysiten Severus von Antiochien entstanden sein dürfte (Rorem and Lamoreaux datieren *Contra Severum* in die Zeit kurz nach 520).[33] In diesen Werken zeigt sich Johannes nicht nur als ein vermittelnder, Ausgleich suchender Denker, nicht nur als ein herausragender Zeitzeuge und in dieser Eigenschaft als eine wertvolle Quelle für die origenistischen Streitigkeiten in Palästina nach dem Tod des heiligen Sabas im Jahr 532,[34] sondern auch als ein hervorragender Theologe mit ausgeprägter Vorstellung von Orthodoxie. So liegt es nahe, nach seiner christologischen und trinitarischen Position zu fragen, und die vorliegende Arbeit Nigras versucht, diese Frage vor dem Hintergrund des Konzils von Chalkedon zu beantworten.

Die Arbeit gliedert sich in drei Teile mit insgesamt sechs Kapiteln: Teil I fragt nach Autor und Werk (S. 19-131) und erläutert dazu in Kapitel 1 die Zeugnisse des sechsten bis neunten Jahrhunderts (S. 19-46) und in Kapitel 2 den *Status quaestionis* von Prolog und Scholien zu den Traktaten und Briefen des Dionysius Areopagita (S. 47-131). Teil II widmet sich der christologischen und trinitarischen Position des Dionysius Areopagita (S. 135-208), die dann in Kapitel 3 erläutert wird. Hierbei zieht Nigra für dessen trinitarische Position vor allem *De Divinis Nominibus* II 3-5; 5-6 und für dessen christologische Position vor allem *De Divinis*

[31] CPG = M. Geerard, *Clavis Patrum Graecorum*, vol. III: *A Cyrillo Alexandrino ad Iohannem Damascenum*, Turnhout 1979; *Supplementum*, Turnhout 1998.

[32] P. Rorem, J. C. Lamoreaux, *John of Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus. Annotating the Areopagiten*, Oxford 1998, 35.

[33] P. Rorem, J. C. Lamoreaux, *John of Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus. Annotating the Areopagiten*, Oxford 1998, 35.

[34] A. Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche*, Bd. 2/3: *Die Kirche von Jerusalem und Antiochien nach 451 bis 600*, Freiburg/Basel/Wien 2002, 81.

Nominibus II 6 und Brief IV heran. In Teil III schließlich folgt die Herausarbeitung der christologischen und trinitarischen Position des Johannes (S. 209-413), indem zunächst in Kapitel 4 die Zeugnisse (das sind hier 1. verlorene bzw. fragmentarische Werke und 2. Prolog und Scholien) genannt werden, auf die sich die Herausarbeitung bezieht (S. 211-265). Es folgt in Kapitel 5 die Christologie des Johannes (S. 267-368). Im Vordergrund stehen hier vor allem sechs Aspekte: 1. die Quellen der Christologie des Johannes (S. 267-273), 2. seine Kritik gegenüber dem Apollinarismus (S. 273-281), 3. seine Zwei-Naturen-Lehre und seine Erklärung des Begriffs *theandrike enérgeia* des Dionysius Areopagita (S. 281-303), 4. kyrillische Elemente seiner Christologie (S. 303-336), 5. seine neuchalkedonische Position (S. 336-357) und 6. sein Verständnis der *oikonomía* als biblisch-narrative Christologie (S. 357-365). Dem Kapitel 5 schließt sich das Kapitel 6 an, das die Dreifaltigkeitslehre des Johannes erörtert (S. 369-410). Im Vordergrund stehen hier vor allem zwei Aspekte: 1. die Identifikation von Einheit und Dreiheit (S. 378-381) und 2. das Wesen Gottes *ad intra* und die reziproken Beziehungen der Hypostasen untereinander (S. 381-409). Den Abschluss dieser drei Teile bilden eine Gesamtzusammenfassung (S. 411-413), Text und Übersetzung von *Contra Severum* (S. 415-418), eine Übersichtstabelle der Scholien des Johannes (S. 419-499), eine Bibliographie (S. 501-530), ein Verzeichnis der Bibel-Stellen (S. 531-533), ein Verzeichnis der Quellen (S. 535-555) und ein Verzeichnis der modernen Autoren (S. 557-563).

Nigras Werk weist große Stärken auf: Zum einen ist es informativ. Es referiert den Forschungsstand zu Person und Werk des Johannes, sammelt sorgfältig und gewissenhaft das gesamte Forschungsmaterial und bemüht sich um eine gelehrte, unvoreingenommene und ausgewogene Bewertung, insbesondere in kontrovers diskutierten Fällen. Zum anderen bietet es mit Blick auf und vor dem Hintergrund des Konzils von Chalkedon die erste Monographie zur Dreifaltigkeislehre und zur Christologie des Johannes. Zum dritten berücksichtigt es hierbei auch Fragmente verlorener Werke und Berichte über verlorene Werke des Johannes (S. 211-250). Zum letzten aber bietet es eine hervorragende Bibliographie (S. 501-530).

Das Buch hat aber leider auch Schwächen, von denen hier einige angeführt werden sollen:

Zu Teil I:

Zunächst einmal fehlt ein kleines Kapitel zur Bedeutung der Metropole Skythopolis (heute: Bet-Sche'an, Beyt Shean), die zur Zeit des Johannes die Metropole der alten Provinz *Palaestina Secunda* war

und nur wenige Kilometer von Caesarea entfernt lag, der Metropole der alten Provinz *Palaestina Prima*.

Zum anderen fehlt ein kleines Kapitel zur Rolle des Redaktions- bzw. Variantenexemplares des Johannes. Denn zum einen wurden in diesem die Traktate und Briefe des Dionysius Areopagita philologisch durchkorrigiert, zum zweiten wurden diese durchkorrigierten Traktate und Briefe in Form von Rand-Scholien nach Art einer Rahmen-Katene durch Johannes selbst kommentiert und mit einem eigenen Prolog versehen, und zum dritten wurden drei Scholien (vermutlich aus der Feder des Johannes Philoponus)[35] hinzugefügt, die den Traktaten des Dionysius Areopagita als durchlaufender Text vorangestellt wurden: Das *scholion de philosophis paganis et de authentia operum Dionysii*, das die Traktae gegen Plagiatsvorwürfe und insbesondere gegen den Vorwurf ihrer denkerischen Abhängigkeit von Proklus verteidigt und zudem die Authentizität der Werke hervorhebt.[36] Das *scholion de operibus deperditis*, das dem Leser erklärt, warum Dionysius Areopagita in den Traktaten des Redaktionsexemplars auf Schriften verweist, die schon jetzt, d.h. kurz nach ihrer Entstehung und Verbreitung, nicht (mehr) auffindbar sind.[37] Und das *scholion de quibusdam vocibus a Dionysio usurpatis*, das letztlich das Vokabular der Hierarchie-Konzeption des Dionysius Areopagita erklärt und darauf aufmerksam macht, dass die Bedeutung des Dionysius Areopagita gerade in seiner Hierarchie-Konzeption liegt.[38] Da die gesamte Überlieferung des Dionysius Areopagita auf dieses Exemplar zurückgeht, das nicht zuletzt durch Johannes von Skythoplis selbst oder in seinem Umkreis entstanden

[35] Zur Zuweisung an Philoponus siehe: B.R. Suchla (ed.), *Corpus Dionysiacum* IV/1: *Ioannis Scythopolitani prologus et scholia in Dionysii Areopagitae librum De divinis nominibus cum additamentis interpretum aliorum* (Patristische Texte und Studien 62), Berlin/Boston 2011, 44.

[36] B.R. Suchla, *Die Überlieferung des Prologs des Johannes von Skythopolis zum griechischen Corpus Dionysiacum Areopagiticum* (Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen. I. Philologisch-Historische Klasse 1984,4), Göttingen 1984, 185-187. B.R. Suchla, *Verteidigung eines platonischen Denkmodells einer christlichen Welt. Die philosophie- und theologiegeschichtliche Bedeutung des Scholienwerks des Johannes von Skythopolis zu den areopagitischen Traktaten* (Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen. I. Philologisch-Historische Klasse 1995,1), Göttingen 1995, 12; 19-20. B.R. Suchla, *Dionysius Areopagita. Leben – Werk – Wirkung*, Freiburg/Basel/Wien 2008, 44-45; 205; 236, nr. 2.

[37] B.R. Suchla, *Dionysius Areopagita. Leben – Werk – Wirkung*, Freiburg/Basel/Wien 2008, 236-237, Nr. 4.

[38] B.R. Suchla, *Dionysius Areopagita. Leben – Werk – Wirkung*, Freiburg/Basel/Wien 2008, 236-237, Nr. 3.

ist,[39] hätte es in einem eigenen kleinen Kapitel behandelt werden müssen.

Der Versuch einer textinternen Zuweisung von Scholien an Johannes von Skythopolis (S. 98-106), den schon von Balthasar[40] unternommen hat, ist nachvollziehbar, aber methodisch nicht abgesichert. Plausible Kriterien und eine methodische Absicherung für textinterne Zuweisungen zu finden, ist in dem hier vorliegenden Fall besonders schwierig, weil zum einen das Genus *scholion* traditionsgemäß kurze, formelhafte und elliptische Texte aufweist und zum anderen mehrere Scholiasten hintereinander Scholieneinträge vorgenommen und sich dabei auch gegenseitig inhaltlich und lexikalisch beeinflusst bzw. inspiriert haben. Dies bedeutet methodisch: Bestimmte Varianten und Verwendungen von Standardfloskeln (z.B. „wir sagen", „wie wir schon oben sagten") sind ebenso allgemein und unpersönlich wie der Gebrauch von Titeln (z.B. „Über Göttliche Namen", „die Abhandlung Über Göttliche Namen") oder Benennungen (z.B. „der große Dionysius", „der göttliche Dionysius", „Dionysius der Areopagite"). Sie taugen daher nicht als Kriterium einer Autorenzuweisung, was sich auch textkritisch bzw. philologisch belegen lässt. Zweifelhaft ist auch der Versuch, textkritische Kriterien für eine Zuweisung von Scholien an Johannes von Skythopolis (S. 106-114) anzuführen, ohne dabei die strengen Regeln der textkritischen Methode zu beachten. Denn nach dieser können Omissionen nicht wiedergutgemacht werden, was besagt: Wenn Codex A eine Lücke enthält aber seine Abschrift diese Lücke nicht aufweist, sondern statt der Lücke einen Text vorlegt, dann muss es sich bei diesem in die Lücke eingefügten Text um einen späteren Zusatz handeln. Hier bleiben also methodische Zweifel am Ergebnis Nigras.

Bei dem Versuch Nigras, den Prolog und die Scholien des Johannes zu datieren, fehlt eine Auseinandersetzung mit den Datierungsversuchen von Flusin und Mazzucchi. Denn Nigra (S. 117; S. 118) datiert Prolog und Scholien in die Zeit zwischen 532 und 544/545 (terminus post quem: 532; terminus ante quem: 544-545),

[39] B.R. Suchla, *Verteidigung eines platonischen Denkmodells einer christlichen Welt. Die philosophie- und theologiegeschichtliche Bedeutung des Scholienwerks des Johannes von Skythopolis zu den areopagitischen Traktaten* (Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen. I. Philologisch-Historische Klasse 1995,1), Göttingen 1995, 19.

[40] H.U. von Balthasar, "Das Scholienwerk des Johannes von Skythopolis", *Scholastik* 15 (1940) 16-38. H.U. von Balthasar, "Das Problem der Dionysius-Scholien", in H. U. von Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie. Das Weltbild Maximus' des Bekenners*, 2. Aufl., Einsiedeln 1961, 644-672.

obwohl Flusin schon 1983 darauf hingewiesen hat, dass Johannes nur jene origenistischen Themen anspricht, die im Jahr 543 verurteilt wurden, weshalb er von einer Datierung zwischen 538 und 543 ausgeht (Flusin; Grillmeier schließt sich dieser Datierung an; Rorem and Lamoreaux argumentieren ähnlich, setzen aber mit der Datierung „written between 537 and 543" die Spanne um ein Jahr nach vorne; dem schließt sich Podolak an; Suchla nimmt mit dem Zeitraum „zwischen 536 und 543/553" eine etwas weitere Spanne an).[41] Mazzucchi wiederum datiert Prolog und Scholien in das Jahr 548,[42] was ebenfalls unkommentiert bleibt.

Bei der Frage nach der Intention des Johannes (S. 119-129) fehlt z.B. der Verweis auf Van Esbroeck.[43]

zu Teil II:

Es ist literarisch unbefriedigend, dass die Überschrift des Hauptteils II („Il contesto: il pensiero trinitario e cristologico dello Pseudo-Dionigi") und die Überschrift von Kapitel 3 („Il pensiero trinitario e cristologico dello Pseudo-Dionigi Areopagita") quasi übereinstimmen (S. 134/5 und S. 567). Auch ist unklar, warum so kurz untereinander einmal Pseudo-Dionigi und dann Pseudo-Dionigi Areopagita steht.

zu Teil III:

Die Erklärung der methodischen Vorgehensweise (S. 260-266) gehört nicht in ein Kapitel (S. 211-265), das den Titel „I testi di riferimento" (S. 211) trägt.

Die Zusammenfassung der Christologie des Johannes (S. 366-367) fällt mit einer Seite etwas knapp aus. Zudem fehlt zum Abschluss

[41] B. Flusin, *Miracle et histoire dans l'œuvre de Cyrille de Scythopolis*, Paris 1983. A. Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche*, Bd. 2/3: *Die Kirche von Jerusalem und Antiochien nach 451 bis 600*, Freiburg/Basel/Wien 2002, 163. P. Rorem, J. C. Lamoreaux, *John of Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus. Annotating the Areopagiten*, Oxford 1998, 39. P. Podolak, "Giovanni di Scitopoli interprete del Corpus Dionysiacum", *Augustinianum* 47 (2007) 335-386, 339. B.R. Suchla, *Dionysius Areopagita. Leben – Werk – Wirkung*, Freiburg/Basel/Wien 2008, 16; 45 u.ö.

[42] C.M. Mazzucchi, "John of Scythopolis' marginal commentary on the Corpus Dionysiacum", *Trends in Classics* 6, 1 (2014) 170-175, 170.

[43] M. Van Esbroeck, "La Triple Préface Syriaque de Phocas", in Y. de Andia (ed.) *Denys L'Aréopagite et Sa Postérité en Orient et en Occident. Actes du Colloque International Paris, 21-24 septembre 1994* (Collection des Études Augustiniennes. Série Antiquité 151), Paris 1997, 167-186, 170.

des Kapitels eine systematische Synopse, die die christologischen Positionen des Johannes tabellarisch auflistet und in die kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen der Zeit einordnet.

Das Verhältnis zwischen der Behandlung der Christologie und jener der Dreifaltigkeitslehre ist unausgewogen. So umfassen Nigras Studien zur Dreifaltigkeitslehre des Johannes (S. 369-410) ca. 40 Seiten, während seine Studien zur Christologie (S. 267-368) ca. 100 Seiten betragen.

Wie im Kapitel zur Christologie des Johannes fehlt auch zum Abschluss des Kapitels über die Dreifaltigkeitslehre des Johannes (S. 369-410) eine systematische Synopse, die die trinitarischen Positionen des Johannes tabellarisch auflistet und in die kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen der Zeit einordnet.

Es fehlt zudem ein Forschungsstand, der den Status quo der Erforschung der christologischen und trinitarischen Position des Johannes beschreibt. Nigra bietet zwar eine gelungene Einführung in den Status quo der Autorenfrage und der textkritischen Erforschung von Prolog und Scholien, aber gerade zum Herzstück der Arbeit, der trinitarischen und christologischen Position des Johannes, fehlt ein solcher. Dies ist insofern bedauerlich, als Vorarbeiten u.a. durch Grillmeier, Rorem, Rorem/Lamoreaux u.a. vorliegen.

zum Gesamtwerk:

Es ist zu bedauern, dass sich das vorliegende Werk auf trinitarische und christologische Aspekte beschränkt. Denn Johannes von Skythopolis selbst kündigt an, dass er die Traktate und Briefe des Dionysius Areopagita vor allem unter **vier** theologischen Gesichtspunkten kommentieren werde: der Lehre von der Dreifaltigkeit, der Christologie, der Schöpfungslehre und der Eschatologie.[44] So wäre es im Sinne des Johannes von Skythopolis und zudem im Interesse des Lesers gewesen, wenn auch die Schöpfungslehre und die Eschatologie behandelt worden wären.

[44] PG IV: Prologus 20,10-30. P. Rorem, "The doctrinal concerns of the first Dionysian scholiast, John of Scythopolis", in Y. de Andia (ed.), *Denys L'Aréopagite et Sa Postérité en Orient et en Occident. Actes du Colloque International Paris, 21-24 septembre 1994* (Collection des Études Augustiniennes. Série Antiquité 151), Paris 1997, 187-200, 188. P. Rorem, J. C. Lamoreaux, *John of Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus. Annotating the Areopagiten*, Oxford 1998, 42-44; 66-67; 146. B.R. Suchla (ed.), *Corpus Dionysiacum* IV/1: *Ioannis Scythopolitani prologus et scholia in Dionysii Areopagitae librum De divinis nominibus cum additamentis interpretum aliorum* (Patristische Texte und Studien 62), Berlin/Boston 2011, 105,1-106,8.

Es ist ferner zu beklagen, dass ein so profundes Buch wie das vorliegende nicht in elektronischer Form vorliegt. Die Vielfalt der Informationen lädt zur Arbeit an und mit dem Buch ein, und dies würde sich am leichtesten mit einer elektronischen Fassung bewerkstelligen lassen.

Doch dies alles ist Klage auf sehr hohem Niveau, was den Glanz des Werkes nicht im geringsten mindert: Das Buch ist ohne jede Einschränkung empfehlenswert. Es bietet reichen Gewinn und sollte in der Bibliothek eines jeden stehen, der sich für die Theologie und Philosophie des spätantiken Christentums, für das sechste Jahrhundert und insbesondere für die Denker und Theologen Dionysius Areopagita und Johannes von Skythopolis interessiert.

Beate Regina Suchla

NOCK, Arthur Darby, *Conversion. The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo*. With a new introduction by ROTHSCHILD, Clare K. (Library of Early Christology Series), Baylor University Press, Waco 2019 (first published in 1933) 345 p.

A.D. Nock's *Conversion* is a true classic, an accessible reference work about the socio-cultural dynamics that enabled the transition from one religion to another, spanning almost a thousand years. The book was originally published in 1933, and I would agree that it deserves a reprint as "a work that continues to speak." The claim that the 2019 edition "revitalizes" the original, however, deserves some nuance.

Conversion contains a twenty-two-page introduction by Clare Rothschild, whose own research makes her an excellent choice to introduce this book. For that reason it is a pity that the introduction informs the reader only rather superficially about the reception of Nock's book (3 pages) and basically consists of a summary of its contents that is of limited use. Nevertheless, the introduction is at its best when Rothschild outlines the afterlife of Nock's seminal work: even though it was very much affected by the interbellum atmosphere, Rothschild points out how and why *Conversion* stayed relevant and even laid the foundation for a whole new branch of research in the field of the study of religion. Most notably, Gaventa (1986) and Segal (1990) followed up on Nock's work and methodology in their monographs. MacMullen (1984) was greatly inspired by Nock, but characterizes the latter's "frequent comparison of Graeco-Roman conversion

to Eastern religious practices" as an overly syncretistic approach. Crook (2004) also took a more critical stance by arguing against the Jamesian, individualistic view of conversion expressed by Nock and by paying more attention to the dynamics of communities. Another point of criticism Rothschild notes is that Nock overgeneralized the Hellenistic *Zeitgeist* by calling it an "age of anxiety"; at the end of the introduction, however, she seems to fall into the same trap when she validates the need for this reprint by referring to the "loss of confidence in social and religious stability today." Nevertheless, most of Nock's main ideas still hold and are respected by authors from all kinds of (sub)disciplines in the study of religion.

The main part of *Conversion* is an exact reprint of the 1933 version, including the layout. The original look and feel makes reading it a nostalgic experience, but from an academic perspective, this choice creates the problem that there is no critical input to guide the modern reader. This observation brings to mind a point of critique shared by Nock's original reviewers, namely, that the notes are few and not very in-depth, even for an accessible reference work. The new edition could have ameliorated the original in that regard by, for example, following up on Rothschild's summary of scholarly works and adding to specific paragraphs of the book notes drawn from recent studies; such additions could have updated the reader on current discussions about the topics so eloquently introduced by Nock. In conclusion, *Conversion* is still very much worth reading, and this new edition succeeds in conveying that message. However, the book could have benefited from a more extensive dialogue with recent literature.

Thomas Valgaeren

OTTEN, Willemien, SCHREINER, Susan E. (eds), *Augustine Our Contemporary: Examining the Self in Past and Present*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame (IN) 2018, 406 p.

This edited volume kind of is and kind of is not a *Festschrift* to David W. Tracy. As it turns out, that makes it a very fine read and definitely worth purchasing. Because on the one hand, you get an enviable cast of contributors giving their best, and on the other hand, you don't get the personal, loving tone that can make readers at large feel suspicious and excluded from such volumes. In this case, we are also spared the eclecticism that often results from a *Festschrift*, and which can make them then awkward prospects for publishers and uninitiated readers.

This volume has one clear, ringing subject: Saint Augustine of Hippo. It also has one clear, ringing conviction: namely, that theology today ought to be in active tussle with historical Christianity. It works. There is a really excellent introduction by Susan E. Schreiner which isn't the least bit apologetic, because it simply doesn't need to be. The essays in the volume read very well together and in their skilful arrangement, exhibit progression. There is a beginning, middle, and end, so that having completed the volume, this reader is left with the impression that he was being steadily educated on a single theme. Here that theme is "The Self". This coherence is no mean feat, which is why I am stressing it. Much respect to the volume editors for pulling it off.

On the genesis of the volume and its nature, Schreiner explains:

> [T]hese chapters do not analyze David Tracy's own writings. Despite his impact on the work of both the Divinity School and the wider world of scholarship, David staunchly refused to allow his colleagues to celebrate his retirement with a conference devoted to his own work… Finally, however, Tracy conceded that we could arrange a conference to commemorate his retirement on one condition; namely, that the conference be about St. Augustine… And so we held a very successful conference, which we felt to be so meaningful that we decided it was worthwhile to publish the results. Our hope is that this volume will demonstrate that thinkers ranging from Augustine's immediate successors to Lonergan and Tracy worked by turning back to the Augustinian legacy. In short, Tracy was right: Augustine has always been a contemporary of the Western tradition (pp. 2-3).

Did Augustine gift to Western ideas the self? Or at least, did he give the self in the form in which you still encounter it in serious thinking, in books, and in university curricula? Yes, he probably did. If by this self, we mean the anxious, introspected, guilt-ridden, God-haunted self, or what comes to the same thing, the various indignant and God-defying reactions against that self, then, yes, he certainly did. All these selves – for or against – can be traced back to Augustine. But it must be stressed that all these selves are indebted to Augustine precisely because they are the selves of serious, even professional reflection on the page. They are the selves launched into life by his pioneering spiritual autobiography, his *Confessions*. They only exist if you first do what he did in that book, and situate yourself against the narrative called "the truth", and reckon with it. If you do that, you may find that you agree with him, or are helped by him. Or you may just the same find his preoccupations self-indulgent (excuse the pun), or even paranoid. But prior to Augustine and that autobiography of his, there was none of this. People were still people, and thinkers were still thinkers.

But if, for example, we take the intellectual tradition that immediately preceded Augustine, the Hellenic, then we see that they were taken up with figuring out how to live by knowledge, in a world of knowledge. They were still people and thinkers, with interiors configured like Augustine's own interior, which he made famous and exemplary. But the Hellenic interior was regarded as a distraction and a weakness, or as simply untrustworthy in the nature of its case. The Hellenic interior got in the way of achieving the otherworldly highs of pure-form knowledge and pure-form enlightenment. Consequently, this pure knowledge and enlightenment, when it came, and when it was directed back to problems of life and society on earth, tended to profile people naively and optimistically, as though only the requisite knowledge correctly applied were waiting to put them all to rights. Effectively, Augustine would take all of this and declare it to be true as far as it goes, and then insert the missing piece that would at last make sense of it all in his opinion; that missing piece was *sin-needing-grace*. He would declare that, yes, the philosophers were technically right to bypass the Christian interior at all costs (if the Good Life was what they were after), but prideful and arrogant, and ultimately proven so by history, to imagine that they had bypassed it. Here, in a nutshell, is the complex Augustinian legacy. The philosophers weren't wrong, they were proud. This conclusion gives us the *Confessions* and its interiority as much as it gives us the *City of God* and its vicious, humorous satire on pagan culture. You will be made to muse on all these points as you read the essays in this volume, directed, it must be said again, by Schreiner's unusually good introduction. The chapter list is as follows:

> David W. Tracy, Chapter One, "Augustine our contemporary: the overdetermined, incomprehensible self" / Bernard McGinn, Chapter Two, "*Semper agens*/ *semper quietus*: notes on the history of an Augustinian theme" / Vincent Carraud, Chapter Three, "*Pondus meum amor meus*, or contradictory self-love" / Willemien Otten, Chapter Four, "The open self: Augustine and the early medieval ethics of order" / Adriaan T. Peperzak, Chapter Five, "Teachers without and within" / David C. Steinmetz, Chapter Six, "Luther and Augustine on Romans 9" / Jean-Luc Marion, Chapter Seven, "St. Augustine, or the impossibility of any *ego cogito*" / W. Clark Gilpin, Chapter Eight, "The Augustinian strain of piety: theology and autobiography in American history" / William Schweiker, Chapter Nine, "The Saint and the humanities" / Franklin I. Gamwell, Chapter Ten, "The source of temptation" / Jean Bethke Elshtain, Chapter Eleven, "Augustine and political theology" / Fred Lawrence, Chapter Twelve, "*Cor ad cor loquitur*: Augustine's influence on Heidegger and Lonergan" / Françoise Meltzer, Chapter Thirteen, "Ruins and time".

Much to enjoy, then, and if one thought emerged from it all for me, it was that it ultimately becomes impossible to separate the Augustinian "self" from the great man himself and his personality. By now we are inclined to think of the Augustinian self like some great scientific discovery that Augustine made on our behalf. In truth, it was simply his outrageous decision to take for his starting point his own life and feelings before God. Of course it turns out that for his great skill and precision in depicting those feelings in prose, he has won numberless readers down the centuries who have discovered in themselves the counterparts of those feelings and thus the "proof" of them. The history of this phenomenon, its description at third hand, and the resulting laws do indeed make it possible now to talk of the Augustinian self and of our debt to it. But our real debt to this man and to his insistence that he mattered so much to God as to write his *Confessions*. *Nota bene*: with this reflection, I am not making a point against this volume; I am saying that it was my abiding thought when I had finished the book, a thought that was probably brought on by the fourteen pairs of hands and multiple stimulating perspectives on offer.

Finally, this volume is presented by its editors as though it were making a definite statement in the ongoing debate about the future of the traditional humanities in a fast-changing world. In this case, the specific future in view is the future of the traditional, that is, historical study of Christianity in a setting such as the University of Chicago Divinity School, led, as it has been, by scholars such as David Tracy. Even Tracy's insistence on having his career commemorated by a conference on Augustine, and then this volume, is explained to you, the reader, on the basis of Augustine's intrinsic, or better, his automatic contemporaneity. This debate is interesting. I am just old enough (literally, I was the last one through the system) to have been trained in the rigorous English school of intellectual history at the University of Durham, in the United Kingdom. There, if you went to Augustine, or to Plato, or indeed to anyone in the past who had written anything down on paper, you went with the intention of uncovering only what the author might have meant by those very words to the people likely to be reading those words at the time that they were written down. This was pure, and I mean PURE, scholarship for scholarship's sake. The procedure was surgical. You went into the texts having scrubbed yourself clean of anything of yourself, and afterwards, you presented your findings in a correspondingly stripped lucidity of style. Any adjective was pounced upon and required to be explained. Of course, it never could be explained. This was the kind of Englishness whose patron saint was

the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein (of the *Tractatus*) and whose temple was the pub. Americans, no matter how brilliant or generous, were "gushing". (For the record, I was on the American side.) Honestly, it was good training, and it set me up well, but it was already an anachronism, fighting a losing battle with the university executive. The battle cry, if that is quite the word, of this approach might have been: "There's a world out there, thank God we don't have to live in it!" Even though I have gone on to write books and edit series that are every bit about engaging the world, I remain very grateful to my training and its rigour, as well as extremely fond of scholarship for its own sake. It is the necessary starting place and the correct, respectful attitude to take towards the masters of your art. What you then go on to do after your training, and after you have studied those masters, is another matter altogether and up to you. So I am on both sides of the equation and believe the truth to be on both sides of the equation.

Traditional scholarship along with traditional everything has been put on the defensive by a new kind of world, a world in which we are all now required to work manifestly for the common good, or else. In this new sunshine, the science departments of universities and schools are happy and making hay and broadcasting results which anyone can appreciate for what they are. The historical study of Christianity, not so much. My view is actually that such study shouldn't be forced to account for itself in the first place, because there is something special and valuable in scholarship for its own sake and in the men and women who pursue it as a vocation. In any normal society, they will always be in the tiny minority, and so the university is the place for them. As in, *the only place for them*. And any normal society should then be glad to have them as the guardians of something that can be called upon as required. They shouldn't have to justify themselves, and they shouldn't try to, because it comes out wrong if they do, and because the world has the more compelling priorities. For example, to ask whether we should give government money to find the cure for cancer or to PhD students to study arcane aspects of Church history is a question that only has one answer. The same may be said about whether reflecting on Augustine and the self is more valuable than removing yourself to Africa to work with destitute children there. I am saying that it never should come to these questions, to this straight shootout, if there can only be one answer. But I'm not the world.

I am only offering these reflections because this volume, in its presentation at least – not necessarily in its individual essays – chooses to go on the offensive in the matter. I am saying that I understand why

it does so and that I am sympathetic to its aims. It is even good to see such a strong line being taken, and by such a senior and distinguished cadre.

Miles Hollingworth

PERRIN, Michel-Yves, *Civitas confusionis: de la participation des fidèles aux controverses doctrinales dans l'Antiquité tardive (début IIIe s. – c. 430)*, Nuvis, Paris 2017, 405 p.

Nachgerade sprichwörtlich ist die Streitsucht von Theologen. Dogmatische Kontroversen waren indes nicht allein die Angelegenheit kirchlicher Eliten, sondern involvierten auch gewöhnliche Gläubige, so die These des Verfassers, die nicht neu ist, die er aber in seiner hochgelehrten Arbeit ungewöhnlich detailliert und vor einem breiten historischen Horizont vertritt.

Der lange Prolog stellt plastisch dar, wie Christen und ihre Gegner die christliche Streitsucht beobachteten, die sie nachgerade als Krieg beschrieben. In drei große Kapitel gliedert sich der Hauptteil der Arbeit. Der erste behandelt das häresiologische Ethos, das Verhalten und Leben steuert. Gemeint ist mit dem Begriff, den Perrin bereits in *The limits of the heresiological ethos in late antiquity*, in: S. Bangert, D. M. Gywynn (Hg.), *Religious diversity in late antiquity*, Leiden 2010, 201-228 entwickelt hatte, eine Haltung, aufgrund deren man sich von dem, was als Häresie gilt, trennen, ja jeden, der von der eigenen Seite zu den Häretikern gerechnet wird, verschmähen soll. Die entsprechende Unterscheidungsfähigkeit bezeichnet Perrin als διαγνωστικὴ ἕξις. Nicht einmal ein gemeinsames Bad sollte mehr akzeptabel sein (S. 92-94), wie eindringliche Passagen zeigen. Und auf der anderen Seite waren faktisch die regionalen Unterschiede der Gebräuche auch solcher Kirchen, die sich dogmatisch einig waren, divers, wie Augustins Mutter erfahren musste (S. 128). Daher bestanden trotz der Festlegungen weiter Unsicherheiten, denn immer neu war festzulegen, welche Differenzen unter häresiologischen Gesichtspunkten inakzeptabel waren.

Im zweiten Kapitel behandelt Perrin die Mittel der Überzeugung durch (oft polemische und mit Leidenschaft von den Zuhörern verfolgte) Predigten, Disputationen sowie Bücher, Briefe und deren Verlesung, die unter antiken Verhältnissen von elementarer Bedeutung war. Doch auch der gemeinschaftliche Gesang und Akklamationen treten in den Horizont und Gewaltakte kommt zur Sprache. Es geht dem Autor nicht so sehr um die Texte als solche, sondern mehr

um ihre Wirkung auf das Publikum, die Öffentlichkeit, die derartige, uns lediglich schriftlich überkommenen Äußerungen in ihrer mündlichen Form herstellten. Stärker als Perrin scheinen mir die Polemiken indes auch der inneren Kohäsion der eigenen Gruppe zu dienen.

Im dritten Kapitel schließlich erörtert Perrin die Bereiche der Einwirkungsmöglichkeiten einzelner Gläubiger. Dabei spielten Bischöfe und Asketen eine besondere Rolle, aber auch Personen, die keine religiöse Spezialisten waren, kamen zu Wort, denen Perrin besondere Aufmerksamkeit schenkt.

Der Epilog ruft Sandro Mazzarinos Konzept der Demokratisierung der spätantiken Kultur in Erinnerung. Die religiösen Konflikte der Spätantike sollten, so fordert Perrin, weniger aus elitärer und dogmenhistorischer Sicht gesehen werden, sondern stärker die Beteiligung gewöhnlicher Gläubiger in den Blick genommen werden, für die Oralität (die ihrem Westen nach schlecht bezeugt ist) besonders wichtig war.

Das Buch beruht erfreulicherweise auf der Kenntnis der internationalen, vielsprachigen Literatur. Es verarbeitet zudem eine immense Menge von Quellen, wobei Perrin dazu neigt, den Aussagen der Autoren über ihre Wirksamkeit Glauben zu schenken, als es mir ratsam erschiene. Möglicherweise war das Interesse der Gläubigen auch stärker spezifischen, polarisierenden Konstellationen geschuldet, die sich nicht verallgemeinern lassen. Neben Augustinus, dessen Tod den Endpunkt bildet, begegnen prominent Autoren wie Gregor von Nazianz, Johannes Chrysostomos oder auch Kyrill von Jerusalem. Deren Zeugnisse stellt Perrin teils in mäandernder Weise zusammen, teils führen die überraschenden Kombinationen auch zu erhellenden Verbindungen. Leserfreundlich ist das Buch mit seinen vielen unübersetzten Zitaten und überaus langen Anmerkungen leider nicht. Die Streitsucht der Christen, die weite Resonanz ihrer Konflikte arbeitet Perrin aber eindringlich heraus.

Hartmut Leppin

PIERI, Bruna, *Narrare memorite, temporaliter dicere. Racconto e metanarrazione nelle* Confessioni *di Agostino* (Testi E Manuali per L'insegnamento Universitario Del Latino. Nuova Serie 143), Pàtron Editore, Bologna 2018, 345 p.

Se l'importanza di un classico può essere misurata anche dalla varietà di prospettive attraverso le quali lo stesso è studiato, le *Confessiones* di Agostino rappresentano un caso esemplare di questa categoria: di

natura difficilmente definibile (sulla quale sono state avanzate le più disparate ipotesi), dotato di una versatile fecondità che gli ha permesso di rendersi apprezzabile fin da subito, a detta dell'autore addirittura prima della sua definitiva pubblicazione, il capolavoro agostiniano è stato oggetto di studi filosofici, teologici, storici. Tuttavia è rimasto piuttosto a margine tanto negli studi di filologia latina quanto in quelli di teoria della letteratura. Partendo da questo dato, l'ultimo saggio di Bruna Pieri raccoglie il frutto di una ricerca che si pone l'obiettivo di recuperare la letterarietà di un testo il cui contenuto si è imposto (certo non a torto) al di sopra della forma – forma che, tra l'altro, si rivela già pregna di significato, al punto che tale saggio può costituire utile strumento anche per gli studiosi del pensiero agostiniano.

Il primo dato su cui l'attenzione dell'autrice si sofferma non può che essere quello del genere letterario: la categoria autobiografica, superficialmente autoevidente, ad un'analisi attenta può essere severamente messa in dubbio. *In primis*, perché il dato autobiografico non copre l'intera opera, ma soltanto – come noto – i primi libri (cfr. p. 22); ma soprattutto perché, come Pieri nota, viene meno nell'opera tutta una serie di caratteristiche definitorie del genere. A cominciare dall'oggetto della narrazione, che nelle prime righe del testo sembra essere non Agostino, ma piuttosto Dio: «ad apertura di opera penseremmo di essere di fronte a una 'biografia di Dio' (secondo la fortunata definizione di M. Pellegrino), più che all'autobiografia di Agostino» (*ivi*). Ma anche quando parla di se stesso, Agostino prende le distanze dal suo oggetto, come se stesse parlando di un altro, sentendo il suo io prima della conversione come un estraneo: «quid mihi iam cum eo est, cuius nulla vestigia recolo?» (*Conf*., I, 7, 12); di più, si può avere l'impressione che persino il soggetto della narrazione non sia lui – non solo per quei passi metadiegetici sui quali l'autrice sofferma più volte l'attenzione, ma anche perché Agostino parla spesso con parole di Dio, interpolando il testo con frequenti citazioni scritturali (anche sotto forma di brevi cenni), provando così a rileggere la sua vicenda dal punto di vista di Dio, che riveste anche il ruolo di garante del corretto ricordare di Agostino. Il sigillo di veridicità del testo scritto non è dunque – come invece dovrebbe – il 'patto autobiografico', cioè l'identità tra soggetto e oggetto della narrazione, bensì la *caritas* (elemento a sua volta divino) che lega chi parla e chi ascolta (cfr. p. 23). Tuttavia questo non basta ad escludere l'utilizzo della categoria, approvato dallo stesso Agostino e manifestato nel riferirsi all'opera come 'le *mie* confessioni'; piuttosto, apre alla possibilità di affiancare ad essa altre caratteristiche, come quella del *genus*

laudativo (nel quale l'oggetto non è ovviamente più Agostino, ma Dio: cfr. pp. 27-28) o del protrettico, che più si legano agli aspetti linguistici del testo.

Nel secondo capitolo questo problema (che non ha, come si può ben intuire, esclusivamente una dimensione stilistica, ma entra nel cuore concettuale delle *Confessiones*) viene affrontato da un'altra prospettiva. Nell'interrogarsi sui ruoli della narrazione, alcune cose non tornano: se è vero che Agostino insiste sulla propria funzione di narratore (attraverso un uso costante di *verba loquendi* e riflessioni metanarrative su questa figura), nel proemio al contrario è il suo ruolo di protagonista ad essere messo in dubbio. Se la funzione del proemio è quella di descrivere l'oggetto della narrazione, allora le *Confessiones* saranno «un racconto di conversione che non mira tanto ad essere la storia del percorso spirituale di un uomo, quanto piuttosto del continuo intervento di Dio a determinare tutta la vicenda personale di Agostino» (p. 50). Più evidente (e per molti versi più chiara, anche se non meno varia) è la funzione dei narratari: se il narratario diretto è Dio (a partire dal vocativo *domine*, dal *tibi*, dallo stesso titolo), che risulta paradossalmente più onnisciente del narratore, Agostino riflette esplicitamente sul senso di una *confessio* rivolta a chi già è al corrente di tutto, dei fatti quanto degli stati d'animo che il narratore prova; e all'interno del genere umano, degli uomini ai quali è rivolta quali narratari esterni, figura anche lui stesso, che nelle *Retractationes* si descriverà nell'atto di leggere la sua stessa opera (cfr. *Retract*. II, 6).

A fare da cerniera all'intera opera (della quale molti e in molti modi hanno provato a individuare un'articolata unità di fondo) la memoria, sezionata nel terzo capitolo come memoria narrativa. Al di là della riflessione esplicita sulla memoria nel X libro, Agostino indulge spesso sull'atto del ricordo come preliminare alla prassi della scrittura; ma la memoria appare dilatata, offuscata, manipolata all'interno della struttura narrativa. Così, dopo aver indugiato a lungo su aspetti meno rilevanti della sua vita antecedente alla conversione, salta completamente gli anni precedenti la stesura dell'opera, anticipa eventi che avrebbero dovuto avere un ordine cronologico diverso (cfr. p. 85) e, caso più lampante di manipolazione mnemonica, finge di dimenticare persino il nome della madre di suo figlio – circostanza ben poco credibile, nel cui gioco narrativo emerge il duro giudizio morale sulla sua convivenza prematrimoniale. Tuttavia l'intera serie degli eventi è scomposta dalla volontà agostiniana di non limitarsi a narrare, bensì di rileggere interamente la propria storia, al punto che «tutta la storia del lungo processo di conversione è narrata a partire dalla sua conclusione, che occupa sempre il primo piano del racconto» (p. 85).

Mentre il quarto capitolo si sofferma sulla centralità del tempo (anche in questo caso, oltre la riflessione esplicitata) come limite dell'esperienza umana e della *confessio* stessa, sulla cui temporalità Agostino si sofferma apertamente con l'utilizzo di formule specifiche («con l'espressione *in tempore* egli dà risalto al tempo del racconto inteso come tempo del narratore», p. 127), il quinto e ultimo capitolo si sofferma sulle strategie narrative della metadiegesi e della *mise en abime*, attraverso le quali l'autore inserisce microracconti che preludono, rimandano e consentono di comprender meglio l'intero racconto di conversione.

Il saggio è completato da tre appendici: una traduzione con commento del proemio al libro X, quale testo dalle feconde caratteristiche metanarrative; un'analisi delle metafore del tempo inserite all'interno del testo; infine, una ricerca sul lessico della conversione.

Il testo si segnala dunque agli studiosi di letteratura come interessante strumento di approccio e di analisi tanto all'opera agostiniana quanto alla metanarrazione in generale, della quale le *Confessiones* sono presentate come esempio *par excellence*; ma anche a studiosi più 'ortodossi' del pensiero di Agostino come filosofi e teologi, che avranno la possibilità di confrontarsi con una delle opere cardine del suo pensiero da un punto di vista differente, riconoscendo in tal modo la funzione non solo estetica, ma anche concettuale della forma, della struttura e del lessico delle *Confessiones*.

Giuseppe Palermo

QUIROGA PUERTAS, Alberto J., *The Dynamics of Rhetorical Performances in Late Antiquity*, Routledge, London/New York 2019, x +171 p.

The crucial role of rhetoric in late antique society and politics is a well-known fact. While earlier scholarship often found fault with the seemingly unoriginal and sterile nature of eloquence in the late Roman Empire, more recent research has come to appreciate that rhetorical skill continued to be a key instrument in many situations, be it Christian preaching, mediation in civic conflict, imperial representation, or the enhancement of social status.[45] As in earlier centuries, *paideia*,

[45] Much material can be found in Peter Brown, *Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire*, Madison 1992. Jan R. Stenger, *Hellenische Identität in der Spätantike: Pagane Autoren und ihr Unbehagen an der eigenen Zeit*,

which largely centred on rhetorical training, was still the hallmark of the powerful figures, even though some ecclesiastics and monks challenged this ideal. Alberto Quiroga Puertas intends to shed fresh light on the enduring importance of eloquence in postclassical society by studying not the delivery of the extant speeches themselves, but narrations of rhetorical performances in late antique literature. The performative, often theatrical quality of rhetorical practice in other periods has already attracted great interest; in particular, studies of oratory in democratic Athens and in the Second Sophistic have benefitted from theatre and performance studies.[46] This slim monograph now aims to make sense of the agonistic culture so manifest in late antique public speaking.

In analysing the narrative accounts of rhetorical display, Quiroga is not interested in the practicalities of the performances but wants to explore their significance for the cultural and religious debates of the times (p. 2). Given the wide-ranging title of the book, it is surprising that the analysis deals almost exclusively with Greek writers of the eastern part of the Empire and the fourth century CE. Quiroga examines both pagan and Christian authors, including Themistius, Synesius of Cyrene, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Libanius. While these prominent practitioners of rhetoric certainly should figure in a study on late antique oratory, the author has missed the opportunity to compare them to writers of the Latin West – one may think of Symmachus – and to extend the chronological range beyond the fourth century. Though offering many insightful readings, the rather narrow scope of the book thus limits the significance of its findings.

After an introduction that sets out the rationale and programme of the book, the analysis starts in the first chapter with an account of ancient theory about rhetorical *hupokrisis* or *actio*. The survey focuses on Cicero and Quintilian, showing that with regard to performance, oratory was never far from the theatre stage, while the theorisers were anxious to demarcate their art from the ill-reputed actors. In the second part, the chapter presents selected narratives of mostly failing rhetorical performances from Homer to Philostratus. This cursory survey anticipates that in late antiquity the narratives are also keen on

Berlin 2009. Lieve Van Hoof and Peter Van Nuffelen (eds), *Literature and Society in the Fourth Century AD: Performing Paideia, Constructing the Present, Presenting the Self*, Leiden 2015.

[46] See the important study by Thomas Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht: Zur sozialen und politischen Funktion der zweiten Sophistik in der griechischen Welt der Kaiserzeit*, Munich 1997, which is surprisingly ignored by Quiroga.

performative disasters rather than on successful displays. All this has often been discussed, and Quiroga cannot offer any new thoughts on the material. Furthermore, the function of this survey for the overall argument remains obscure. I am also unsure whether the chronological tour through the theoretical texts is helpful, since there was, as Quiroga himself notices (p. 33), almost no evolution in the views of *hupokrisis*.

Chapter 2 is again divided into two parts: the first studies how the philosophers Themistius and Synesius employed descriptions of rhetorical performances in order to establish themselves as the true philosophers and expose their rivals as mere sophists. The choice of the two intellectuals is well made as in general their thoughts on *paideia* and philosophy have much in common. The second part then investigates how ecclesiastical authors, Eusebius of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus, denounced other churchmen as heretics by framing them as showy orators. In this chapter, the religious dimension comes to the fore, and it is sensible that Quiroga agrees with many recent studies that differences in religious orientation did not necessarily play out in the field of intellectual culture. His analysis shows clearly that Christian and non-Christian elites shared the same culture and used the same strategies to create and distance themselves from the 'charlatans'.[47] However, what receives only superficial treatment is the literary side of the narrations. Quiroga's readings do little to illuminate the exaggeration and caricature that is at work here. He also neglects the entertainment aspect that such invectives certainly had and the authors' ostentation of their own literary accomplishment. These were essential elements in the construction of one's own intellectual standing and in the humiliation of one's antagonists. Further, for an accurate understanding of Christian rhetorical performance, Quiroga should have considered in more detail the Christian ambivalence with regard to rhetoric, as reflected in Augustine's *De doctrina christiana* and Chrysostom's *On the Priesthood*. Unlike their pagan colleagues, ecclesiastical figures had to take into account additional issues such as the mixed composition of their congregations and reservations about traditional *paideia*. Preachers such as Chrysostom frequently propagated the idea that unlettered Christians devoid of any rhetorical training easily defeated the skilled sophists. Therefore, in a Christian context, the denouncement of others' rhetorical shortcomings could mean walking

[47] It is regrettable that Quiroga does not make use here of Richard Lim's observations on public verbal competition in late antiquity (*Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity*, Berkeley 1995).

a tightrope. Here it would have been helpful to contextualise the skirmishes with further inner-Christian intellectual feuds such as that between the erstwhile companions Jerome and Rufinus.

Chapter 3, which is longer than chapters 1 and 2 combined, is evidently intended as the core of the book. It first seeks to demonstrate that the reputation of late antique sophists depended on their failure or success in performative competition (p. 101). Quiroga here examines passages from Eunapius' *Lives*, Himerius' speeches, and Libanius' orations and letters. While this part appears only to illustrate once more the well-studied central place of performances in the sophists' careers, the focus is then Libanius' *Autobiography* (*Or*. 1), with its series of narrations of rhetorical performances. The interpretation largely follows the sophist's own chronological account of his life to reveal the narrations as one of the leitmotifs of the work. The author gives a thorough and detailed analysis of Libanius' invectives against rival sophists and examines the strategies with which the autobiography depicts their flawed performances. Quiroga shows that the Antiochene sophist, following the traditional ideal of the *vir bonus dicendi peritus*, insinuates a strong link between oratorical fiascos and ethical flaws. Although Quiroga has an eye for these passages, his readings do not go beyond existing studies that have noticed the centrality of these stories for Libanius' self-fashioning in the *Autobiography*.[48] Further, closely following the sophist's linear account of his own career does not seem helpful as it reproduces the repetitiveness of the *Autobiography*. A more analytical approach would better elucidate the strategies and implications of Libanius' portrayals of his enemies.

The brief conclusion sums up the main findings: the frequent narrations of rhetorical performances in late antique Greek literature primarily serve to enhance the social status of their authors. Since the writers tend to build their own standing by sullying the reputation of their rivals, we find debacles considerably more often than triumphs in these accounts. Finally, critique of poor rhetorical skill in the competitive society of the fourth century was a vehicle for promoting cultural and religious agendas so that the narrations can be considered an 'identity marker' (p. 162).

[48] See in particular Stenger (cited above), pp. 229-245, and 242-244 on Libanius' self-presentation after the Riot of the Statues, which Quiroga ignores in the analysis of this topic. See also: Raffaella Cribiore, *Libanius the Sophist: Rhetoric, Reality, and Religion in the Fourth Century*, Ithaca 2013.

Quiroga's book illuminates an important aspect of the rhetorical culture of Greek late antiquity. The book lets the pagan and Christian writers mostly speak for themselves and thus allows us a glimpse into their manoeuvres in the social, political, and religious territories of their times. One would have wished, however, that the author had granted key aspects of his topic more space and extended the scope of his analysis by dealing with other major figures, including figures from the Latin West, and by looking beyond the fourth century. Owing to Quiroga's decision to limit his study in this way, the result feels somewhat unbalanced and incomplete. While the first two chapters address the topic often only in a cursory way, Libanius is privileged disproportionately, which is all the more problematic as Quiroga fails to put his self-fashioning into perspective by considering other performers in similar detail. Additionally, the author's aspiration to add to our understanding of the rhetorical culture of the late Empire, even to uncover 'a hermeneutics of late antique times' (p. 2), is not achieved. His picture of the sophists' self-presentation largely confirms what scholars have already stated.

Jan R. Stenger

REXER, Jochen, *Sakrament und Schrift bei Augustinus. Ad inquisitiones Ianuarii und Augustins Deutung von Liturgie und Bibel* (Augustinus – Werk und Wirkung 9), Ferdinand Schoeningh, Paderborn 2020, 382 p.

Das vorliegende Werk wurde im Jahr 2017 von der Evangelisch-Theologischen Fakultät der Universität Tübingen als Habilitationsschrift angenommen, d. h. als Qualifikationsschrift für das Amt des Hochschullehrers. Soviel darf schon hier vorweggenommen werden, daß man nach der Lektüre des Buches davon überzeugt sein darf, daß jede Institution großen Gewinn daraus ziehen dürfte, Herrn Rexer als Dozenten zu ihren Lehrkräften zu zählen. Denn mit dieser Studie weist der Autor nicht nur seine eingehende Kenntnis des Themas und des Faches nach, sondern in der klaren und ansprechenden Form der Darstellung auch seine didaktischen Fähigkeiten.

Die präzise Einleitung in Fragestellung, Forschungsgeschichte und Aufbau (S. 1-8) präsentiert in umfassender Weise die bisherige Forschungsliteratur und identifiziert ihre noch offenen Desiderata, wo sich die vorliegende Studie verortet. Diese bestehen vor allem darin, daß die beiden Briefe Augustins Nr. 54 und 55, die er selbst in seinen

Retractationes (2,20) unter dem Titel *Ad inquisitiones Ianuarii* als zwei Bücher (*libri*) zum Thema „*De sacramentis*" charakterisiert, bisher nicht umfassend analysiert wurden. Zwar wurde ihre Bedeutung für die von der Feier des Osterfestes als ihrem Zentrum ausgehenden Sakramententheologie Augustins sowie sein Liturgieverständnis und seine Pastoral erkannt. Es fehlt aber, wie der Autor präzise definiert, „eine Gesamtdarstellung ..., die Augustins Reflexion über sein Sakraments- und Osterverständnis nach den *inq. Ian.* thematisiert, die eine Gesamtschau eröffnet und die Verbindung seiner Ostertheologie und seiner Deutung der Sakramente" sowie den „Zusammenhang zwischen Augustins Liturgieerklärung und seiner Bibelinterpretation ... vor dem rhetorischen Hintergrund, sowie die Bedeutung der *similitudo*, vor allem in Beziehung zu *sacramentum*" thematisiert (S. 8-9). Dieses Desiderat erfüllen die folgenden vier großen Kapitel der Studie, die organisch aufeinander aufbauen.

Kapitel 1 „Ostern in den zwei Briefen *Ad inquisitiones Ianuarii*" (S. 9-81) führt den Leser mit einer kommentierenden Analyse in Absicht, Thematik und Methodik des Werkes ein, die so in ihrer Ausführlichkeit und Tiefe bisher noch nicht geleistet worden ist. Damit wird die unverzichtbare Grundlage für das Verständnis der folgenden Kapitel gelegt. Dabei wird u. a. die grundlegende Zweigliederung der Antwort Augustins deutlich, nämlich zunächst die liturgische Praxis der sakramentalen Feier (*quomodo faciendum*), woraus sich das Verständnis der Sakramente speist und worin es sich zugleich manifestiert (*quomodo intelligendum*). Diese vorgängige eingehende Analyse bietet so den Schlüssel sowohl für den Erkenntnisfortschritt als auch das Verständnis der folgenden Kapitel.

Kapitel 2 „*Sacramenta facienda* – Ostern bei Augustinus im liturgiegeschichtlichen Kontext" (S. 82-166) beschäftigt sich konsequenterweise mit dem ersten Schritt der Sakramententheologie, nämlich ihrer liturgischen Praxis, am zentralen Beispiel der von Ianuarius angefragten Feier des Osterfestes. Diese wird in ihren historischen, theologischen und katechetisch-pastoralen Kontext gestellt, wozu Augustins zahlreiche Osterpredigten (*sermones* 218-229D) die wichtigsten Kontexte bereitstellen. Augustinus unterscheidet dabei drei grundlegende liturgie-praktische Kriterien der *sacramenta*: (1) biblischer Ursprung, (2) einheitliche universalkirchliche Praxis aufgrund apostolischer bzw. konziliarer Autorität, (3) unterschiedliche lokale Formen der Feier von Sakramenten. Die Sakramentalität der Osterfeier bestehe im *transitus (pascha)*, dem Übergang von der Sünde zur Erlösung, die sich im *mysterium lucis* des Ostertermins manifestiere. „So erweist sich die sakramentale Feier von Ostern als ein zentrales

Thema der Ostertheologie Augustins, das vertieft werden muß. Seine vielfältigen Ostersakramente fordern eine Klärung seines Sakramentenverständnisses“ (S. 166).

Dieser Aufgabe wendet sich Augustinus in seinem zweiten Brief an Ianuarius Nr. 55 und das ihn analysierende Kapitel 3 zu: „*Sacramenta intelligenda – Transitus noster oportet in sacramento celebrari*“ (S. 167-240). Es zeigt, daß Augustinus darin „*sacramentum*“ in dreifachem Sinne verstehe: als Ritus, als Symbol und als Geheimnis. Ersterer manifestiert sich in Taufe, Eucharistie und generell in der Liturgie, der zweite in Hinweisen auf das Heilsgechen wie dem österlichen Mond oder der Zahl der fünfzig Tage der Osterzeit, die schließlich zum mystischen Gehalt dessen führen, was sie bezeichnen. Dabei ist aufschlußreich, daß Augustinus die Begriffe „*sacramentum*“ und „*mysterium*“ nicht streng voneinander unterscheidet, sondern wechselseitig verwendet. „Allen *sacramenta paschalia* gemeinsam ist ihre Verweisfunktion als ein *signum*, das auf eine *res* verweist und einen Bezug hat zu Christus als *res significata*. Für Augustinus wird ... ein *signum* zum *sacramentum* durch *sanctificatio* bzw. *consecratio*“ (S. 233-234).

Diese grundlegende Erkenntnis führt zur Analyse des Zusammenhangs von Wort und Sakrament in Kapitel 4 „*Similitudo sacramenti* – Der Zusammenhang von Schriftverständnis und Sakramentsdeutung“ (S. 241-317). Denn für Augustinus sind die Symbole der Offenbarung in Schöpfung und Heiliger Schrift „*sacramentorum figurae ad informationes mysticas*“ (*inq. Ian.* 2,11; S. 237). Dabei entspricht „das Bezeichnete oder der Inhalt eines *sacramentum*, die *res*“, vermittels einer *similitudo* „dem Bezeichnenden oder Zeichen des *sacramentum*, dem *signum*“ (S. 241). Der Begriff der *similitudo*, den Augustinus aus der klassischen Rhetorik kennt, wird somit in hermeneutischer Funktion zum Verbindungsglied der „*corporalia temporaliaque* und *aeterna et spiritalia*“ (S. 264), von (Schrift-) Wort und Sakrament.

Der Schluß „Die Ostertheologie Augustins als Heiliges Wort und Sakrament“ (S. 318-328) faßt die neuen und umfassenden Ergebnisse der Studie zum Zusammenhang von (liturgischem) Sakrament und Heiliger Schrift präzise zusammen, die das Verständnis der augustiunischen Theologie in diesem Punkt wesentlich voranbringen.

Die üblichen Verzeichnisse und ausführliche Register beschließen das Buch: Abkürzungs-, Quellen- und Literaturverzeichnis, Register zu Bibel, Antiken Autoren und Werken, Modernen Autoren, Lateinischen Wörtern und Begriffen, Namen und Sachen (S. 329-382).

Die Quellen- und Literaturkenntnis ist umfassend, ihre Auswahl treffend, ihre Auswertung erfolgt in origineller Weise und methodisch auf dem höchsten Stand der Forschung. Die Studie steht auf höchstem wissenschaftlichem Niveau und leistet einen wegweisenden Beitrag zum Fortschritt der Augustinusforschung.

Der Band ist auch drucktechnisch mit größter Sorgfalt erstellt worden. Druckfehler finden sich äußerst selten (z. B. S. 129 Pfingstpredigt, S. 351 Hörner, nicht Horner).

Die zahlreichen wichtigen Ergebnisse, die Rexers Studie zur augustinischen Sakramentstheologie und deren Verbindung zu Schrift und liturgischer Praxis erbringt, lassen sich naturgemäß nicht in wenigen Zeilen kommentieren. Ihr wegweisender Charakter erweist sich aber daran, daß sie zu weiteren, vertiefenden Fragestellungen im Rahmen des neu eröffneten Horizontes anregen.

Auf S. 28 und 163 schreibt Rexer: „Der Grund, warum Augustinus Weihnachten und Ostern unterscheidet, ist in der spezifischen Detailfrage des Januarius zu sehen. In anderem Zusammenhang beschreibt er das Weihnachtsfest als Teil des österlichen Erlösungsgeheimnisses." Auf S. 129 fügt er hinzu: „Das Osterfest, sagt Augustinus in den *inq. Ian.*, ist eine *memoria* und wird *in sacramento* gefeiert. Daher stellt sich die Frage, ob und wie Augustinus *memoria, sacramentum* und *transitus* in seinen Osterpredigten vor dem Hintergrund seiner Festpredigten und umfangreichen Predigttätigkeit gebraucht."

Rexer beantwortet diese Frage im folgenden im Rahmen seines Forschungsprojektes für Augustins Osterpredigten und Ostertheologie. Wenn aber auch das Osterfest und nicht nur Weihnachten und die Heiligenfeste eine *memoria* ist, sind alle liturgischen Feste des Jahres grundlegend *memoriae*. Andererseits stuft Augustinus in seinen Weihnachtspredigten (*sermones* 184-196, 369-370) das Weihnachtsfest, ohne darin den Begriff *sacramentum* ein einziges Mal zu verwenden (vgl. CAG), der Sache nach als Teil des *mysterium lucis* ein, d. h. wie Ostern als *transitus* vom Dunkel zum Licht, vom Sichtbaren zu Unsichtbaren (vgl. *sermones* 189,1; 190,1). Darüber hinaus spricht er mehrfach von der *consecratio* des Weihnachtstages (vgl. *sermones* 186,1; 187,1; 188,2; 189,1; 194,1; 185,1), einmal von dessen *sanctificatio* (*sermo* 189,1). Gerade durch diese beiden Vorgänge wird aber, wie Rexer hervorhebt, „ein *signum* zum *sacramentum*" (S. 234).

Es dürfte sich daher lohnen, die weitere Frage zu erforschen, ob nicht alle Festpredigten Augustins auf eine Sakramententheologie geprüft werden sollten, die zwar nicht den Begriff *sacramentum* verwendet, wohl aber dessen Gehalt.

Einen Hinweis in diese Richtung geben Augustins Predigten am 24. Juni, dem Geburtsfest Johannes des Täufers. Als einziger irdischer Geburtstag, den die Kirche zur Zeit Augustins neben dem Jesu Christi feierte (das Fest Mariä Geburt am 8. September entwickelte sich erst ab Ende des 5. Jh.), stellt auch dieser ein *magnum sacramentum*/*magnum mysterium* dar wegen des *mysterium lucis*. Auch Johannes' Geburt geschieht *in magno sacramento* (vgl. *sermo* 290,2-3). Denn ab der Sommersonnenwende am/um den 24. Juni nimmt das Licht ab, weil der Vorläufer, auch wenn er der größte je von einer Frau geborene Mensch ist, kleiner werden muß, während ab dem Geburtstag des Sohnes Gottes am 25. Dezember das göttliche Licht der Erlösung unaufhaltsam wächst (vgl. z. B. *sermo* 289,5).

Auch Johannes' Funktion als Stimme (*vox* – des Rufers in der Wüste; vgl. Jes 40,3; Lk 3,4), die Christus, dem Wort, das das ewige Licht ist (*verbum*/*lux* – vgl. Joh 1,1-14), vorausgeht, um Zeugnis zu geben für das wahre Licht (vgl. Joh 1,6-8), konstituiert ein *magnum sacramentum* (vgl. *sermo* 288,1.4-5).

Nun mag man argumentieren, daß die Predigten Augustins zur Geburt Johannes des Täufers Augustins wegen der einzigartigen Verbindung ihres Festgeheimnisses zu Weihnachten eine „sakramentale" Sonderstellung einnähmen. Dem widersprechen allerdings Formulierungen wie in *sermo* 273,5, der am 21. Januar, dem Fest der hl. Martyrer Fructuosus, Augurius, Eulogius und Agnes gehalten wurde: „ein großes Sakrament (*magnum sacramentum*): wir sind Christi Wohlgeruch an jedem Ort (2 Kor 2,15). Also konstitutiert auch das Vorbild der Martyrer und das christusgemäße Leben der Gläubigen ein *sacramentum*.

Nun könnte man argumentieren, daß es sich bei den beiden Briefen 54-55 *Ad inquisitiones Ianuarii* um ein Frühwerk Augustins ca. aus dem Jahr 400 handelt (vgl. S. 9 mit Anm. 1) und dieser in den weiteren dreißig Jahren seines Lebens und Wirkens seine Sakramententheologie entsprechend entwickelt habe.

Allerdings wird *sermo* 273 üblicherweise in das Jahr 396 datiert (vgl. Pierre-Patrick Verbraken, Études critiques sur les sermons authentiques de saint Augustin, Steenbrugge 1976, 125) bzw. neuerdings „ca. 392-401" (vgl. François Dolbeau, *Sermones (ad populum)*, in: Augustinus-Lexikon 5/1-4, Basel 2019-2020, 312), wofür man gute Gründe ins Feld führen kann. Bei allen Unwägbarkeiten einer zuverlässigen Datierung der Predigten Augustins macht dieses Datum jedenfalls darauf aufmerksam, daß dieser seine liturgische Sakramentstheologie auch schon in frühen Jahren seines theologischen und

pastoralen Wirkens auf alle Feste des Kirchenjahres erweitert haben könnte. Es dürfte sich in jedem Fall lohnen, dieser Frage auf der Basis von Rexers umfangreichen Vorarbeiten nachzugehen.

Hubertus R. Drobner

RICCI, Cristina (ed.), TANNER-EGG, Isabelle (coll.), *Basilea Patristica. Praefationes in Ambrosii, Augustini, Gregorii Magni Opera* (Europa humanistica 21, Répertoires et inventaires III), Brepols, Turnhout 2019, 365 p.

„Was üblicherweise am Rande einer Ausgabe steht, rückt in den Mittelpunkt des vorliegenden Bandes: die *praefationes* zu den Basler Gesamtausgaben von drei prominenten Kirchenvätern der lateinischen Tradition (Ambrosius von Mailand, Augustinus von Hippo und Gregor der Große)." Mit diesen Worten vom Hinterdeckel ist kurz und präzise umrissen, was den Leser in dieser sorgfältig gearbeiteten Edition erwartet. Die mehr als 40 Texte umspannen einen Zeitraum zwischen 1492, der Ambrosius-Edition des Amerbach, und 1556, dem Nachdruck der Augustinus-Edition des Erasmus, und bieten eine breite Palette an Themen: Sie reichen von kurzen technischen Notizen mit wenigen Zeilen bis zu umfangreichen Widmungsbriefen und literaturgeschichtlichen Abhandlungen im Umfang mehrerer hundert Zeilen. Sie bieten nicht nur biographische Daten zu den vorgelegten Kirchenvätern sowie Erörterungen zu ihrem Stil und ihrem theologischen Gedankengut, sondern auch viele zeithistorische Einblicke in die Netzwerke der humanistischen Editoren und Buchdrucker (hier sind vor allem die Namen Amerbach, Froben und Erasmus zu nennen). Man erfährt von umfangreichen Bibliotheksrecherchen, von neugefundenen Werken, von Erörterungen zur Echtheitskritik patristischer Texte, Textkritik und Druckfehlern, und natürlich von harscher Kritik an weltlichen und geistlichen Autoritäten, aber natürlich auch von umfangreichem Lob der Mäzenaten und Widmungsträger, auf deren ideelle und finanzielle Unterstützung die Bearbeiter der Editionen bei ihrer mühsamen und kostspieligen Editions- und Drucktätigkeit bauen durften.

Das Ziel dieser Edition, die auf ein vom Schweizerischen Nationalfonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung unterstütztes Projekt zurückgeht, besteht darin, diese hochinformativen Paratexte „kritisch zu erschließen und zu übersetzen, um dadurch die Grundlage für weiterführende Untersuchungen zu schaffen". Unter

der Leitung der Baseler Latinistin Henriette Harich-Schwarzbauer zeichnen Cristina Ricci vor allem für die kritische Erschließung mit Kommentar der Praefationes und Isabelle Tanner-Egg für die Übersetzungen verantwortlich; die letzte Praefatio des Huldrich Coccius (Koch) zur Gregor-Edition von 1551 wurde von Katharina Suter-Meyer übersetzt.

Die Einleitung erklärt unter anderem, dass sich die Edition auf Praefationes in Epistelform beschränkt (es fehlen daher z.B. die der Vorrede zu Amerbachs Civitas-Edition unmittelbar folgenden Distichen) und die Praefationes zu Hieronymus ausgeklammert werden (sie sollen in einem eigenen Band ediert werden). Im Editionsteil wird jede Textausgabe in einheitlicher Form präsentiert. Regesten informieren über die wichtigsten Daten: den Autor, den Titel, das Impressum (mit Erscheinungsort, Editor und Erscheinungsjahr), den bibliographischen Nachweis des benutzten Exemplars und die Kollation mit der Angabe der Zahl der Bände und ihres jeweiligen Umfangs; in den Fußnoten befindet sich jeweils ein sehr nützlicher Link zu Digitalisaten. Danach folgt unter „Berücksichtigte *praefationes*" neben Angaben zu ihrer Zahl und Sprache eine Aufschlüsselung der einzelnen Texte mit Angabe ihres Verfassers, Anfangs- und Endworten sowie der Datierung und Lokalisierung. Die eigentliche Edition präsentiert wie üblich links den lateinischen Text, rechts die deutsche Übersetzung. Vier knappe Apparate bieten die wesentlichen Informationen zu Textvarianten, Bibelstellen und anderen Quellen sowie einen konzisen historisch-kritischen Kommentar. Ein von Cristina Ricci erstelltes Autorenverzeichnis, das die wesentlichen Informationen zu den edierten Kirchenvätern, den Vorredenverfassern und den Druckern bietet, erlaubt neben einer Bibliographie und einem Personenregister eine rasche und präzise Information zum gewünschten Thema.

Abgesehen von einer Doublette (fünf Zeilen Text sind wiederholt [p. 262,35-39 = p. 262,39-44]) und einigen kleineren Druckfehlern ist die Edition sehr sorgfältig gearbeitet. Leider aber wurde verabsäumt, mit einigen Kleinigkeiten die Benutzerfreundlichkeit zu erhöhen: Zum einen wird bei Verweisen innerhalb der Edition nicht auf die Seitenzahl des vorliegenden Bandes verwiesen, sondern es finden sich eher sperrige Zitate vom Typ „Conr. Leont. *praef. in Ambr*. 1506, *Registrum* (*Si tibi*), ll. 2-19" (so das Zitat p. 156 app.); der Benutzer wäre dankbar, würde ihm mitgeteilt, dass die verwiesene Stelle auf p. 64 zu finden ist, zumal die Kopfzeilen der Edition über fast 300 Seiten hinweg starr immer nur dieselbe wenig hilfreiche Angabe (Basilea Patristica – Text, Kommentar und Übersetzung) bieten und daher das schnelle Auffinden einer bestimmten Praefatio

schwierig ist. Ein zweiter technischer Kritikpunkt ist die mangelhafte Synchronisierung von lateinischem Text und deutscher Übersetzung. Da sie nur an den Absätzen, nicht aber an den Zeilen orientiert ist, kommt es dazu, dass bei längeren Absätzen Teile der Übersetzung (mitunter im Umfang von einer halben Druckseite, z.B. pp. 92f.) auf die nächste Doppelseite verschoben sind und daher lateinischer Text und deutscher Übersetzung nicht nebeneinander stehen. Als dritter technischer Kritikpunkt ist zu bedauern, dass die Seitenzahlen des Frühdrucks nicht am Rand des edierten Texts angegeben sind, was ein Auffinden einer Stelle im Original wesentlich erleichtern würde.

Das größte Problem sehe ich in der Übersetzung. Sie folgt „grundsätzlich der lateinischen Satzstruktur, sieht sich aber gleichzeitig dem Gebot eines lesefreundlichen Textes verpflichtet" (p. 20). Viele Formulierungen wirken aber etwas sperrig und schulmäßig, da sie meines Erachtens zu nahe an der lateinischen Lexik und Syntax hängen. Das gilt zum Beispiel für den Begriff *sermo*, der selten mit „Predigt", sondern meist mit „Rede" wiedergegeben wird, oder buchtechnische Ausdrücke wie z.B. p. 164,5: *incipit quam foelicissime*] „beginnt möglichst glücklich" (ich gestehe, ich wüsste keine passende deutsche Übersetzung). Vor allem Infinitiv, Partizipial- und Gerundivkonstruktionen sind oft sehr schematisch übersetzt (z.B. p. 98,123: iuberentur occidi] die Übersetzung „den Befehl erhält, getötet zu werden" ist widersinnig; p. 248,379: sibi promisit futurum, ut … crederetur] *futurum ut* umschreibt den passiven Konjunktiv des Futurums und sollte nicht mit „für die Zukunft" übersetzt werden; p. 312,27: ob indicem concinnandum] „wegen dem [!] Index, der zusammengefügt werden musste"). Darüber hinaus verdunkeln mehrere fehlerhafte oder sinnwidrige Übersetzungen den Gedankengang (s.u.).

Trotz dieser Kritikpunkte – ein kritisches Lektorat hätte nicht geschadet – kann das Buch als gelungener Beitrag zur Rolle Basels als Brennpunkt der europäischen Buchproduktion gelten und man darf mit Vorfreude auf den angekündigten Band mit den Vorreden zu Hieronymus warten.

Details zur **Übersetzung**: p. 36,44: *sathanae* ist wohl parallel zu *inimicis* als Dativ zu verstehen; p. 62,123: folium octonis alphabetis litteris esse signatum] nicht „ist jedes einzelne Blatt des Oktavs mit alphabetischen Buchstaben versehen", sondern „… mit je acht Buchstaben des Alphabets …" (das Original, das übrigens richtiges *alphabeti* bietet, führt nur je vier Buchstaben pro Doppelseite an<9; p. 64,7: *labor* bezeichnet nicht die Mühe des Editors bei der Anfertigung eines Verzeichnisses, sondern die Mühe, die der Leser ohne dieses Hilfsmittel hätte; p. 64,11: *acriter reprehensum* bedeutet als

Gegensatz zu *modeste laudatum* „scharf kritisiert" und nicht „widerlegt"; p. 68,8: *en* ist keine latinisierte Form der griechischen Präposition ἐν, sondern eine Interjektion „sieh da!"; p. 76,25: *in fronte* bedeutet sicherlich nicht „am Rande der Bücher", sondern „auf dem Titelblatt", bzw. „im Vorwort". Im Gegensatz zu ihren vollmundigen Ankündigungen an prominenter Stelle (*in fronte*) erzielen die kritisierten schlechten Editoren bei der Durchführung ihrer Edition (*in processu*) keinen sichtbaren Fortschritt; p. 86,4: non indigna lectu cuiuscunque sunt] Erasmus hebt den Wert der pseudepigraphen Werke hervor. Die Übersetzung „weil es nicht unwert ist, von jemandem gelesen zu werden" ist nicht korrekt, richtig wäre „weil sie nicht unwert sind gelesen zu werden, von wem sie auch stammen"; p. 88,8: *praescriptio* ist ein juristischer Terminus „Einrede", nicht „Titel"; p. 94,65: eo legat] nicht „er schickt ihn dorthin", sondern „er betraut ihn damit"; p. 114,7 die Worte *de verbis apostoli* sind eine nähere Bestimmung zu *25. Augustini*, also „die 25. (Predigt) bei Augustinus (d.h. in der Sammlung) *Über die Worte des Apostels*"; p. 138,57: ut contra malorum omnium impressiones firmiores simus] das Wort *impressio* kann hier wohl nur so viel wie „das Bedrängen" bedeuten, aber nicht „Druckerzeugnisse"; p. 138,75: libris … omni … genere disciplinarum refertis] refertis ist Perfektpartizip zu *refercio* („voll") und nicht zu *refero* („bezogen"); eine ähnliche Verwechslung liegt wohl auch in p. 190,6 und p. 288,70 (trotz der richtigen Bemerkung in der Fußnote) vor; p. 140,90 ut dicere coeperam] nicht „wie ich zu sagen pflegte", sondern „wie ich begonnen hatte zu sagen", eine geläufige Wendung am Ende einer Digression; p. 140,102: ingenio dumtaxat suo iudicioque plusquam debeant fidunt] nicht „(solange die Herausgeber) nur ihrem Talent vertrauen, mehr als sie der Urteilskraft verpflichtet sind", sondern „nur ihrem Talent und ihrer Urteilskraft über Gebühr vertrauen"; p. 142,115: undecunque conquisitis veteribus et castigatis libris] nicht „nachdem ich die alten und überarbeiten (sic!) Bücher von überall her zusammengetragen hatte", sondern „nachdem ich die alten Bücher von überall her zusammengetragen und überarbeitet hatte"; p. 144,143: quin semper] nicht „dass es nicht immer", sondern „ohne dass es immer"; p. 144,160: abolitam atque e manibus excussam … velim] nicht „von Hand angefertigte <Vita> für ungültig erklären möchte", sondern „für ungültig erklären und aus der Hand schlagen möchte"; p. 148,2: ex epistolis Erasmi cuilibet ipsorum praemissis cum catalogo eiusdem librorum] hier rekurriert der Verfasser auf die Vorreden des Erasmus und seinen Werkkatalog, die den einzelnen Bänden seiner Ambrosiusausgabe vorangestellt werden; *eiusdem* verweist

auf Erasmus und kann daher kaum mit „ebendieses <Bandes>“ übersetzt werden; p. 150,13: qualis citra controversiam is est, qui] nicht „bei dem es sich zweifelsohne um den gleichen handelt, der”, sondern schwächer „von welcher Art zweifelsohne der ist, der”; p. 156,24: obtruserant] nicht „zurückgehalten hatten”, sondern „aufgedrängt hatten”; p. 170,93: o beatae sanctae matris tuae Monicae lachrymae] *beatae* ist wohl zu *lachrymae*, *sanctae* zu *Monicae* zu beziehen, aber wohl nicht beides auf *lachrymae*; p. 176,31: *quinquagena* ist t.t. der Enarrationesedition „Gruppe von fünfzig Psalmen”; p. 180,3: quod adhuc in cathecumino … coruscavit] nicht „etwas, das bisher im Katechumene (sic!) … schimmerte”, sondern „etwas, das in ihm, als er noch Katechumene … war, aufstrahlte”; p. 182,2: lumen Augustiniani ingenii fulgores circumundique emissurum in Christi ecclesia … nosci … promeruit] *in Christi ecclesia* gehört kaum gemeinsam mit *circumundique* zu *emissurum*, sondern zum folgenden: „das Licht des augustinischen Geistes, das im Begriffe war seinen Glanz überall zu verbreiten, hatte es verdient, in der Kirche Christi gekannt … zu werden”; p. 190,6: quod a praestantiori disputatione De civitate Dei merito inscribitur opus] nicht „dieses Werk, das aufgrund der ziemlich vorttrefflichen Abhandlung mit Recht den Titel *Über den Gottesstaat* trägt”; *praestantiori* ist ein echter Komparativ „dieses Werk, das nach der vortrefflicheren Abhandlung …” (Vorbildstelle ist Aug. retract. 2,43: *titulum tamen a meliore acceperunt ut de civitate dei potius vocarentur*); p. 190,9: quamquam ea sit … elegantia, ea rerum … noticia, is orationis splendor … ut] in der Übersetzung ist die originale Syntax (ein durch dreimaliges *is* bzw. *ea* vorbereiteter Konsekutivsatz) völlig verkannt; p. 190,23: in assertione libertatis] nicht „im Beharren auf ihrer Freiheit”, sondern „bei der Verteidigung der Freiheit”; p. 190,26: non sustinuit antiquus ille serpens] nicht „bot jener alte Drache … keine Unterstützung”, sondern „konnte … es nicht ertragen”, p. 200,2: perinde ac novo principio] nicht „eine neue Grundlage (zu schaffen)”, sondern „gleichsam mit einem neuen Beginn”; p. 204,7: contra … impiissimi Arri sectatores] nicht „gegen … die höchst falschgläubigen Anhänger … des Arius”, sondern „gegen … die Anhänger des höchst falschgläubigen Arius”; p. 206,14: cum hac mea protestatione] nicht „so meine Zusicherung”, sondern „unter diesem meinem Vorbehalt”; p. 206,25: litteris utcunque scriptis caducisque] nicht „in … jedenfalls vergänglichen Buchstaben geschriebenen (Exemplaren)”, sondern „in Buchstaben, die wie auch immer geschrieben und verblasst sind”; p. 224,89: paulatim inveterato morbo mederetur] *paulatim* ist nicht auf *inveterato*, sondern auf

mederetur zu beziehen, also: „nach und nach die zur Gewohnheit gewordene Sucht zu heilen"; p.226,119: a sordido quaestu et hunc comitari solitis litibus] nicht „vor schmutzigem Gewinn … und dass letztere begleitet wird von den üblichen Streitigkeiten", sondern „vor schmutzigem Gewinn und den gewöhnlich damit einhergehenden Streitigkeiten"; p. 272,4: in his fere solent notarii quod dicebatur excipere, nonnumquam qui dicturus erat vel antequam dicere digerebat in schedam quod parabat disserere, vel quod dixerat litteris mandabat] Dieser Satz wurde missverstanden. Er handelt vom Prozess der Verschriftlichung von Predigten (zugleich, vorher oder nachher): „in diesen (d.h. in den Predigten) zeichnen die Stenographen gewöhnlich auf, was gesagt wurde; manchmal notierte der Prediger, bevor er sprach, das, was er sagen wollte, auf einem Zettel, oder vertraute der Schrift an, was er gesagt hatte"; p. 286,40: maluit aliis iudicandi munus cedere] nicht „wollte er die Aufgabe des Urteilens meiden", sondern „wollte er die Aufgabe des Urteilens lieber anderen überlassen"; p. 286,53: *suaviter* ist auf *aspirantibus* und nicht auf *invehitur* zu beziehen; p. 298,11: ὅτι χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά ἔστιν] nicht „dass das Schwierige schön ist", sondern, „dass das Schöne schwierig ist"; p. 300,29: iisque conferendis et describendis] nicht „dem, was man zusammentragen und ordnen musste", sondern in Hinblick auf die Editionstechnik „dem, was man kollationieren und abschreiben musste"; p. 300,36: sed et in reliquis sigillatim ostendentes, tum quae Augustinum patrem referunt, tum quae alios parentes exprimunt] nicht „sondern im Übrigen auch einzeln aufzeigen, was einerseits an Augustinus als Urheber erinnert, was andererseits andere Autoren zum Ausdruck bringen", sondern „sondern auch im Übrigen einzeln aufzeigen, was einerseits an Augustinus als Urheber erinnert, was andererseits auf andere Autoren hinweist"; p. 312,46: quorum etiamsi postremus tempore, haud tamen doctrina … extitit] nicht „auch wenn er unter diesen als letzter (aufgrund der Zeit, nicht aber wegen der Lehre …) auftrat", sondern „unter denen er als letzter, zwar in Hinblick auf die Zeit, nicht aber in Hinblick auf die Lehre … auftrat"; p. 316,95: aliter atque hactenus distinguendorum] nicht „anders und derart zu unterscheiden", sondern „anders als bisher zu gliedern"; p. 318,113: serie orationis] nicht „(durch) die Ordnung", sondern „(durch) den Stil".

Im folgenden noch einige Kleinigkeiten zu **Druckfehlern**: p. 46,130: excederet] excederetur; p. 86,2: ἠθικά (so auch p. 21 Anm. 52)] ἠθικά; p. 140,85 ira] ita; p. 144,146 dissidebamus] diffidebamus; p. 170,98: sermone] sermonem; p. 184,4: sncto] sancto; p. 186,2: usque] usquam; p. 196,17: versus] versu; p. 196,27:

excellentissimi] excellentissimum (übersetzt wurde der richtige Text); p. 216,11: τῷ] τῳ̃; p. 322,150: dubius] dubium; **Bibelstellen**: p. 44,109: cf. Ps. 18,7; p. 216,11: cf. Rom. 12,3; p. 262,27: cf. Ps. 68,10; **Quellen**: p. 68,10f.: Der Vers *sic nunc codicibus istis trans ora virorum* / *doctorum volitans* nimmt eine Anleihe aus dem berühmten Grabepigramm des Ennius (var. 18 Vahlen); p. 154,22 *multo relinctu per iugulum revocare* („unter großem Verlust durch ihre Kehle widerrufen")] Bei der Wendung, die den Rückruf eines voreilig edierten Texts beschreibt, handelt es sich wohl um eine Anspielung auf eine noch unidentifizierte (Dichter?)Stelle, Morphologisch und sachlich zutreffend wäre, *relinctu* nicht von *relinquere* (bzw. *relictus*), sondern von einem bei Osbern von Gloucester (herzlichen Dank an Gerard Duursma vom ThLL!) und Pontano belegten Verb *relingere* (bzw. *relinctus* „wieder auflecken") abzuleiten. Zu *per iugulum revocare* in selber Verwendung vgl. die wenige Jahre zuvor erschienenen Satire 7 des Lambertus Hortensius; p. 190,19: paucis animum adverte docebo] cf. Verg. Aen. 4,115: paucis adverte docebo; p. 228,141: Africa semper aliquid novi mali solet gignere] antike lateinische Quelle dieses griechischen Sprichworts ist Plin. nat. hist. 8,42; p. 248,379: repererunt similes labra lactucas] antike lateinische Quelle dieser Redensart ist Lucil. 1299 (cf. Hier. epist. 7,5; Otto, Sprichwörter 182f.); **Kommentierung**: p. 56,32 gemeint ist die letzte Predigt der Sammlung mit dem Titel „De baptismo sancti Augustini", eine Fälschung aus dem Kreis der Augustiner-Eremiten (vgl. p. 114,13); p. 74,19: laudum praeconia Paulinus episcopus elegantissime prosecutus est] Mehrere Gründe sprechen dafür, dass mit *Paulinus episcopus* nicht der Bischof von Nola, sondern der Mailänder Diakon und Verfasser einer Ambrosiusvita gemeint ist: Erstens geht seine Vita dem Widmungsbrief unmittelbar voran, zweitens nimmt der Brief wenige Zeilen zuvor auf die bei Paulinus genannte Bienenlegende Bezug, drittens setzt der Brief mit den Worten *et nos itidem sequenti* (!) *epistolari prooemio* fort und viertens erhält der Diakon auch im Frontispiz des Frühdrucks den Titel Bischof; p. 178,8-16: Hier wäre ein Hinweis auf die evozierten Werke angebracht: Contra Academicos, De beata vita, De ordine und vermutlich De libero arbitrio; p. 184,18] Mit *Contra partem Donati* ist das retract. 2,5 genannte, aber heute verlorene Werk gemeint und nicht der erhaltene, retract. 1,20 genannte Psalmus contra partem Donati; p. 200,5] Nur einige Teile (von in euang. Ioh.) sind tatsächlich im genannten Zeitraum 414-416/17 entstanden; p. 218,15: in Cypriano spiritum veneramur martyrio dignum] Warum hier eine Anspielung auf das pseudo-cyprianische Werk De duplici martyrio vorliegen soll, ist unklar; p. 254,452:

ut ex ipsius aliquot scriptis apparet] Erasmus bezieht sich auf Aug. epist. 224 und retract. epil.; p. 260,20: alicubi putat epistolam non videri] cf. Aug. retract. 2,10; **Bibliographie**: Ich vermisse die Verwendung des Augustinus-Lexikons; p. 42.336f. der Koeditor neben Joseph Zycha heißt Karl Vrba (nicht Urba).

Clemens Weidmann

RIEDWEG, Christoph, HORN, Christoph, WYRWA, Dietmar (eds), *Philosophie der Kaiserzeit und der Spätantike* (Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie der Antike 5), Schwabe Verlag, Basel 2018, 3 volumes, 2599 p.

Reviewing an immense, highly elaborate, and meticulously articulated three-volume history of Roman and late antique philosophy, co-authored by fifty-eight specialists from seventeen countries and edited by three eminent scholars assisted by fourteen collaborators, which forms part of the standard German History of Philosophy into the bargain, feels like naively or at any rate fatally instantiating Aesop's fable about the wren carried on the eagle's back.[49] On the other hand, the only way in which reviewing books of this sort and quality can in principle be of some use is to point out possible shortcomings and to suggest possible alternatives to the narrative emerging from, or the assumptions permeating, the work under review.

The tripartite volume, forming part of a history of Greek and Roman philosophy, naturally includes a considerable number of titles (as required by the guidelines of the Überweg series), terms, phrases, and sentences in Greek and Latin, as well as two respective glossaries. More often than not, the Greek material is fine. From time to time, however, mistakes pop up. Errors such as Ἀντιοχεὶς (p. 1500; *lege* Ἀντιοχεῖς), *Συμμικτὰ* (p. 1582; *l. Σύμμικτα*), *Ἐρανίστης* (p. 1624; *l. Ἐρανιστής*), *Ἐκκλεσιαστική* (p. 1626; *l. Ἐκκλησιαστική*), *Αἱρητικής* (p. 1626; *l. Αἱρετικῆς*), *Κράτυλον* (p. 1915; *l. Κρατύλον*) and Ἀμμονίου (p. 2009; *l.* Ἀμμωνίου) have no consequences for meaning. Misspellings of Greek words as trivial as 'man' (ἀνθρώπον, p. 2256; *l.* ἄνθρωπον), 'life' (βιοῦ, p. 1501; *l.* βίου), 'book' (βίβλιον, p. 1919; *l.* βιβλίον), 'young men' (νεούς, p. 1526; *l.* νέους), 'knowledge' (ἐπίστημη, p. 1935; *l.* ἐπιστήμη), 'first' (πρώτον and πρώτιστας,

[49] Fable 238 = Perry 434 (Plutarch of Chaeronea, *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 806E10-F6).

p. 1921 and 1936; *l.* πρῶτον and πρωτίστας), Ἀθήναν (p. 1926; *l.* Ἀθηνᾶν), 'thought' (βούλη, p. 895; *l.* βουλή), 'In defence of' (Ὕπερ, p. 787; *l.* Ὑπὲρ), 'hatred' (μίσου, p. 568; *l.* μίσους), 'wherefrom' (ποθέν, p. 905; *l.* πόθεν), 'categories' (κατηγορίων, p. 387; *l.* κατηγοριῶν); 'doctrines' (δόγματων, p. 1351; *l.* δογμάτων), 'honour' (τίμην, p. 2257; *l.* τιμήν), 'quality' (ποίοτης, p. 2070; *l.* ποιότης), 'potentially' (δύναμει, p. 1406; *l.* δυνάμει), 'intent' (σκόπου, p. 1548; *l.* σκοποῦ), 'statues' (ἀνδρίαντας, p. 1616; *l.* ἀνδριάντας), 'three-dimensional' (τρίχῃ, [*l.* τριχῇ] διαστατόν; p. 2043), 'Holy Scripture' (θείᾳ γράφῃ, p. 1470; *l.* θείᾳ Γραφῇ), 'second' in feminine singular (δεύτερα οὐσία, p. 1531; *l.* δευτέρα οὐσία), 'eternity' (ἀιδιοτήτος, p. 1921; *l.* ἀιδιότητος), 'relative' (πρὸς τί, p. 2070; *l.* πρός τι), come as a shock. Besides, some of the mistakes occurring in the very titles of the ancient Greek writings are misleading. For example, ἔλεγος (p. 902; *l.* ἔλεγχος) simply lacks a letter but coincidentally results in producing a different word; and *συναϊδίως* (p. 2214; *l.* *συναΐδιος*) renders the title syntactically nonviable. Other mistakes can puzzle the reader. Δεδηλώκα μὲν (p. 1915; *l.* δεδηλώκαμεν) for a moment puts one in the situation of those who received a Delphic oracle admitting of double reading. Περὶ οὐσίαν τὸ ποῖον (p. 2015; *l.* περὶ οὐσίαν τὸ ποιόν) does not admit of any reading, whereas αἰσθητικῆς οὐσίας (p. 1580) should be restored to αἰσθητῆς οὐσίας. The sex of Σεραπίδος (p. 353) should be restored (Σεράπιδος). Α΄ – η΄ Φυσικῆς (p. 407; *l.* Α – Η Φυσικῆς) mistakenly turns the letters placed on the books of Aristotle's *Physics* into numbers. Ἐναρμονικόν (p. 509; *l.* ἐναρμόνιον) does not exist. And ἐνυπόστασις, which figures in the Greek glossary, does not exist either (it should presumably read ἐνυπόστατον, which occurs on p. 2296). This holds for the anagrammed κρατερία (p. 188; *l.* καρτερία), too. Κάλλους ἀρχέτυπος, as it stands, does not make sense and can hardly find a place in a glossary. As with all the terms in the glossaries, the reader is offered no indication as to where to find it in the book; it is only by cross-referencing the Plotinian passage referred to on p. 1303 that one can understand what the integral term (if term at all) is, namely, λόγος κάλλους ἀρχέτυπος. Κατόρθωσις does occur in the ancient Greek philosophical literature, but is much less frequent than κατόρθωμα, which, however, does not figure in the glossary. True, the glossary faithfully gathers the term as it stands in the relevant chapter, i.e., that on Arius Didymus (p. 306); but even in Arius' *Epitome*, κατόρθωσις occurs only once, whereas κατόρθωμα occurs sixteen times. In the Latin glossary, 'inanes' should be corrected to 'inane' (the void). Both in the relevant chapter and in the

index of proper names, the person recorded as 'Hipparchias' should be restored to her sex as 'Hipparchia'. (Incidentally, in recent decades, misspelling Greek tends to be rather typical even of several prestigious scholarly books on Greek philosophical thought; there is even a – fortunately very small – number of publications built on misread or plainly misunderstood words, phrases, and passages from editions of Greek writings.) That the glossaries do not refer the reader to book pages implies that they are intended to be of independent value; they are supposed to include the most remarkable philosophical terms of the period covered by the volumes. Still, doing so by means of the traditional tool of a glossary appended to a printed book is an impossible project or, at least, a project that can be implemented in so many different ways (mainly as far as the inclusion-exclusion criteria are concerned but also with regard to the difficult question of what counts as a term and what does not) that one can easily challenge any of them. So, I will not insist on this point.

As far as I can tell, references to sources are in most cases accurate (one of the few exceptions occurs on p. 322; 217b7-9 should read 219b7-9). Rarely, references to sources and studies for certain concrete claims are lacking. For instance, what is said on p. 1534 about Basil of Caesarea's doctrine of the divine "essence" and "energies" is silently but directly based on his *Epistle 234*, paragraph 1, ll. 27-31;[50] the unspecialized reader has almost no chance to easily find this on his own.

Much more essential (and debatable) is what might be called an excessively wide (or, from another perspective, loose) focus, or over-inclusiveness. What counts, from the scholarly point of view, as philosophy in history, or better, as philosophy? Sauntering along the pages devoted to Christian authors makes one wonder in what respect and to what extent the relevant set of passages would differ from some equally elaborate history of Christian theology (probably to be labeled 'History of Christian Dogma in Antiquity' or so) of the same historical period; besides the fact that dogma would be contextualised in ecclesiastical history, extensive coincidence would presumably arise not only as far as the list of figures and writings but also as far as themes and even doctrines would be concerned. Nowadays, for a number of non-scholarly and scholarly reasons, asking for definitions of historical objects such as 'philosophy', which is taken as one thing, and religion-based 'theology', which is taken as another, is not fashionable; urging things

[50] Ed. Y. Courtonne, *Saint Basile. Lettres. Texte établi et* traduit, tome III, Paris 1966, 42.

in this direction is promptly decried as narrow-minded and methodologically flawed, in particular as anachronistic (cf. Preface, p. XX) and even ideologically biased, i.e., Enlightenment-tempered. Still, current reluctance to draw such demarcation lines does not spring from any well-established or well-elaborated way of classification allegedly more reliable than using Porphyry's *praedicabilia* as tools of distinguishing and classifying things. For example, it does not go without saying that creating in a history of philosophy, however long it is allowed to be, specific paragraphs on, e.g., Severus of Antioch and Hypatius of Ephesus (pp. 2236-2246) is justifiable. If mentioning figures of such a kind is somewhat useful, it is so only *per accidens,* not *substantialiter*, if philosophy is to be recognized as a distinct form of intellectual activity; and it should be somehow justifiable before the reader's eyes that this *per accidens* is not tantamount to *par accident*. To put it in Augustinian terms, it is in principle desirable that it be clear to the reader interested, and the student engaged, in the development of philosophy through history what extra-philosophical historical information and which figures, writings, and doctrines included are for one's *uti* and what for one's *frui*. Furthermore, the proportion between *uti*- and *frui*-material should be reasonable; what can count only as 'context' should be reduced to a reasonable amount in comparison to what deserves to count as 'text'.

The reader is informed that "the selection of material is based 'less on the current concept of philosophy than on what counted as philosophy or what was thematically linked to it in the epoch to be portrayed' (H. Holzhey, Foreword to the first volume of *Die Philosophie der Antike* in the Überweg series). This explains, *inter alia*, the detailed treatment of the Orphic writings or of general theological questions in this volume" (p. XX). Still, the core notion of this statement, i.e., "the current concept of philosophy", stands in need of disambiguation. For, on one hand, there are the various views among present philosophers themselves about what philosophy is; variety in this field is quite expected, as philosophers are the subjects of philosophy and see things each in their own – usually exclusivist – way. On the other hand, in the scholarly field of the history of philosophy, philosophers (I mean their thoughts) are considered as objects of study, and a denominator is supposed to be established so that history of philosophy regards a really existing and distinct entity. Without such a preliminary discussion, over-inclusion – literally speaking – is unavoidable; for instance, drawing demarcation lines between history not only of theology but also of ideas or science or literature would not be sustainable. Calling such a discussion difficult to carry out or

casting doubt on how far agreement can be reached is understandable, but such concerns do not cancel the need for having the discussion. Regarding this exercise as pointless or even harmful, as far as implementing the task of grasping the philosophical thought of the past is concerned, is tantamount to committing the error allegedly to be avoided. This approach, which claims that its open-mindedness aims at doing justice to what philosophy was in this or that historical period without privileging the "current concept of philosophy", has in fact succumbed from the outset to the non-scholarly post-modern exigency that everything can in principle count as everything, provided one simply raises a claim to this effect; postulating that scholarly branches should have (defined) objects of study would sound too Aristotelian to be followed. Or, even this is Aristotelian; for, to Aristotle, the history (of anything) is not *scientia*. But perhaps this type of cure is worse than the disease itself.

Be that as it may, sometimes contributors seem to feel the need to highlight the philosophical aspect of the thought of this or that Christian author. But even this concession only turns out to underscore the problem just noted. For example, the main part of the chapter on Diodore of Tarsus (pp. 1597-1605) is divided into "Dogmatik", "Bibelauslegungen", and "Philosophie". The last term is by definition the only one pertinent to a history of philosophy, and yet that section is exclusively devoted to Diodore's *Contra Fatum* on the basis of Photius' report about it (*Bibliotheca* 223), who, as a good philologist, plausibly classifies the work as a piece of Christian polemics (not as a philosophical writing) ("…σπουδάζει τὴν τῆς εἱμαρμένης πλάνην κατενεγκεῖν…"), assessing Diodore's arguments as partly successful and partly merely rhetorical and superficial.

Further, given the all-inclusive tendency that marks the overall conception of the book, it comes as a surprise that not even a single paragraph is devoted to Gregory the Great; and, precisely because of the overall conception, one would not be inclined to think that this is due to the humanist or Illuminist denigration of his mentality as emblematic of religious 'obscurantism'. Arguing that Gregory was so much less 'philosophic' than, e.g., Arius (pp. 1478-1490) or Apollinarius (pp. 1574-1579) that the pope should be skipped would hardly be convincing. In the same vein, if the reader is supposed to be so wide-minded as to be prepared to meet with figures traditionally (and not unreasonably) held to be mainly, even exclusively, theological, then, granted that the book still reads "Philosophie" in its title, (s)he would gladly be offered, among other things, a paragraph on Eutherius of Tyana (first half of the 5th c. AD). Indeed, in his main writing,

Antilogia, Eutherius offers a philosophically interesting discussion of the rationality of faith vs. ecclesiastical authority with an emphasis on the psychological and epistemological dimension of faith as a mental act,[51] which discussion anticipates ideas only to be rendered widely known much later by thinkers such as John Locke and Jean Le Clerc. Reminding us of Augustine (p. 1711), Eutherius involves in his discussion the Stoic-in-origin *συγκατάθεσις* / *assensio* and warns against temerarious or non-sensical assent.

Likewise, a follower of Eunomius, Julian, who is not mentioned in the volume (not to be confused with Julian of Halicarnassus), authored (in 379/380 AD, I would argue) a *Commentary on "Job"*, which definitely is of some philosophical import, at any rate much more so than the writings of several purely ecclesiastical figures whose names appear on the list of entries. For instance, Julian's anti-astrological arguments are of some interest,[52] and his doctrine of divine providence[53] is most probably directly based on Plotinus' *Enneads* III, 2, 3.

As for Eunomius himself, the theological orientation of the overall plan of the book granted him a specific entry (pp. 1492-1493), but this one-page treatment only concerns his "Leben" and "Werke"; his thought, by contrast, is presented in the course of the two-page-long section "Verhältnis zur Philosophie" of the entry "Neuarianismus". The presentation mostly reproduces Gregory of Nyssa's polemical deformation of Eunomius' thought, as well as J. Daniélou's covertly inimical, obviously superficial, and oftentimes erroneous account of it,

[51] See chs. I-II, VI, X, and XVII; ed. M. Tetz, *Eine Antilogie des Eutherios von Tyana* (Patristische Texte und Studien 1), Berlin 1964, 4-7; 13; 20-22; 34-36; cf. *Euthèrios de Tyane. Protestation. Lettres. Texte de M. Tetz. Introduction, traduction et notes par J. Paramelle. Avec la collaboration de L. Neyrand* (Sources chrétiennes 557), Paris 2014, 86-98; 120; 148-152; 198-206 ("…Νεύμασιν ἀναποδείκτοις ἀκολουθήσω…; …Τοῦτο… λέγουσιν ἐπ' ἐξουσίας, οὐκ ἔκ τινος ἀκολουθίας… …Προστάττουσι τοῖς μὲν ὠσὶν ἀκούειν, τῇ δὲ καρδίᾳ μὴ συνιέναι μηδὲ τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῶν λεγομένων σκοπεῖν… …Οὐ δεῖ γυμνὰ νοημάτων ἁρπάζειν τὰ ῥήματα… …'Πίστιν' ὀνομάζει τὴν ἀβασάνιστον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀσυστάτοις καὶ ἀναποδείκτοις ἐπὶ βλάβῃ συγκατάθεσιν. Ἀλόγως πιστεύσω καὶ μὴ ἐξετάσω τί δυνατὸν… ἢ Θεῷ φίλον ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σύμφωνον…; …Τί κέρδος ἔξω τῇ διανοίᾳ τῇ μηδὲν τούτων λογιζομένῃ; …Μήτε χωρὶς λόγου πιστεύοντες μήτε χωρὶς πίστεως λέγοντες"). This sounds like it is addressing Theodotus of Ancyra's (*post* 381 – *ante* 446) Orthodox fideism: "Ὁμολογῶ … τὸν αὐτὸν Θεὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον… Πίστευε τῷ θαύματι, καὶ μὴ ἐρεύνα λογισμοῖς τὸ γενόμενον. … Καταλιπὼν λογισμοὺς τὴν πίστιν ἀνάλαβε" (Oration in the Council of Chalcedon, 431 AD; ed. E. Schwartz, *Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum*, tome I, vol. 1, part 1, Berlin 1927, 89,31-34).

[52] Ed. D. Hagedorn, *Der "Hiobkommentar" des Arianers Julian* (Patristische Texte und Studien 14), Berlin 1973 (repr. Berlin and New York 2011), 106; 252-262.

[53] *Op. cit*., 65.

dressed with some speculations expressed in several more recent pieces of scholarship. Theological orientation is reflected in the very place of Eunomius in the overall plan of the book. From the dogmatic and ecclesiastical point of view, placing him in the Arian neighbourhood is more than natural. Still, it is not made clear what differentiates the philosophical part of his thought from the philosophical thought of the so-called great Cappadocians, a label whose objectively inherent assumptions – i.e., that the thought of the three "great Cappadocians" is more or less uniform, so as to be distinguishable from the thought of others, and that Eunomius (a Cappadocian, too) is, from the philosophical point of view, of lesser import than them – do not go without saying, especially in view of the *damnatio memoriae* officially imposed on Arius and Eunomius alike.

One might even go as far as to remark that the grounds for including Basil and Gregory Nazianzen in the history of philosophy for their time are not clear. Indeed, this remark has already been made on the occasion of their inclusion in the thematically similar two-volume *Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity*.[54] True, interpreting Gregory's celebrated phrase ἁλιευτικῶς, ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀριστοτελικῶς as an expression of pride for "reasoning more like a fisherman than an Aristotelian"[55] is as wrong as the equivalent traditional fideistic interpretation, which sees in the phrase a declaration of the superiority of Revelation to philosophy. For, in fact, as its context clearly shows,[56] Ἀριστοτελικῶς is simply a metonymy for meticulous or perplexed or quarrelsome or deceitful discourse,[57] used in the context of Gregory's point that the Orthodox should not impair themselves by insisting on potentially dividing details but rather unanimously

[54] Ll. P. Gerson (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity*, Cambridge 2010.

[55] See D. King, "What Is Philosophy in Late Antiquity?", *Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture* 7 (2013) 90-100, at 95.

[56] Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oratio XXIII*, 12, 11-18: "Ταῦτα ὡς ἐν βραχέσι πεφιλοσόφηται πρὸς ὑμᾶς δογματικῶς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντιλογικῶς· ἁλιευτικῶς [cf. Mt 4:19; Mc 1:17], ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀριστοτελικῶς…, ἵνα γνῶτε τὸ αὐτὸ φρονοῦντας ἡμᾶς οἱ καθ' ἡμῶν δημηγοροῦντες καὶ πανηγυρίζοντες, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ὁμονοοῦντες…, ἓν πνέοντας, καὶ μὴ … σπερμολογῆτε τὰ μικρὰ ἡμῶν εἴτε πταίσματα χρὴ λέγειν εἴτε καὶ παίγνια…" (eds J. Mossay and G. Lafontaine, Grégoire de Nazianze. *Discours* 20-23. *Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes* [Sources chrétiennes 270] Paris 1980, 304).

[57] On this metonymical use of the proper names of Aristotle, Chrysippus, Pyrrho of Elis and Sextus Empiricus in Gregory, which was partly based on Lucian and Clement of Alexandria, see J.A. Demetracopoulos, "Gregory Nazianzen: Sceptic or Anti-Sceptic?", *Archiv für mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur* 20 (2014) 116-143, at 118-121.

embrace the core of his own "brief account" of the doctrine of the Trinity. However, this observation does not cancel the fact that taking Gregory as a philosopher or as a philosophically-engaged theologian requires no justification; what philosophy, what theology, and what simply religion were in his mind should be distinguished from each other, and then examined as far as their co-articulation in the mind of a Christian leader is concerned.

The same holds true for the intellectual adherents to non-Christian religions of the time. Still, equating Christianity, as a potential hindrance to genuine philosophizing, with pagan religions seen as such a factor,[58] should perhaps be moderated. The reason why one should do so is that Christianity, by positing divine revelation as the only reliable source of truth and by transforming that revelation into a set of dogmas formulated by a legal entity called the church, became, at least in part, irreducibly incompatible with philosophical inquiry, however large the number of philosophical concepts and doctrines that found their way into Christian writings may be. By contrast, pagan religions, having no official expounders of their 'doctrines', objectively offered themselves as material for large-scale allegorical or naturalistic interpretations by philosophers.

Let me push this critique slightly further by pointing to a text which is not referred to in the book[59] and which, standing, as I think, in between, makes the above suggestion to distinguish between philosophy, theology, and religion difficult to follow. Having been described as "a Stoic writing under the name of St. Anthony",[60] the moral treatise *Παραίνεσις περὶ ἤθους ἀνθρώπων καὶ περὶ χρηστῆς πολιτείας* has been tentatively dated to the second–third c. CE and deemed purely Stoic in content, the very few Christian elements that figure therein being considered either quite superficial or interpolations. It seems to me that the work was probably written in the late 4th c. and that its Christian elements are more than what was initially estimated (by I. Hausherr),[61] albeit standing in a rather uneasy symbiosis with the

[58] "The time has come for scholars to lay aside the conviction that the only good philosopher is a de-Christianised philosopher, while pagan religiosity belongs to a different category" (D. King, "What Is Philosophy in Late Antiquity?", 95, n. 6).

[59] In general, it seems that spurious and anonymous writings draw less scholarly attention than the 'ordinary' or 'normal', so to speak, ones (cf. D. King, "What Is Philosophy in Late Antiquity?", 94, n. 10).

[60] See I. Hausherr, "Un ecrit stoïcien sous le nom de Saint Antoine Hermite", *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 30/3 (1933) 59-63.

[61] See M. Spanneut, *Permanence du stoïcisme. De Zénon à Malraux*, Gembloux 1973, 143-144.

Stoic ones. If so, does this work count as philosophical or not? This review is arguably not the place to address the question. Let me only point out that the writing stands on ground that is common to philosophy and religion, taken as ways of learning how to live. Ps.-Anthony describes education and spiritual guidance as ἀνθρωποποιεῖν[62] in a way reminiscent of Democritus' B33 D-K as well as of ch. 32 (ll. 164-168) from Simplicius' *Commentary* on Epictetus' *Enchiridion*.[63]

Digressing for a while to the bare *realia* of the book under review, using *Epistle 38* from the Byzantine corpus of Basil's epistles as genuine on the basis of a single scholar's arguments (p. 1531; cf. pp. 1524; 1546), when in fact, according to most scholars, it was written by Gregory of Nyssa, as its style cries out from miles away, is somehow surprising. As a study included in the bibliography (p. 1779, No 744) yet not used in the relevant chapter cautiously states (on its p. 197), "it remains to be seen whether or not Drecoll's arguments will overturn scholarly consensus on the question of Ep.'s 38 authenticity"). As a matter of fact, a study that is modest in its title but excellent and perhaps insurmountable in its content and that dates from soon afterwards[64] settles – conclusively, I think – the issue by attributing the letter to Gregory. Since, roughly speaking, the logical tools that the epistle uses in the service of Trinitarian theology are Porphyrean in origin, whereas those used by Basil in the *Adversus*

[62] Ps.-Anthony, *Παραίνεσις περὶ ἤθους ἀνθρώπων καὶ περὶ χρηστῆς πολιτείας* 11 (ed. Nicodemos of the Holy Mountain, *Φιλοκαλία τῶν ἱερῶν νηπτικῶν συνερανισθεῖσα παρὰ τῶν ἁγίων καὶ θεοφόρων Πατέρων…*, Venice 1782, 12-31, esp. 12b-13a). The writing is attributed to St. Anthony as early as the first half of the 12th c. by Nicholas Catascepenus (*Vita sancti Cyrilli Phileotae* 39, 1; ed. É. Sargologos, *La Vie de Saint Cyrille le Philéote moine byzantin (†1110). Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes* [Subsidia hagiographica 39], Brussels 1964).

[63] Ed. I. Hadot, *Simplicius: Commentaire sur le "Manuel" d'Épictète. Introduction et édition critique du texte grec* (Philosophia antiqua 66), Leiden 1996, 313.

[64] G. Maspero, M. Degli Esposito, and D. Benedetto, "Who Wrote Basil's *Epistula 38*? A Possible Answer through Quantitative Analysis", in J. Leemans and M. Cassin (eds), *Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium III. An English Translation with Commentary and Supporting Studies. Proceedings on the 12th International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (Leuven, 14-17 September 2010)* (Supplements to *Vigiliae Christianae* 124), Leiden/Boston 2014, 579-594. Neither this collective volume nor the other two parts of its sequel (on Books I and II of Gregory's *Contra Eunomium*) – M. Brugarolas (ed.), *Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium I. An English Translation with Supporting Studies* (Supplements to *Vigiliae Christianae* 148), Leiden/Boston 2018. L. Karfíkova, S. Douglas and J. Zachhuber (eds), *Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium II. An English Version with Supporting Studies. Proceedings of the 10th International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (Olomouc, September 15-18 2004)* (Supplements to *Vigiliae Christianae* 82), Leiden 2006) – figure in the bibliography on Gregory of Nyssa (1784-1788).

Eunomium and elsewhere seem to be a (ready-to-hand) mixture of Aristotelian and Stoic concepts, the import of the authorship issue is more than philological. Be that as it may, the issue at stake is still a theological, not a philosophical one.

Autonomy is, according to the founder of the scholarly branch known as the history of philosophy, namely, J.-J. Brucker,[65] as well as many other historians, including Fr. Überweg, one of the two major characteristics of philosophical thought; the other is coherence. In this respect, perhaps more should have been said on most of the figures parading in the book; this characteristic is what principally distinguishes an exposition of "Lehre", as defined in the guidelines of most, if not all, of the volumes of the Überweg series ("Zusammenhängende kritische Darstellung der Lehre") from mere doxography or "Werkbeschreibung" (defined as "Aufbau und Inhalt der Hauptwerke … ohne Bewertung darzustellen"). More attention to coherence would also help with assessing the degree to which this or that Christian thinker can be deemed a philosopher; if, for any reason, no (thematically full or partial) philosophical system seems to emerge (which appears to be the case with several traditionally canonical philosophers, too), the reader should be provided with the evidence needed to recognize this absence of coherence; putting the hot potato in the reader's hands and then simply withdrawing to the safety of tidily expounding works, doctrines, cultural context, and bibliography is definitely well- but also half-done work.

The issue is reflected in how the views of certain Christian thinkers regarding the faith-reason problem are expounded. For example, the exposition of Gregory of Nyssa's doctrine begins with an explicit (albeit rather superficial, passage-listing) exposition of his attitude to (pagan) philosophy (pp. 1549-1550), which embeds, in some respect, a discussion of the faith-reason problem. By contrast, in the chapter on Augustine, one of the thematically fullest and doctrinally most accurate chapters of the book, this problem figures (pp. 1710-1712) simply as the fifth and last issue of his "Erkenntnistheorie" (p. 1701). Besides, out of the relevant Augustinian sources, a major one is missing, namely, *Epistle 120*.

Given Augustine's intellectual development, his attitude to Scepticism is expectedly offered a specific paragraph (pp. 1690-1691) as

[65] J.-J. Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabulis ad nostram usque aetatem deducta*, tome I, Leipzig 1742 (repr. Hildesheim and New York 1975), 6-8: "…philosophia a reliquis eruditionis humanae disciplinis distinguenda sit. … Nec miscenda inter se theologia cum philosophia…" (and elsewhere).

well as presented in the context of expounding his views of "Selbsterkenntnis und Selbstbewusstsein" (pp. 1706-1708). One might link this attitude to Augustine's views of time, the subject of a special paragraph (pp. 1712-1716), which offers a rich account of the various views of his possible sources. As regards the aporetic part of his discussion (see, e.g., *Confessions* XI, 17, 22: "Quaero…, non adfirmo"), Scepticism seems to be a highly plausible candidate. Compare, e.g., Augustine's celebrated passage: "Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio" (*Confessions* XI, 14, 17) to the opening paragraph of Sextus Empiricus' discussion of the issue in the *Pyrrhonian Outlines* (III, 136): "Τὸ … αὐτὸ πάσχομεν καὶ ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ χρόνου ζητήσει· ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις δοκεῖ τι εἶναι ὁ χρόνος, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις ἀνυπόστατος φαίνεται" (see also the long discussion in Sextus' *Adversus Mathematicos* X, 169-247 ("Εἰ ἔστι χρόνος"), esp. 193-202), which looks like an anti-Stoic radicalisation of the Stoic downgrading of past and future as "subsisting" (ὑφεστάναι) but not truly "existing" (ὑπάρχειν) as well as of the Stoic shrinkage of the "present" to an infinitely short space of time ("Οὐδεὶς ὅλως ἐνίσταται χρόνος… Πᾶς χρόνος εἰς ἄπειρον ἔχει τὴν τομήν…"),[66] and which exhibits numerous very close parallels to Augustine; presumably these parallels are to be accounted for by a common source or sources.

The role of Porphyry in the formation of several aspects of Augustine's thought is properly stressed. With regard to the logical-metaphysical problem of the applicability of Aristotle's Categories to intelligible reality, one would add the striking parallel between *De Trinitate* V, 8, 9 and the most probably Porphyrean (see pp. 1330-1331) *Commentarium in "Parmenidem"* XII, ll. 22-33,[67] the former probably being based on Gregory of Nazianzus' *Oratio XXXI*, 6, ll. 7-9,[68] too. In a nutshell, Augustine was attracted by the idea that, strictly speaking, the Category of "agere" or "facere" can be applied, in its purest form, i.e., without implying any "pati", only to God, which in turn shows that the Category of "relation" can be applied to him without impairing his simplicity, i.e., his being "substance" or "essence" in the most real sense. Further, to show that some *relativa*

[66] Ed. I. ab Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, Vol. II, Leipzig 1903, 164,22-25 (fr. 509); cf. *op. cit*., 165,33-43 (fr. 518 and 519).

[67] Ed. P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus,* II: *Textes*, Paris 1968, 102-106.

[68] Eds P. Gallay and M. Jourjon, *Grégoire de Nazianze. Discours 27-31: Discours théologiques. Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes* (Sources chrétiennes 250), Paris 1978, 286.

do not imply any change for their bearers, Augustine (*De Trinitate* V, 16, 17) sets forth the example of "nummus" taken as the "pretium" of some good, which, as known, is mutable and only extrinsically and conventionally connected to the good itself. His analysis of the nature of this particular *relativum* shows that what he implicitly refers to is the Stoic Category *πρός τί πως ἔχοντα*.[69] His relevant lines might be taken as an additional testimony to this Stoic concept.

Having read the entire chapter on Augustine, one will perhaps be led to challenge the traditional assessment (still shared by a large number of scholars, though not often spelled out) that Augustine is more important as a headspring, useful to know in order to understand medieval (and some episodes of post-medieval) thought, than as philosopher in his own right[70] – although for one to confidently reject this view a more systematic, in the strictest sense of the term, account of his thought is required.

As for the Greek part of Augustine's *Nachleben* (p. 1745), the contribution is based only on three articles; of these one is not quite relevant, another adopts a rather weird approach, and the third, being insufficiently updated, is replete with gaps and erroneous data, to which some new errors are added, e.g., that Gregory Palamas (who, in fact, did not know Latin, but simply exploited Maximos Planudes' translation of *De Trinitate*) translated some Augustinian writings into Greek. Once more, this *Nachleben* has exclusively to do with theology, and no studies on the reception of the philosophical elements of Augustine's thought are mentioned. In general, several of the "Nachwirkung" paragraphs require substantial (both philological and doctrinal) enrichment. To mention but an instance, Theodore of Asine's doctrine (which is Cynic in origin and not his alone) that virtue is attainable by both sexes (p. 1392) is reflected in certain texts by Gregory Thaumaturgus, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, and Ps.-Gregory of Nyssa.[71]

[69] The closest testimony is I. ab Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, Vol. II, Leipzig 1903, 132,21-133,18 (fr. 403). Aristotle had already stressed the conventional nature of money (*Nicomachean Ethics* V, 1133a19-31 and 1134b 35-1135a 3), but not in the context of a logical theory.

[70] See, e.g., J.-J. Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabulis ad nostram usque aetatem deducta*, tome III, Leipzig 1742 (repr. Hildesheim and New York 1975), 507: "…(Augustinus) … se hominem fuisse non in primo philosophorum ordine numerandum demonstraverit…" – although this is counter-balanced by the bold qualification that, from the philosophical point of view, he eclipsed all of his contemporaries (*op. cit.*, 485).

[71] See, e.g., the *apparatus fontium* in H. Hörner's edition of Ps.-Gregory of Nyssa's *De creatione hominis I* (*Gregorii Nysseni opera. Supplementum*, Leiden 1972,

This need for enrichment holds true for the reception of, say, Sextus Empiricus (p. 228), Proclus (p. 1969), and Boethius (p. 2381). With regard to Sextus, in the Greek tradition, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory Nazianzen, Nikephoros Gregoras, Nicholas Cabasilas, Gregory Palamas, Plethon, and Bessarion could be added, each in his own way. Plethon should have definitely been mentioned with regard to Proclus, too, and Maximos Planudes', Manuel Holobolos', Prochoros Cydones', and Manuel Calecas' translations of certain Boethian writings (including the *De Consolatione Philosophiae*), as well as their Late Byzantine reception by several authors, might have been included.[72] In general, with regard to what can be called 'reception' of the philosophical thought of this or that intellectual figure or text, specialists in the receiving authors are in principle in a more advantageous position than specialists in the authors received.

In some cases, certain paragraphs on "Nachwirkung" call for nuance or correction. For example, the statement (p. 1534) that Basil of Caesarea anticipated Gregory Palamas' doctrine of divine essence and energies (cf. *supra*) is incorrect;[73] interpreting a patristic passage appealed to some dozens of times both by Palamites and anti-Palamites by simply taking sides with the one of the two rival parties can hit the target only by coincidence. Regardless, once more, this is a

34, 6-36, 6). On Gregory Nazianzen's stress that moral obligations apply in principle to both sexes on equal terms, with men enjoying no more 'liberty' than women, see his *Oratio XXXVII*, 6,2-7,11 (ed. C. Moreschini, *Grégoire de Nazianze. Discours 32-37. Introduction, texte critique et notes. Traduction par P. Gallay* [Sources chrétiennes 318], Paris 1985, 282-286).

[72] On most of these tips, one may consult A. Brungs, G. Kapriev, and V. Mudroch (eds), *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie Begründet von F. Überweg. Die Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Band 1: *Judentum*, Bandteil 1: *Byzanz*, Basel 2019. On Plethon's and Bessarion's reception of Sextus and Sextus' transmission in the modern Europe, see more in J.A. Demetracopoulos, "Cydones Redivivus: Bessarion Self-placed between Greeks and Latins, the Scholastic 'Quaestio', and the Hard Quest for Truth", in S. Mariev (ed.), *Bessarion's Treasure: Editing, Translating and Interpreting Bessarion's Literary Heritage* (Byzantinisches Archiv – Series Philosophica 3), Berlin/Boston 2020, 111-176, at 144-158.

[73] See E. von Ivánka, *Plato Christianus. Übernahme und Umgestaltung des Platonismus durch die Väter*, Einsiedeln 1964; Italian translation by E. Peroli, *Platonismo cristiano. Recezione e trasformazione del platonismo nella Patristica. Presentazione di G. Reale. Introduzione di W. Beierwaltes*, Milan 1992, 340-342. A. Torrance, "Precedents for Palamas' Essence-Energies Theology in the Cappadocian Fathers", *Vigiliae Christianae* 63 (2009) 47-70, at 54-56. J.A. Demetracopoulos, "Palamas Transformed. Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction between God's 'Essence' and 'Energies' in Late Byzantium", in M. Hinterberger and Chr. Schabel (eds), *Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History 1204-1500* (Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales. Bibliotheca 9), Leuven 2011, 263-372, at 267-268.

primarily theological issue, not a philosophical one. Further, Augustine's true influence on Anselm of Canterbury is thematically wider, yet at the same time doctrinally less deep, than what is implied (pp. 1742-1743). For example, Anselm's *credo ut intelligam*, for all his lip service to Augustine, stands in fact as a clearly different intellectual project, that of exploring the truth of faith *sola ratione*. Regardless, if one would like to present Anselm as standing more or less close to Augustine, referring to the latter's *Epistle 120,* where the most *ratio*-friendly Augustinian interpretation of Is. 7:9 ("Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis") occurs, as well as to certain of the early Augustinian philosophical dialogues (386-390 AD), such as the *De quantitate animae* (388 AD), which is truly close to, e.g., Anselm's major dialogue, the *Cur Deus homo*,[74] would be fitting.

As far as the secondary literature is concerned, the editors inform us (p. XX) that the last update of the contributions took place in 2012; and one is happy to see that numerous titles dating even to more recent years figure in the volumes. For instance, title Nº 114 (listed on p. 482), which nominally dates to 2009 but, as is often the case with journal volumes, in fact circulated later on, is mentioned and taken into account on p. 461. Still, on p. 221, the same title is not taken into account with regard to the date of Sextus Empiricus; doing so would have resulted in revising his *floruit* to the early 3rd c.

Having said the above, it is not at all out of formal courtesy but out of respect for the meticulous, effortful, and effective scholarship

[74] Augustine of Hippo, *De quantitate animae* VII, 12: " – …vera ratio… …ratio …certa"; " – Agat ac ducat ratio qua vult, dummodo perducat. – Deus hoc faciet…"; XXIII, 41: " – …'Sapere aude'… – Ego prorsus nihil metuo, quoquo res modo processerit…" (ed. W. Hörmann, *S. Aureli Augustini opera*. Sect. I, Pars IV: *Soliloquiorum libri duo. De inmortalitate animae. De quantitate animae* (CSEL 89), Vienna 1986; cf. *Epistula* 120, 1, 6, ed. Al. Goldbacher, *S. Aureli Augustini epistulae*. Pars II: *Ep. XXXI-CXXIII* (CSEL 34), Prague, Vienna and Leipzig 1898, 708,25-27: "Haec dixerim, ut fidem tuam ad amorem intellegentiae cohortarer, ad quam ratio vera perducit et cui fides animum praeparat"); Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur Deus homo* I, 20: " – Sola … ratione procedamus. – Quamvis me in angustias quaedam ducas, desidero tamen multum ut, sicut incepisti, progrediaris"; I, 25: "… me volo perducas illuc, ut rationabili necessitate intelligam esse oportere omnia illa, quae nobis fides catholica de Christo credere praecipit, si salvari volumus"; II, 9: "Sic est via qua me ducis undique munita ratione… – Non ego te duco, sed ille de quo loquimur… nos ducit, ubicumque viam veritatis tenemus"; II, 11: "Ad hoc nos indeclinabiliter perducit ratio"; II, 17: "Ostendimus … certam rationem quomodo Deus…"; II, 19: "…ratio veritatis nos docuit…" (ed. F.S. Schmitt, *Sancti Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia. Volumen secundum, continens opera quae archiepiscopus composuit*, Rome 1940, repr. Edinburgh 1948, 88,8-10; 96,9-11; 106,5-8; 110,8; 126,5; 130,29).

exhibited in this long-expected work that, on the whole, one should stress how profitable both focused and full study of it definitely will prove for a wide range of historians.

John A. Demetracopoulos

SÁGHY, Marianne, SCHOOLMAN, Edward M. (eds), *Pagans and Christians in the Late Roman Empire: New Evidence, New Approaches (4th-8th Centuries)* (CEU Medievalia 18), Central European University Press, New York (NJ) 2017, x + 371 p.

Frühere Arbeiten zur (ausgehenden) Spätantike sind tendenziell von der Dichotomie und Gegenüberstellung von „Heiden" und „Christen" ausgegangen und folgen oft einem Konfliktmodell als Leitparadigma. Erkenntnisse aus den letzten zwei Dekaden zeigen jedoch, dass die Situation viel komplexer ist als bisher angenommen. Anstelle einer simplen Heiden/Christen-Dichotomie ist differenzierter mit einer Pluralität von (Gruppen)Identitäten, einer Mannigfaltigkeit der Prozesse innerhalb dieser Gruppen wie auch zwischen diversen Gruppen zu rechen. Seither werden immer wieder Versuche angestellt, diese Komplexität mit neuen Modellen wie Multikulturalität, Kohabitation, Kooperation oder Gruppenkohäsion präziser zu beschreiben.

Die Beiträge des vorliegenden Sammelbandes gehen auf eine Konferenz zurück, welche die Wechselwirkungen zwischen „Heiden" und „Christen" auf dem Gebiet des Römischen Reiches zwischen den 4. und 8. Jahrhundert näher erkundete. Organisiert wurde die Tagung von der frühverstorbenen Expertin für Spätantike und Frühmittelalter, Marianne Sághy (1961 – 2018). Bis zuletzt war sie Professorin an der damals noch in Budapest ansässigen Central European University (CEU), die mittlerweile unter erheblichem politischen Druck nach Wien verdrängt ist. Die Tagung selbst wurde im Zusammenarbeit mit der Universität Pécs veranstaltet und fand in Budapest und Pécs im März 2013 statt.

Nur 19 der ca. 30 Vorträge der Tagung fanden eine Aufnahme in den vorliegenden Band. Nicht enthalten sind u.a. die Referate der beiden Hauptredner Hartwin Brandt und Alan Cameron, sowie die der Organisatorin Marianne Sághy. Dieser Umstand ist umso bedauerlicher, weil sie vermutlich Wesentliches zur Leitfrage des Themas der Tagung „the validity of the concepts 'pagan' and 'Christian'" (S. 2) beitrugen.

Die Mehrheit der Annäherungen wurde, in fünf Kategorien unterteilt („Lives", „Identities", „Cults", Landscapes", und „Tombs"), im vorgelegten Band präsentiert. Der mit „Lives" betitelte Abschnitt mit Studien von Maël Goarzin (Lausanne), Linda Honey, Margarita Vallejo-Girvés (Madrid), Anna Tóth (Budapest), und Juana Torres (Santander) stellt den impulsreichsten Teil des Bandes dar. Dieser Abschnitt erlaubt „the finest levels of resolution in understanding the relationships between the two communities and the intellectual and spiritual mindsets they represented" (S. 3) und bietet daher eine, auf persönlichen Erfahrungen der Zeitgenossen basierenden Einstieg ins Thema.

Der zweite Themenblock ist „Identities" gewidmet und bietet Essays von Monika Pesthy-Simon (Budapest), Levente Nagy (Pécs), Jérôme Lagouanère (Montpellier), und Ecaterina Lung (Bucharest). Die Reise führt diesmal von unterschiedlichen Facetten der identitätsstiftenden Märtyrerliteratur über Augustinus literarische Behandlung der *pagani* bis hin zu Identitäten in den historiographischen und chronographischen Schriften des 6. Jahrhunderts.

Die Sektion „Cults" verschiebt den Fokus auf Kultpraktiken. Beiträge von Branka Migotti (Zagreb) und Edward E. Schoolman (Reno, NV) kombinieren geschickt literarisches und archäologisches Material, um zu zeigen, dass „clear differentiation of pagan and Christian layers in cultic performances, objects and beliefs is, in certain cases, well-nigh impossible." (S. 5) Der Aufsatz von Miriam Adan Jones (Amsterdam) geht in eine ähnliche Richtung, wenn sie pagane und jüdische Elemente in der Angelsächsische Mission des 6. Jahrhunderts nachweist.

„Landscapes" mit Essays von Hristo Preshlenov (Sofia), Józef Grzywaczewski (Warschau) und Daniel K. Knox (Budapest) unterstreicht die Bedeutung von Änderungen in Landschaften und Stadtbildern. Die religionskulturelle Topographie zeigt sich einmal mehr als plural und hybrid, denn „[p]agan traditions were, however, slow to disappear" (S. 6). Die zwar langsame aber unaufhebbare Transformation hin zu immer deutlicher wahrnehmbarer christlicher Präsenz löste allerdings – selbst bei Christen – nicht nur Euphorie aus. Der Verfall Roms, eng verbunden mit dem Bild der Göttin *Roma*, wird z.B. vom Poeten-Bischof Sidonius Apollinaris beklagt. Für die Erkundung der intellektuellen Landschaften der Philosophie entwickelt Luciana Gabriela Soares Santoprete (Bonn) digitale Werkzeuge.

Der Abschnitt „Tombs" bietet eine Reihe von Fallstudien zur spätantiken Sepulkralkultur, verfasst von Ivan Basić (Split), Zsolt Visy (Pécs), Olivér Gábor und Zsuzsa Katona Győr (Pécs) sowie von Elizabeth O'Brien (Dublin). Dieser stark von Traditionen geprägte

und auf Veränderungen eher zögerlich eingehende Bereich bietet „sound indicators of continuity as well as of change“. (S. 7). Die Essays verdeutlichen das gerade genannte Beobachtung anhand des Diokletian Mausoleums im heutigen Split, dem spätantiken Friedhof von Pécs und frühmittelalterlichen Grabstätten in Irland. Dabei werden auch methodologische Probleme sichtbar, wie etwa dass die heidnischen und christlichen Grablegen nicht immer mit gewünschter Sicherheit unterschieden werden können.

Eine Stärke des Tagungsbandes liegt zweifellos daran, dass es ihm gelingt, die disziplinäre und institutionelle Diversität der Teilnehmenden in eine fruchtbare Diskussion zu verwickeln. Dabei werden öfter Texte, Monumente oder geographischen Regionen erörtert, die sonst eher selten im „Mainstream“-Diskurs Platz finden. Das mag wohl auch mit der durchaus sichtbaren Präsenz von Forschern aus den ehemaligen Ostblockstaaten zusammenhängen. Ihre oft auf die Randgebiete des Römischen Reiches bezogene Expertise fördert nicht nur das Forschungsinteresse für eher weniger bekannte Quellen, sondern hat auch immer wieder das Potenzial, bereits bekannte Phänomene und Wirkungsmechanismen aus Kerngebieten des Römischen Reiches in neuen Perspektiven zu betrachten bzw. zu hinterfragen. Ein besonderes Verdienst des Sammelbandes liegt darin, diese „Lokalexpertise“ nun auch für ein größeres internationales Publikum auf Englisch zugänglich zu machen. Man kann nur hoffen, dass diese ertragreiche Zusammenarbeit trotz persönlicher Schicksalsschläge wie das Lebensende Marianne Sághys und einer bedenklichen politischen Großwetterlage in Ungarn für die wissenschaftliche Community auch in der Zukunft erhalten bleibt.

András Handl

SCHAFER, Steven, *Marriage, Sex, and Procreation. Contemporary Revisions to Augustine's Theology of Marriage* (Princeton Theological Monograph Series 240), Pickwick Publications, Eugene (Oregon) 2019, xx + 186 p.

Changing sexual mores

Since the sexual revolution, sexual mores in the West have undergone a series of drastic alterations. Among Christians there is no longer any normative understanding of sex, marriage, and family. First, the advent of reliable birth-control provided a way to sever the link

between sex and procreation. Second, fewer people are choosing to marry. Individuals are electing to cohabit before or instead of marriage. Third, premarital virginity is no longer widely practiced. Fourth, advances in technology fundamentally alter our perception of the world and of ourselves. Finally, the influence of religion over sexual practice has diminished. In spite of all this, the central components of the theology of marriage laid down by Augustine (354-430), bishop of the North African city of Hippo, have guided Christian sexual ethics for centuries and are as such deeply imbedded in current theological discussions, including in the domain of same-sex relationships.

The contemporary discussion about the inclusion of same-sex individuals and their relationships within the church's theology of marriage and sexuality has devolved into diametrically opposed positions. At times the debate is framed as being between those who comply with the authority of Scripture and those who would rather appeal to the authority of love. The former more often use theological language, while the latter rely on secular vocabulary to support their arguments. A new framework in order to engage in meaningful dialogue is needed.

Augustine and the three goods of marriage

One of the main proposals of Stephen Schafer, the author of this book, is that a conversation about same-sex relationships cannot take place apart from a wider discussion about sex, marriage, and family, as understood through the lens of the church's theological tradition. Therefore, the first half of the book is an analysis of how the early church thought about sexuality (chapter one) and an analysis of the work of Augustine (chapter two), the origins of the church's theology on sex and marriage. Augustine's three goods of marriage – procreation, fidelity, and sacrament – held sway from the fifth century to the present day. He insured that his theological position made sense of the entire biblical witness and the preceding doctrinal tradition. That discussion was dominated by two extreme positions. One position exalted virginity at the expense of marriage; the other left little room for virginity, celibacy, or other forms of ascetic life. Augustine had the unenviable task of navigating a middle course between these extremes. He consistently affirms the three goods of marriage, but in his works the order of these goods occasionally varies so as to address specific doctrinal challenges. Although some of his arguments and conclusions may be insufficient to address many of the questions of contemporary theologians, Augustine was progressive, if not radical

for his time. While other writers assumed that sexual intercourse and the desires that accompany it were so marred by sin that they refrained from discussing the topics, Augustine investigated the views swirling around him. He found a place in his theology for desire, intercourse, marriage, virginity, and continence.

The church's traditional theology of marriage requires sexual differentiation. According to Augustine, God created humans as sexually differentiated beings before the fall, and as such the anatomical features that distinguish male and female bodies are good. Second, he asserted that marriage and marital intercourse exist for the purpose of procreation. As such, roles cannot be bypassed by appealing to an allegorical reading of the procreative command paired with covenantal theology. The covenant is the grand narrative of God's interaction with humankind in salvation history.

The traditionalists and same-sex relationships

The traditionalists want to maintain the relational vocations of marriage and celibacy as the only licit options for Christians. They rely for their argumentation on the creation stories and on the books of the law in the Old Testament. Therefore, first, same-sex acts are sinful because they violate the created order and second, because only monogamous heterosexual marriage is licit sexual behavior, according to Levitical commands. According to the Apostle Council in Jerusalem (Acts 15) Gentiles also have to observe the Jewish sexual purity laws. Thus, for traditionalists the debate over the affirmation of same-sex relationships is primarily about the authority of Scripture. But by privileging the creation stories, they 'forget' that creation is not an independent category; it is connected to the fall, redemption, and eschatology in the grand narrative of God's action in the world. The traditionalists are unable to explain why Christians – contrary to the Jewish people – do not have to marry and have children. Even so, they leave no room for the 'difficult texts' that describe non-monogamous marital situations in the Old Testament.

A distinct approach to Augustine's theology of marriage

But contemporary revisionists are also still arguing with Augustine, either explicitly or implicitly. In the third chapter, four contemporary revisionists present a distinct approach to Augustine's theology of

marriage in order to explore gay and lesbian relationships and the question of same-sex marriage: Adrian Thatcher, Eugene Rogers, Robert Song, and Elizabeth Stuart. These theologians claim that the church should recognize same-sex relationships because of the similarities that their relationships share with marriage. First, the Triune God is the basis for relationality, mutuality, and the sharing of love. Humans, created in the image of God, reflect these qualities by sharing mutual love with others. Second, humans express love through sexuality. Hence, requiring lesbian and gay individuals to remain celibate represents a barrier to their expression of love and by extension, to their ability to reflect the Triune God in whose image they are created. Third, Jesus broke down barriers to inclusion and sought to bring the marginalized into the fold. Therefore, recognizing the legitimacy of same-sex relationships is in line with welcoming the Gentiles into the covenant and with Jesus' inclusion of women. Based on these moves, the revisionists think that the question of same-sex acts, relations, and marriage is primarily about the expression of love and welcoming the outcast. And so they lack – according to Stephen Shafer – a detailed account of procreation and sexual difference, two key theological categories from the doctrine of creation. Furthermore, they do not take into account the existence of disordered, distorted, and sinful sexual desire and expression.

Christian sexual ethics revisited?

In the concluding chapter four, the author provides an overview of the state of the discipline of Christian sexual ethics by appealing to the four revisionists. Regardless of their disagreements, there are also areas of broad agreement between the revisionists and the theological tradition.

Fidelity and permanence

Of Augustine's three goods of marriage, two continue to receive broad support: fidelity and permanence. Sexual faithfulness to one's marital partner is described by Adrian Thatcher as an ongoing action that bears witness to God's faithfulness. However, fidelity is more than sexual exclusivity or a negative command to refrain from extramarital sex. Fidelity also includes the positive commitment to seek the good of one's partner and ensure that both partners experience the opportunity to flourish. In some instances, the violation of fidelity is so egregious that divorce is required and remarriage permitted.

Similar to Thatcher, Eugene Rogers' commitment to marital fidelity is grounded in covenantal theology. For Christians, marital fidelity witnesses to Christ's faithfulness to the church in two ways. First, the sanctifying work of transforming eros into agape necessarily takes time and hence permanence. Second, marital love receives its rationale from the gospel, which represents God's rejection of conditional love in favor of eternal, unqualified love.

Robert Song argues that marriage reflects and embodies the divine covenantal relationship in a limited way through its commitment to faithfulness and permanence. These are intrinsic goods which require no additional telos.

Initially, Elizabeth Stuart rejected relational fidelity, defined as a commitment to remain sexually faithful to one's partner. First she challenged the traditional connection between fidelity and covenant. The biblical model of covenant is predicated on inequality and often accompanied by the language of servitude. Second, she proposed the image of the deity as 'a promiscuous lover', whose universal love expands beyond monogamy. Human relationships are grounded in the universal love of God and are therefore not intended to be sexually exclusive. Yet in defining relational sin as the act of betrayal – a moral judgment grounded in the logic of faithfulness – she ran contrary to that image of 'promiscuous lover'. Furthermore, Stuart includes in her relational theology the category of radical vulnerability. This pinnacle of friendship, according to her, can only be achieved with one person at the time. And so a narrowing of the expression of one's love is needed, and that is similar to the faithfulness exhibited by monogamous love.

Unlike Stuart, the three other revisionists, Thatcher, Rogers, and Song, have demonstrated that it is possible to articulate an understanding of relational fidelity and permanence that is grounded in the God of the covenant that does not include the asymmetrical qualities of the divine-human covenant. Key to their interpretation is the conviction that marriage reflects the divine-human covenant in a limited way, because the marriage covenant is established between equal partners.

Bodily desire

Either explicitly or implicitly, there is agreement among revisionists that theological reflection should begin with the conviction that bodily desire is good because it is created by God. According to Stuart, the church has described bodily desire as a disability which must be overcome. By contrast, she argues that desire is a positive category

and should therefore be expressed as freely as possible, as long as the relational context meets the criteria of mutual acceptance, respect, and delight.

According to Thatcher, as a result of the fall desire sometimes devolves into a quest for self-fulfillment that is divorced from seeking the other's good. Therefore, individual bodily desires are open to criticism. Rogers points to the importance of including the category of redemption. Sin has distorted bodily desire. Yet Christ's redemptive work on eros means that it is not only a source of temptation, but also a means of redemption. God in Christ loves creation and humankind with a love characterized by eros. When applied to marriage, Rogers asserts that it is possible to attain knowledge of God's love through loving and being loved by one's spouse. Finally, Song argues that sexual desire can serve as a finite symbol which points humans to the eternal. Human bodily desire reflects the love of God in the Trinity as well as God's love for creation. Therefore, eros experienced and expressed by married couples or covenant partners witnesses in a limited way to the intimacy one will experience with God in the eschaton.

Same-sex marriage equal to marriage between man and woman?

Another area in which the revisionists share a measure of agreement is in their affirmation of the uniqueness of same-sex experience. Stuart traces the difference in experience between heterosexual and same-sex relationships to the divergence of societal norms, for example on gender, sex, and class. For her, the attempt of theology to require relationships to be sexually differentiated is a patriarchal construction: in marriage a patriarch is assured of the sexual loyalty of his wife and the purity of his bloodline.

However, theologically speaking, the primary difference between the two groups is that of differences in bodily desires that are directed or not to sexually different bodies. As a consequence one relationship is procreative while the other is not. Therefore, according to Thatcher, same-sex relations cannot be called marriage, because marriage requires an openness to children. Nonetheless, he argues, same-sex couples also display a kind of reproduction. Therefore non-heterosexual relationships should receive the same benefit and be subject to the same standards as heterosexual relationships. Arguing in this direction, Thatcher reveals his preference for similarity over difference. He makes it clear that the doctrine of the Trinity is the driving force behind his relational theology and supplants the theology of

creation. In the Trinity each of the divine persons transcends gender difference.

Rogers takes it a step further: he rejects procreation as a necessary telos for marriage and therefore reduces the distance between heterosexual and same-sex relationships. Weddings, both straight and gay, witness to Trinitarian Love. Similarity supersedes difference. Meanwhile, he emphasizes that all humans have a bodily vocation specific to each individual and therefore not predetermined based on membership in a specific people group. The Apostle Paul describes both marriage and celibacy as a gift; thus forced celibacy does not recognize the specific gift that God bestows on the individual.

However, the attempt to deemphasize difference also results in removing the particularity of gay and lesbian experience and hence in homogenization. In such a setting, the church is unable to learn from the particular giftedness of lesbian, gay, and heterosexual individuals. As individuals and institutions marked by sin, we all have blind spots. Often these can only be remarked and identified by outsiders, whom the church has traditionally labeled as the 'sexual other'. Assuming a listening posture requires a great deal of humility.

Song provides the beginning of an alternative framework for addressing the difference between heterosexual and same-sex relationships. He argues that the key difference – the ability to procreate – cannot be overruled or abandoned in an effort to extend marriage to same-sex couples. Marriage has a distinct theological goal provided by the doctrine of creation. As a creation good, the institution of marriage requires an openness to physical procreation and by extension to sexual difference. Therefore, marriage is not an option for same-sex couples. A different theological grounding is necessary to make space for same-sex relationships, as well as for heterosexual couples that are not directed toward procreation. Song presents a third relational vocation and gift of God, alongside marriage and celibacy: the covenant relationship, characterized by permanence and faithfulness. Whereas marriage is grounded in creation and hence directed toward procreation, the covenant relationship is grounded in covenant, a doctrinal category which will be fulfilled in the eschaton, a time when there will be no death and therefore no need for procreation. The covenant relationship is open to other forms of fruitfulness in service to the Kingdom of God. Song's significant contribution to the church's ongoing discussion makes these undertakings all the more necessary and worthwhile.

With this book the author has shown that the current debate cannot be resolved while couched in terms of us versus them, because both revisionists and traditionalists affirm the authority of Scripture.

Stephen Schafer moves beyond superficial surface polarities to uncover the actual theological issues at stake in the church's theology of sexuality and marriage by encouraging contemporary revisionists to learn from history and to reason from within the bounds of the theological tradition. In so doing, he contributes greatly to elucidating the conversation and to ecclesial discernment.

Ilse Cornu

SINISCALCO, Paolo, *Dai martiri agli imperatori. Il cristianesimo e la società antica tra Occidente e Oriente* (Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum 153), Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum/ Nerbini International, Roma/Lugano 2019, viii + 589 p.

Dobbiamo essere grati all'Istituto Patristico Augustinianum di Roma per aver dato alle stampe questo bel volume di Paolo Siniscalco. Si tratta di una raccolta di saggi selezionati all'interno di una straordinaria produzione scientifica estesa su un arco temporale di oltre mezzo secolo, e che per questa ragione sono oggi talora di non facile reperimento. Essi vengono ora messi a disposizione del pubblico per una agevole e sistematica lettura, sostanzialmente invariati e senza aggiornamenti bibliografici, ma con l'aggiunta di alcuni inediti.

I diversi contributi sono opportunamente raggruppati in cinque sezioni che riflettono lo sviluppo cronologico e l'espansione geografica del cristianesimo antico dalle origini neotestamentarie fino alla diffusione del messaggio evangelico agli estremi confini orientali del mondo antico: 1) "La missione verso occidente"; 2) "Dal battesimo d'acqua al battesimo di sangue: i cristiani nella società romana"; 3) "L'epoca costantiniana"; 4) "Dall'impero romano all'impero romano d'oriente"; 5) "Il lascito della romanità".

Non è neppure lontanamente pensabile poter presentare nello spazio di una recensione, sia pure in maniera sintetica, la grande varietà di argomenti trattati in questo volume e la vastità della documentazione utilizzata. Può essere invece utile indicare le grandi linee di ricerca che hanno ispirato l'autore.

Questo è certamente un libro di storia, nel senso pieno e complesso del termine. Storia religiosa innanzitutto, che coinvolge i diversi ambiti della teologia, della liturgia, del diritto ecclesiastico. Ma anche, e in maniera inscindibile, storia politica, storia sociale, storia culturale dell'impero romano. Si tratta di una indagine storiografica che, oltre a confrontarsi in maniera puntuale con gli autori e

le tendenze più autorevoli del panorama internazionale, è particolarmente attenta all'analisi letteraria e filologica dei testi antichi, le fonti dei primi secoli della nostra èra, siano esse di provenienza cristiana o pagana, di natura religiosa o giuridica. Naturalmente, forte è la presenza degli autori cristiani sui quali si è a lungo esercitata la perizia esegetica dell'autore, a partire da Ireneo, Tertulliano e Cipriano fino a Lattanzio, Eusebio, Ambrogio, Agostino e Gregorio I papa.

Direi che la narrazione corre in un certo senso parallela al grande affresco del volume, più volte ristampato, *Il cammino di Cristo nell'Impero romano* (l'ottava edizione è del 2016), e svela il puntiglioso lavoro di scavo che lo ha preceduto ed accompagnato nel corso degli anni. E tuttavia emergono nella trattazione alcuni nuclei tematici che evidentemente stanno particolarmente a cuore all'autore, se su di essi egli è ritornato periodicamente con successive precisazioni proponendo interpretazioni sempre più raffinate. Attraverso lo studio rigorosamente storico dei rapporti tra comunità dei credenti, istituzioni politiche e società antica, come si sono venuti configurando nel passaggio dall'epoca precostantiniana dei martiri all'epoca postcostantiniana degli imperatori cristiani – è questo, a me sembra, il filo conduttore della presente raccolta –, l'autore individua la centralità dei temi seguenti: la natura e la definizione dell'autorità politica nel discorso cristiano; il significato e la portata dell'esperienza del martirio cristiano; il valore e le implicazioni della tolleranza religiosa; la nozione di laicità tra diritto e religione, che sfocia naturalmente nell'indagine sul significato dei diritti dell'uomo e delle libertà fondamentali come la "libertà religiosa" e la "libertà di coscienza".

Sono questi, come ognun vede, problemi complessi e talora spinosi, già ampiamente dibattuti, sui quali però l'autore ritorna in maniera originale proponendo valutazioni e giudizi basati su una scrupolosa ricognizione delle fonti e ispirati ad un atteggiamento di grande equilibrio intellettuale. L'importante postfazione illumina retrospettivamente il senso di questo lungo percorso alla ricerca degli utili suggerimenti che il "modello" romano-cristiano, pur con i suoi limiti e le sue ambiguità, è ancora in grado di offrire alla comprensione di fenomeni e problemi del mondo attuale quali: la questione della cittadinanza nella prospettiva dell'universalità cristiana, il fenomeno delle migrazioni e dei rapporti della Chiesa con i popoli "barbari", la distinzione tra sfera politica e sfera religiosa e il rapporto tra il potere ecclesiastico e il potere imperiale, infine la rielaborazione della nozione filosofica e giuridica di *humanitas* nel passaggio dall'antichità al cristianesimo.

Il volume è prodotto in maniera tecnicamente perfetta, anche se non mancano alcuni piccoli errori di stampa che non compromettono comunque la corretta comprensione del testo. Segnalo solamente che l'Agostino inviato agli Angli da papa Gregorio I (pag. 48, nota 57) è finito non si sa come nell'indice dei personaggi e degli autori antichi confuso con Agostino di Ippona (pag. 565), e che nello stesso indice non è registrato il nome di Cromazio di Aquileia, giustamente invece citato a pag. 187, nota 43.

Nel complesso il volume offre una lettura istruttiva sul piano dell'erudizione e dell'informazione, e notevoli spunti di riflessione storiografica e, almeno indirettamente, teologica, in questo senso rispecchiando perfettamente l'indole e gli interessi dell'autore. Sottoscrivo quindi volentieri le belle parole che Jean-Noël Guinot ha scritto nell' "Introduzione" presentando il profilo scientifico dell'autore e i vari aspetti della sua poliedrica attività, e ad esse rimando per ulteriori considerazioni sulla figura e l'opera di Paolo Siniscalco.

Pier Franco Beatrice

SQUIRES, Stuart, *The Pelagian Controversy. An Introduction to the Enemies of Grace and the Conspiracy of Lost Souls*, Pickwick Publications, Eugene OR 2019, 344 p.

One year after the publication of Ali Bonner's *The Myth of Pelagianism*, Oxford, 2018, a book that denies the existence of Pelagianism as a kind of coherent construct and argues that Pelagius was no heretic, Stuart Squires publishes a lengthy book in which he offers a history of the Pelagian controversy. It is evident from the author's title that his book has to do with the enemies of grace. Squires's book is divided into two parts. The first part, consisting of ten chapters, first presents the broader context and then the biographies of the main players in this controversy. The second part, comprising eight chapters, deals with the theological positions of the major players involved in the debate. In this second part, two chapters illustrate Augustine's theology (chapter 13 focuses on Augustine's positions between 411 and 418; chapter 17, meanwhile, on the theology of Augustine in the period 419-430). Squires offers an interesting survey of the Pelagian controversy and its agonists. He does so in a clear and entertaining style, presenting different and even opposed positions in such a way that the reader becomes aware of the complexity of the dossier under consideration, and of our poor knowledge of several elements in these

dossiers, which is due to a lack of sources. The reader will appreciate Squires's attempts to offer background information when needed (see, e.g., the discussion of *apatheia* on pp. 221-223). The book offers an interesting timetable (pp. XVII-XX) and an extensive bibliography (pp. 295-332). The book concludes with text, subject, and Scripture indices (pp. 333-334).

It goes without saying that this reviewer was very much interested in the presentation of the heroes of the Pelagian controversy. While for most of the participants in the debates, Squires offers a short biography of their whole life, the chapter on the lives of Augustine (ch. 5) and Jerome (ch. 6) leave this aside, probably because these giants' biographies are expected to be known. The views of Pelagius (ch. 2) are underpinned with several quotes, even from works such as *De divina lege*, which may not have been written by Pelagius.[75] With regard to Pelagius' commentaries on Paul's Letters, I am of the opinion that Squires underestimates somewhat the complexity of the manuscript tradition and the problem with regard to later additions in this commentary which made it more Pelagian than it originally was.[76] The way Augustine spoke about Pelagius was less positive than is suggested by Squires (p. 42). It was only in the very beginning, when most things were undecided, that Augustine praised Pelagius. However, as time went on, he became more and more critical of Pelagius. He described Pelagius as a man holding positions without knowledge (*De natura et gratia* 7,7); he identified Pelagius as the *haeresiarches* (*De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,5,15; *Opus imperfectum* II,66) and regularly spoke of the heresy of Pelagius (*Epistula* 169,13; *De haeresibus* 88), considering it a pestilence (*Opus imperfectum* IV,114). It was also Augustine who felt the need to warn Juliana Anicia, Sixtus, and Paulinus of Nola about Pelagius' ideas, thus making Pelagius suspect in their respective milieus. In passing, I do not think that Paulinus of Nola held a doctrine of original sin, certainly not in the Augustinian sense of the word (p. 46). That Pelagius rejected original sin might be a matter of further discussion, for how could Pelagius know such doctrine in 405/6, when the concept of original sin was not

[75] See O. Wermelinger, *Neuere Forschungskontroversen um Augustinus und Pelagius*, in C. Mayer & K.H. Chelius (Hrsg.), *Internationales Symposion über den Stand der Augustinus-Forschung vom 12. bis 16. April 1987 im Schloss Rauischholzhausen der Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen* (Cassiciacum 39/1), Würzburg 1989, 189-217, an important study on the authorship of Pelagian writers, not mentioned in this book.

[76] See H.J. Frede, *Ein neuer Paulustext und Kommentar* (Vetus Latina. Aus der Geschichte der lateinischen Bibel 7-8), Freiburg 1973-1974.

yet widely spread in Italy? However, Squires suggests (p. 96, n. 101) that Pelagians might be responsible for the attack on Jerome's monasteries. I think that we do not know this on the basis of the sources preserved.

I very much liked the presentation of Caelestius (chapter 3),[77] offering a survey of positions by both ancient and contemporary authors, for it reveals the rich phantasy of authors writing down their ideas without having much source material at their disposal (cf. also the presentation of Zosimus in chapter 8, pp. 139-140). However, I wonder whether Caelestius was anathematized at Carthage (the official minutes of the process do not speak of it). In *De gestis Pelagii*, written six years after the trial, which was held in Augustine's absence, Augustine claims that Caelestius was anathematized there. In any case, according to the minutes of the Carthage meeting, Caelestius (rightly) said that it was a matter of debate. With regard to Caelestius, Augustine's tone is quite severe (cf. *Epistula* 157,3,22). One has the impression that the negative tone builds to a crescendo, for in *Retractationes* II,33 it is even suggested that Caelestius was excommunicated. A systematic presentation of the way Augustine dealt with "the enemies of grace" would probably reveal that in the course of the controversy Augustine became more and more severe towards them.

Chapter 8 deals with events that happened between 411 and 418. With regard to Jerome's role in the controversy, I think there is an urgent need to study in a more detailed way what dimensions of Jerome's thought are rhetorical and what aspects focus rather on doctrinal reality (Squires's evaluation of the way Jerome linked Pelagius to Jovinian is devastating for Jerome; see p. 229). When discussing the accusation of Jerome that Pelagius and Pelagians held apparently "secret doctrines" (p. 108), Squires offers insightful suggestions for such a study. In any case, the distance between Pelagius and Origenism is such that one might rightly question the earnestness of Jerome's accusations (pp. 114; 116 [accusations made by Jerome but no proof that Pelagius had made them]; 118 [on marriage][78]). Squires clearly states that there is no indication in Pelagius' writings that he agreed with Origen on the preexistence of the soul. Moreover, with regard to the origin of the soul, Augustine, who struggled with this issue throughout his whole life, asked Jerome's advice (*Epistula* 166), but Jerome did not want to discuss the matter (*Epistula* 172 among the

[77] The same is to be said with regard to Orosius; see p. 99.

[78] In passing, Augustine's *De bono coniugali* was written in order to correct positions such as those of Jerome and Jovinian.

letters of Augustine). Jerome, who defended the creationist position with regard to the soul, as Pelagians like Julian of Aeclanum did, maintained that infants were not guilty (*Adversus Pelagianos* 3.6; *Epistula* 39.2.3; 85.2.1; 85.5.1 etc.). With regard to Jerome's historical trustworthiness, it would have been helpful to know the source of Jerome's information about Sicily (cf. p. 125). With regard to the events happening in the East in 415, Squires mostly refers to Orosius. This reader wonders whether the information given by Orosius, who was in fact the loser in the East, is actually trustworthy (cf. pp. 128-130). Since it seems that Orosius did not speak Greek,[79] one wonders how Orosius can suggest that his words were incorrectly translated from Latin into Greek (cf. p. 129).

With regard to the letter of Pelagius to Demetrias, I am not convinced that Pelagius was warning Demetrias of the corrupting influence of Augustine (p. 111). The text quoted deals with our view of God, and the most I can conclude from it is that Pelagius had an enormous respect and veneration for the God of the Bible. That in later manuscripts this letter is attributed to either Jerome or Augustine is proof that many could consider the letter as a specimen of true Christian spirituality.[80] In passing, it should be said that sinlessness is a concept present in the Bible (the list of the people receiving such qualification is quite impressive), that Jerome, not Augustine speaks of *impeccantia* (it is interesting to see that Augustine's friend Marcellinus also raised questions with regard to sinlessness, that as a committed Christian he was dissatisfied with Augustine's answers to his questions, and that Augustine felt the need to respond again to the criticism of Marcellinus). Pelagius himself admitted that he was a sinner and that he had never met a sinless person (pp. 186-188 present very well the theoretical character of the discussion and the biblical roots of the concept of sinlessness). Therefore I do not see why Pelagius contradicts his earlier positions in *De natura et gratia* 41,48, and I do not see why he should be accused of lies, while, precisely on this matter, Augustine's changes are considered to be "a genuine change of heart" (p. 215). The biblical testimonies about sinlessness are there, and also accepted by Augustine (see pp. 214-215), probably because of Jerome's position, which is an interesting suggestion indeed (p. 215). The sinfulness of his own time, including of himself, is admitted by Augustine. As Squires makes clear, Augustine also

[79] Cf. H. Inglebert, "Orosius", in *AL* 4, 3/4, Basel 2014, 398-403, here 399.

[80] See the very interesting and revealing comments of A. Bonner, *The Myth of Pelagianism*, Oxford 2018, 294-298.

admits that it is hypothetically possible for one to remain sinless, for the opposite would limit God's power (cf. pp. 213 and 216).

Squires follows Augustine's statement that Pelagius lied about his authorship of a letter and treatise written to a widow (pp. 134; 188). A starkly different opinion can be found in Löhr (p. 78).[81] I suggest that one should be careful with accusing Pelagius of lies, especially when the authorship of Pelagius is claimed by others, not by himself. Why should Pelagius take the risk of lying? Pelagius wrote a letter to Augustine upon arrival in Carthage, a letter to which Augustine replied. Squires offers a good survey of Augustine's answer (p. 136). However, he does not do that much with a study of Jan den Boeft (1987) that makes clear the problematic character of Augustine's later defensive interpretation of that letter's content.

Squires suggests that Augustine might have received a copy of Jerome's *Dialogi contra Pelagianos* (cf. p. 137). If this may be the case, Augustine seemingly made little use of it, and later, in the debate with Julian (cf. *Opus imperfectum* IV), he does not show much familiarity with Jerome's work. It might well be that Jerome's reply either did not please Augustine (in the discussion with Julian, Augustine invoked a good number of authorities in *Contra Iulianum* I-II, but Jerome is given a rather marginal place among these authorities), or that he did not receive or read it. In any case, the part on the exchange of letters between the Africans and Innocent (pp. 137-139), is, in my view, rather flat and does not pay sufficient attention to the fact that Innocent was unfamiliar with the issues at stake.[82]

In chapter 9, Squires offers an historical overview of the debate between Julian and Augustine, making clear that with regard to insults, nobody had any lessons to teach Saint Augustine. Squires is wrong (p. 153) when, referring to *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum* V,4, he suggests that Turbantius was converted to Pelagianism. It is, in that context, precisely the opposite: Turbantius converted to the "Catholic faith" and thus left his Pelagian colleagues, together with whom he had initially refused to sign the *Tractoria* of Zosimus. Ch. 10 deals in a balanced and sympathetic way with John Cassian, offering a survey of the man's life. This reviewer is of the opinion that

[81] See W. Löhr, *Pélage et le pélagianisme*, Paris 2015, 78.

[82] See M. Lamberigts, "Was Innocent Familiar with the Content of the Pelagian Controversy? A Study of his Answers to the Letters sent by the African Episcopacy", in P. Nehring, M. Strozynski, R. Tockzo (eds), *Scrinium Augustini. The World of Augustine's Letters* (Instrumenta Patristica et Mediaevalia. Research on the Inheritance of Early and Medieval Christianity 76), Turnhout 2017, 203-223.

neither the monks of Hadrumetum nor those of Marseille deserve to be qualified as Semipelagian (p. 179) or to be included in the Pelagian controversy as such: Augustine writes to them as brothers and friends, explaining his own positions in a friendly and collegial way. This being said, I am also of the opinion that the differences in point of view between Cassian and Augustine are more fundamental than is often suggested, not only with regard to important Pelagian issues, but for other issues too.[83]

In the second part, the theological positions of the antagonists are discussed. Squires rightly emphasizes Pelagius' convictions about the goodness of God's creation par excellence: the human being. I do not understand why such an important issue is entitled a rejection of original sin (p. 183), since Squires does not discuss that doctrine here, and rightly so, for Pelagius himself did not dispute or reject the doctrine of original sin. I also suggest that Squires should read the pages that G. Greshake, *Gnade als konkrete Freiheit* (Mainz, 1972), spends on the concept *imitatio* and its impact on one's behavior. Indeed, it recalls the Greek *paideia*-model, thus recognizing that imitation in education and the moral life plays an important role in one's ethical formation, since imitation results in identification with the model. In other words, Pelagius' view of grace is less external than suggested by Squires (see also pp. 210 and 230). Moreover, the gift of the *posse*, an important aspect in the relation God wants to start with human beings, is presented in a way that does not do justice to Pelagius (cf. p. 211). I think Squires underestimates the impact on Pelagius of the early Augustine's views about free will and sin (pp. 185-186). Pelagius repeats the young Augustine, who does opt for freedom of choice. In any case, Squires is right when stating that Pelagius' view of grace suffers from Augustine's criticism. I do not share the critique of Pelagius's Christology (pp. 190-191), and I suggest that Squires consider the article of J. Rivière, concerning the Pelagian views of redemption, which is mentioned in the bibliography but seemingly not used in the discussion of the issue.[84] Squires is right when observing that there is no real Pelagian theology of the baptism of infants and that willful acceptance on the part of the individual is lacking in their case (p. 193). On this point, it is interesting that Squires, when dealing with Augustine, observes that the "theology

[83] Cf. M. Lamberigts, "Reception of Augustine during his Lifetime", in T. Toom, *Augustine in Context*, Cambridge 2017, 236-237.

[84] J. Rivière, "Hétérodoxie des Pélagiens en fait de rédemption?", *RHE* 41 (1946) 5-41, offering a very detailed survey of the pros and the cons, comes to the conclusion that critique on this issue "ne tient pas devant les faits" (p. 41).

articulating why infants need to be baptized had yet to be developed fully" (p. 205). The same should be said with regard to the presence of sin in infants: can one speak of presence of sin when willful acceptance is missing? In any case, the idea that infants must be baptized in order to enter into the kingdom of heaven is an idea not only common to Pelagius and Caelestius (cf. p. 198), but also to Eastern authors such as Chrysostom. Further, the idea of a Pelagian third place, suggested by Augustine, is not confirmed in Pelagian writings, as was made clear by F. Refoulé.[85] I agree with Squires that the opinion of limbo was not yet developed in the fifth century (p. 198), but when it was developed (among others by Thomas Aquinas), it was done because the faithful could not believe that unbaptized babies would end up in hell, the consequence of the Augustinian view of original sin. Since 2007, the Roman Catholic Church accepts that the mercy of God is such that, infants, among others having no fault of their own, will be admitted to the kingdom of God.

In ch. 13, Squires presents in a concise but correct way Augustine's theology in the period 411-418, rightly emphasizing that the changes in Augustine's views make it hard to formulate a consistent account of his positions (cf. pp. 206 and212); that Augustine's views were changing is, according to Squires, evident (cf. p. 216). However, I think Squires does not do justice to the authors mentioned on p. 203 (n. 24) when discussing the mistranslation of Romans 5:12: one of the great merits of Lyonnet is precisely that he showed that Augustine had already constructed his doctrine of original sin before he started appealing to Romans 5:12. The fundamental question to be asked is thus another one: is the doctrine of original sin as presented by Augustine present in Scripture? Does Scripture confirm that infants are born with original sin and thus because of *reatus* end up in hell when they die without being baptized? According to Squires, Augustine "was forced to focus his attention on the narrow topic of the baptism of infants, which became the primary battlefield on which the fight over original sin, as well as the meaning of baptism, were fought" (p. 204). Augustine chose this battlefield, not Paul, who was Augustine's great giant and considered by Augustine to be his predecessor in the doctrine of grace.

[85] See F. Refoulé, "La distinction 'Roayme de Die-Voe éternelle' est-elle pélagienne?", *RechSR* 51 (1963) 247-254, esp. p. 253: "En résumé (after a detailed discussion of Augustine's criticism), il nous semble probable que les pélagiens n'ont jamais proposé eux-mêmes la distinction « royaume de Dieu-vie éternelle »". The study is mentioned in the bibliography, but not discussed.

The chapter on Jerome (ch. 14) well describes the link Jerome made between Pelagius and Origen. Squires observes that there is a difference in outlook in book 3 of Jerome's work against Pelagius in comparison to books 1 and 2, and Squires suggests that the arrival of Orosius, who brought the works of Augustine to Jerome, might be the cause of this difference. However, Squires adds, Jerome rejected Augustine's overly pessimistic view of the human condition (pp. 225-226) and did not share Augustine's view regarding the transmission of sin to babies (p. 230); Squires might be right, for Augustine does not much appeal to Jerome in his debate with Julian, and even seems to distance himself from the monk of Bethlehem in book 4 of *Opus imperfectum*. Squires's statement that Jerome does not fully embrace original sin (p. 227) might be an explanation for this distancing by the bishop of Hippo. For his part, Jerome is seemingly unaware of the distance Pelagius himself took from Origen (see *De gestis Pelagii* 3,10), and it is a pity that the critical evaluation presented in chapter 8 is not taken into account in this chapter. Anyway, Squires convincingly makes clear that Jerome's discussion of grace and free will lacks nuance and precision (p. 231).

The chapter on Orosius (ch. 15) aims to do justice to the influence of both Augustine and Jerome on Orosius, thus nuancing the view that Orosius was mostly influenced by Augustine (pp. 235-237). The chapter very clearly reveals that Orosius presented Pelagius in a way that was, to say the least, not very fair (see pp. 232-233). Moreover, someone like Augustine might be surprised to read the following statement of Orosius: "To offer prayer is up to me …" (cf. p. 233).

Squires starts his chapter on Julian (ch. 15) with Julian's critique of Augustine as a Manichaean (pp. 238-240) but does not answer the fundamental question: are these accusations correct? J. van Oort, who spent years researching Manichaeism as well as Manichaeism in Augustine was of the opinion that Julian was right: "For the time being, we may conclude that Julian displayed keen insight in claiming that Augustine's views concurred with those of the Manichaeans."[86] I do think that research on the Pelagian controversy must cope with this challenging conclusion, for it may well be that through Augustine an important "heretical" current has crept into Western Christianity. I also missed in this chapter a thorough discussion of Julian's medical knowledge, considered by Peter Brown as more up to date than that

[86] See J. van Oort, "Was Julian Right? A Re-Evaluation of Augustine's and Mani's Doctrines of Sexual Concupiscence and the Transmission of Sin: Part 2", *Journal of Early Christian History* 8, 2 (2018) 1-15, 12.

of Augustine.[87] Moreover, Squires remains silent about the fact that Julian hit the Achilles tendon of Augustine's doctrine, the creation of the soul. In a "creationist" view, God and God alone is the creator of the soul and on that level no sin, not even original sin, can be present in a baby, unless one makes God responsible for it. Julian made a big issue of God's justice, but Squires remains silent on this important topic. Julian also criticized the arbitrariness of Augustine's concept of grace, but, again, Squires does not deal with it. All in all, the *corpus Iuliani* is more extensive than that of any (other?) Pelagian and thus deserves a more thorough presentation and discussion. I do understand that Squires wanted to avoid repetitions with regard to issues such as a sinless life, baptismal theology, and grace (cf. p. 248), but the fundamental critiques made by Julian now remain undiscussed.

In the second chapter dealing with Augustine's theology (ch. 16), Squires observes that Augustine could not understand why Julian did not recognize the differences between original sin and natural evil (p. 249). I suggest that Julian could not agree with Augustine's position because for Julian carnal concupiscence – Julian prefers to speak of natural concupiscence – is an essential part of being human. It belongs to the essence of humanity and thus cannot just be cut out of our nature. Squires shows very well how far away Augustine is from this position and how much debate Augustine's position has caused and continues to cause (pp. 250-251). Augustine's appeal to tradition (pp. 249-250) is an attempt to prove that his doctrine is in line with both the Eastern and Western tradition and thus is not Manichaean. This argument is developed in *Contra Iulianum* I-II, but can this rhetorical masterpiece be described as an adequate refutation of Julian's accusations? Squires well presents Augustine's view of carnal concupiscence (pp. 250-256) but does not discuss the biblical (Pauline) impact on Augustine's doctrine, for, in the debate with Julian, Augustine time and again refers to Paul. I am not sure that Augustine ever stated that sex within marriage, with the intention to procreate, is "morally praiseworthy" (p. 257). I think that Augustine speaks of a good use of something evil (*bene uti malo*)[88]. The difference between Julian and Augustine lies precisely in the status of

[87] P. Brown, "Sexuality and Society in the Fifth Century A.D.: Augustine and Julian of Eclanum", in E. Gabba (ed.), *Tria corda. Scritti in onore di Arnoldo Momigliano* (Biblioteca di Atenaeum 1), Como 1983, 49-70, mentioned in the bibliography, offers useful information about this issue.

[88] See, e.g., *Contra Iulianum* III,49.50; IV,1.39; V,60; *Opus imperfectum* III,183; V,7.13.18.23.

concupiscence; while for the rest, the positions of the two antagonists on marriage and procreation are very near to each other. Also, Julian considers sex within marriage as the only means for (correct) procreation. Anyway, Squires makes clear that marriage and sex are not the same (cf. pp. 258ff.).

In ch. 18, the theology of Cassian is presented, with Cassian's theology receiving more space and attention than that of Pelagius, Caelestius, or Julian. Squires makes clear that Cassian's understanding of Adam is more optimistic than Augustine's. I received an impression that Cassian, better than Augustine, explained why God let Adam sin: God respected Adam's freedom (pp. 262-264). Squires well describes Cassian's view of the relation between grace and free will (pp. 264-271), stating that Cassian remained vague with regard to the priority of grace over free will, or the other way around (p. 270), and this reader understands better why people such as Prosper of Aquitaine had, at least initially, problems with the monk's positions. The way Cassian speaks of free will and grace in *Collatio* 13,9f. (pp. 269-270) may be more acceptable for Pelagius cum suis than for Augustine. In any case, synergetism seems to be the choice of a monk with expertise in Eastern monastic life, but now living in the West (p. 271). Of the reality that such monks can also evolve, Squires's analyses of *Institutio* 12, *Collatio* 3 and 13 are an interesting proof (p. 268). The interesting section on sinlessness makes clear that Cassian's positions on this matter differ from those of Augustine and Jerome (p. 274). Squires very much focuses on the Pelagians when dealing with Cassian's view of sinlessness. Squires might be right, but this reader is still waiting for an answer to the question as to whether the critique made by Cassian was based on knowledge of Pelagian writings or on hearsay. Pelagius took sin very seriously.

In the last section, entitled Conclusion, but not really offering conclusions (pp. 278-294), Squires offers an interesting survey of many people who struggled with Augustine's view. During Augustine's lifetime, the monks of Hadrumetum and Marseille feared that their monastic project would become meaningless because of Augustine's view regarding the dominance of grace. In the 470s, Faustus, bishop of Riez, wrote a treatise titled *De gratia* in which he emphasized the importance of human efforts in the process of salvation. At the instigation of Scythian monks, Fulgentius, bishop of Ruspe, wrote his *De veritate praedestinationis et gratiae Dei*, in order to refute the work of Faustus, thus putting much emphasis on grace and predestination, defending both a predestination to salvation and to condemnation. This position would be corrected in the Council of Arles (529), which rejected the

predestination to hell. The list of authors who would be involved in polemics concerning the right interpretation of Augustine's views is impressive: Gottschalk of Orbais, the Reformers, Trent, the Jansenist controversy. Squires ends with a statement of the current pope, Francis, who was speaking of Neopelagianism. All the people involved in these debates about the correct interpretation of Augustine (and the Pelagians) were committed and engaged Christians. The fact that they often disagreed with each other makes clear that a debate of the first three decades of the fifth century is still stirring emotions. We must be grateful to Squires that he has brought this to our attention, for too many became victims of condemnation, trial, and the death penalty because of their sympathy either for Augustine or the Pelagians.

Mathijs Lamberigts

TARRANT, Harold, LAYNE, Danielle A., BALTZLY, Dirk, RENAUD, François (eds), *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity* (Brill's Companions to Classical Reception 13), Brill, Leiden 2018, 680 p.

In this extensive volume on the reception of Plato in antiquity, all the major philosophical figures are covered, both pagan and Christian. The chapter on St. Augustine is authored by Gerd Van Riel ("Augustine's Plato", pp. 448-469). The essay begins with an initial observation that Augustine had a "fairly good general knowledge of Plato's philosophy" from various sources, but he had little access to Plato's dialogues, due to his "limited knowledge of Greek" (p. 448). Van Riel does not subscribe entirely to the traditional view that Augustine could not read Greek authors at all, but he does not elaborate on the exact meaning of the bishop of Hippo's "limitations" concerning the language of Plato. The rest of the essay, however, suggests that Van Riel does not believe it plausible that Augustine might have tried to read Plato in Greek, since the analysis of Augustine's sources focuses exclusively on Latin authors who mediated to him the philosophy of the founder of the Academy.

Van Riel concentrates on the relationship of Augustine to Plato's dialogues, not to Platonism as such, which is, obviously, a prudent choice, given the scope of a single essay. Van Riel's analyses are based searching for the references not only to Plato himself, but also to "Platonists" via the CETEDOC database (*Brepolis Latin Direct: Library of Latin Texts*).

The first section of the essay is entitled "Augustine's 'Handbook Plato'" and begins with a long quotation from *uera rel*., where the bishop of Hippo imagines Plato's conversion to Christianity, had he been alive after the Incarnation. Then Van Riel gives an account of those places where Augustine generally refers to the most important features of Plato's philosophy, but not on the basis of any concrete dialogue, that is, where Augustine refers to the "handbook Plato". Such general knowledge may have been drawn from various sources, argues Van Riel, not only textual and not only the dialogues themselves.

In the section "Augustine's Sources", the author explains that the two main sources for Augustine's knowledge of the dialogues are translations by Cicero and the works of Apuleius of Madauros. That Cicero seems to have been the most obvious source for Augustine's knowledge of Plato's philosophy has long time by scholars, since Marcus Tullius both reported Plato's views extensively in his philosophical works and translated portions of them (especially, *Timaeus*; cf. the seminal study by R. Poncelet: *Cicéron, traducteur de Platon*, Paris 1953). Van Riel points out that Apuleius, Augustine's compatriot, may have been a significant, yet neglected source, and Van Riel's arguments for this suggestion are convincing. He also suggests, more tentatively, that Augustine might have used Porphyry's *Letter to Marcella*.

Those insightful and concise remarks conclude with the observation that "Augustine's knowledge of Plato was not just contextual, i.e. dependent on the context of his direct source (in this case: Porphyry), but that he also had recourse to a broader set of Platonic passages, put together from different sources, which he could set to use in his works. He may have known this information by heart, but he will, more probably, have had a kind of record available in the form of personal notes or hypomnemata" (p. 464).

It is a pity that Van Riel does not take into account the groundbreaking monographs on the Platonic tradition published in recent years by L.P. Gerson (especially his *From Plato to Platonism*, Cornell 2013). Van Riel uses a traditional perspective in which the Middle Platonists and Neoplatonists are not reliable sources for understanding the philosophical system of Plato. For instance, he does not question the ruling assumption that the identification of the Demiurge with the Forms is a later invention of the Middle Platonists and that there is no trace of it in the *Timaeus* itself (while it seems to be a quite logical consequence of juxtaposing 29e1-3 and 30d1-31a1). Van Riel also states that "indeed there is no such thing as formless matter in Plato

himself" (p. 469) and that Augustine who develops this idea in *conf*. 12 must have taken it from the later sources. Again, Plato does not use the term "matter" in the sense proposed by Aristotle, but Plutarch explicitly identified Aristotelian matter with Plato's receptacle (*De Is*. 372f). Moreover, the principle to which Plato refers to as "indefinite" in some dialogues (e.g., *Phil*. 16c-d ff.), Aristotle identifies as the Great and Small or the Indefinite Dyad, claiming that this principle in Plato corresponds to his material principle, while the One (representing definiteness, limit, and measure) corresponds to the principle of form or essence (ὡς μὲν οὖν ὕλην τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν εἶναι ἀρχάς, ὡς δ' οὐσίαν τὸ ἕν, *Met*. A, 987a).

In his interpretation of Augustine's account of the Platonic Idea of Good, Van Riel claims that Augustine did not know about the Idea of the Good as it appears in the *Republic*, but his reference to it is based on "the Neoplatonists" (Plotinus?). He juxtaposes Augustine's "Neoplatonic" description of the Good as (supposedly "impersonal") *unum atque summum bonum* in *ep*. 118.3 with the claim that *ipsum autem uerum ac summum bonum Plato dicit Deum* (*ciu*. 8.8). If the first seems to Van Riel an accurate description of the Neoplatonic understanding of the One-Good, the other is construed as a mistaken identification of the Good "beyond essence" with the personal God or the Demiurge. But the identification of the Good with God is not Augustine's invention; it had been made earlier by Numenius of Apamea, who was a great influence on Plotinus. Eusebius of Caesarea quotes extensively from his treatise *On the Good* in his *Praeparatio evangelica* (e.g., in book XI).

Van Riel writes that "under the influence of Origen, among others, Augustine became aware of many specific Platonic doctrines that were useful in articulating Christian theology" (p. 466). But a hypothesis worth considering would be that Augustine was familiar with the very idea that the Good equals God, if not with Eusebius' references to Numenius, who identified the Good as the First Intellect or the Father (and the Demiurge as the Second Intellect and his Son). Numenius struggled with the necessity to reconcile the simplicity of the Good/Father with the fact that it also contains the multiplicity of the Forms; this problem was also something which Augustine had to deal with in his philosophy, in the Trinitarian framework. Numenius was familiar with the Bible and famously described Plato as "Moses speaking Attic Greek" (fr. 8.13). He also referred to the Good or the First Intellect as ὁ ὤν, "The Existing One", which is the name that God reveals to Moses in the Septuagint (Ex 3:14). In this light, Augustine's "mistaken" reference to Plato's identification of the Idea

of the Good with God is a curious reflection of the vivid Platonic tradition of his time, which was also a living tradition of interpreting the dialogues of Plato.

On the whole, Van Riel's essay is not only an invaluable summary of what we know about Augustine's knowledge of Plato, it also provides some original insights, as well as points for future.

Mateusz Stróżyński

TOOM, Tarmo (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine's 'Confessions'* (Cambridge Companions to Religion), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2020, 340 p.

Les contributions réunies dans ce volume proposent une mise au point des plus utiles et précieuses sur l'état actuel de la critique sur les *Confessions* d'Augustin d'Hippone. Comme le note Tarmo Toom dans son introduction (pp. 1-7), l'ouvrage a été rédigé à plusieurs mains par de nombreux spécialistes reconnus et dont les approches se complètent, voire s'opposent, ce qui permet d'offrir au lecteur plusieurs discours sur cette même œuvre. De fait, cet ouvrage s'offre non seulement comme un manuel destiné à un public étudiant et universitaire, mais aussi comme un ouvrage de référence pour toute étude ultérieure sur les *Confessions*.

L'ouvrage se décompose en trois parties. Dans la première, sont réunies des contributions qui ont trait aux circonstances et à la structure des *conf.* C. Hammond aborde, dans un premier temps, la question de la genèse des *conf.* (pp. 11-27), en insistant sur l'importance du motif de la *confessio*, dont elle ne retient cependant qu'une signification binaire, et non la tripartition *confessio peccatorum, confessio fidei* et *confessio laudis*. Elle montre ainsi que les *conf.* doivent d'abord se comprendre comme une prière adressée à Dieu. A. Kotzé, dans la contribution suivante (pp. 28-45), s'attelle aux difficiles questions de la structure et du genre de l'œuvre, pour lesquelles elle propose un utile état de la critique. On est néanmoins étonné de ne pas retrouver ici trace de suggestions sur la structure des *conf.* qui insistent sur le parallèle entre les livres I-X et XI-XIII à l'aune des motifs génésiaques de la *creatio* et sur lesquelles se fondent certaines contributions de l'ouvrage, notamment celles de M. Drever et de V. H. Drecoll. Toutefois, le mérite de cette contribution est de mettre en avant les approches actuelles du genre de l'œuvre qui rapprochent les *conf.* des genres protreptique et parénétique. La dernière contribution de

cette première partie est l'œuvre de J. D. BeDuhn (pp. 46-59) qui s'attache à l'étude du public visé par l'œuvre. L'auteur insiste tout particulièrement sur la place importante que prend la réfutation manichéenne dans la stratégie narrative de l'évêque d'Hippone.

La deuxième partie de l'ouvrage, de loin la plus importante en quantité, traite des principaux thèmes des *conf.* M.-A. Vannier aborde la question des motifs de l'*auersio* et de la *conuersio* dans les *conf.* (pp. 63-74). Elle montre combien cette dialectique structure l'œuvre et la pensée d'Augustin; la *conuersio ad Deum* est, à la fois, un don de la grâce de Dieu et engage la responsabilité de l'être humain. Cette contribution est judicieusement complétée par celle de M. Drever qui traite du motif de la *creatio* et de la *recreatio* (pp. 75-91). Ce motif permet, en effet, non seulement de penser l'unité de structure des *conf.*, mais aussi la dynamique de l'anthropo-théologie augustinienne. La contribution suivante est l'œuvre de J. van Oort et traite de la question du péché et de la concupiscence (pp. 92-106). On peut ici regretter le choix de l'auteur de ne comprendre la question du péché que sous l'angle très restreint du péché sexuel et de réduire les *conf.* uniquement à une confession de péchés sexuels. Sans doute aurait-il mieux valu proposer ici une étude du motif de la triple concupiscence, tirée de 1 Jn 2,16, en s'appuyant sur l'usage qu'en fait Augustin au livre X des *conf.* afin de proposer une approche plus équilibrée de cette question. Au péché s'oppose la grâce, que traite la contribution suivante de V. H. Drecoll (pp. 107-122). L'auteur propose ici une excellente synthèse sur cette question ardue en montrant que la grâce peut être comprise d'une part, à l'aune d'une théologie de la prière (la foi est une action de la volonté humaine, mais cette volonté provient directement de Dieu si et seulement si Dieu l'accorde); d'autre part, à l'aune d'une théologie de la conversion (à travers l'exemple de sa conversion, Augustin illustre la manière dont la grâce divine opère); enfin, à l'aune d'une théologie du repos éternel, qui non seulement structure l'œuvre de la première à la dernière phrase, mais souligne aussi le rôle joué par la grâce. Par ailleurs, V. H. Drecoll souligne, à raison selon nous, les limites des thèses de S.C. Byers (p. 118, n. 31) et de la description que fait cette dernière des processus motivationnel et émotionnel dans les livres VII et VIII des *conf.* P. van Geest, pour sa part, s'attelle à l'épineuse question de la représentation de Dieu dans les *conf.* (pp. 123-137). Avec beaucoup de justesse, il montre, d'une part, l'importance du substrat plotinien dans la description de Dieu dans les passages apologétiques des *conf.;* d'autre part, que, lorsqu'Augustin invoque Dieu, ces invocations reposent sur une syntaxe d'origine biblique et insistent sur la culpabilité et l'imperfection humaine pour faire mieux ressortir l'urgence de prier

la miséricorde divine. A.-I. Bouton-Touboulic, quant à elle, traite de la question du bonheur et de l'amitié dans les *conf.* (pp. 138-153). Tout en s'appuyant sur les sources aristotélicienne et cicéronienne de la définition de l'amitié, l'auteur montre avec bonheur combien l'évolution du thème de l'amitié dans les *conf.* engage la question de la conversion et de la grâce en offrant une opposition nette entre la mauvaise amitié qui conduit au péché et la bonne amitié qui permet la conversion à Dieu.

La contribution suivante de S.C. Byers sur les notions d'amour, de volonté et d'ascension intellectuelle dans les *conf.* (pp. 154-174) est celle qui nous semble la moins convaincante. L'auteur veut montrer que les extases dont Augustin fit l'expérience à Milan et à Ostie ne sont pas des visions du Dieu chrétien pris comme un tout, ni même des personnes trinitaires. En insistant sur le fait qu'Augustin utilise l'expression *id quod est* (*conf.* VII, 17, 23), l'auteur veut montrer qu'Augustin, d'après le récit dans ces deux expériences, n'a pas saisi Dieu, mais une forme intelligible de Dieu. En ce sens, l'expérience augustinienne serait plus néo-platonicienne que chrétienne – la dimension chrétienne n'étant assurée que par le rappel de la distance qui sépare la créature du Créateur. Cette démonstration n'emporte pas notre adhésion. D'une part, lorsque l'auteur veut montrer, par des parallèles textuels, qu'aucun texte plotinien sur la vision de l'Un ou du Bien ne correspond à la description augustinienne de la vision de l'Être, elle omet le fait que l'on observe à partir de Porphyre une assimilation de l'Un et de l'Être, dont rend bien compte la métaphysique d'un Marius Victorinus par exemple. D'autre part, même si l'on admet que l'*id quod est* renvoie à la notion néo-platonicienne d'idée et de forme divine, encore aurait-il fallu s'interroger sur la manière dont Augustin lui-même interprète ces notions et proposer une étude de l'importante *qu.* 46 *De Ideis* qui est à peine citée (p. 166, n. 32, où l'auteur suppose que la source du *De Ideis* serait le *De philosophia* perdu de Varron). En effet, les travaux d'A. Solignac, J. Pépin ou G. Madec ont pu montrer que cette *qu.* 46, loin d'être uniquement influencée par Plotin, prend sa source dans une vaste doxographie platonicienne qui inclue également des auteurs médio-platoniciens, ce qui invalide l'hypothèse d'une source varronienne. En outre, Augustin décrit dans cette *quaestio* la *forma*, sise dans l'intellect divin, comme ce qui tire son existence de Dieu et ce grâce à quoi Dieu a pu créer tout ce qui a été créé. Or, Augustin écrit clairement dans son récit de l'extase d'Ostie (*conf.* IX, 10, 24) qu'il a atteint avec sa mère la vision non de l'*id quod est*, d'une Forme de l'Être, mais de l'*Idipsum*, l'Être même, par qui tout tire son existence. La limite de cette contribution se situe donc, selon nous, non seulement dans ses affirmations (et l'on

peut regretter que l'auteur ne fasse ici aucune référence aux travaux, pourtant essentiels sur le sujet, de J. Pépin ou de G. Madec), mais aussi dans sa méthode. Comme le notait déjà en son temps A. Mandouze, la méthode des *parallèles textuels* tend à gommer les spécificités d'une expérience spirituelle et à confondre le langage d'une expérience spirituelle avec l'expérience elle-même. A l'instar d'A. Mandouze, nous sommes donc d'avis que seule une étude des *schèmes spirituels* peut permettre d'appréhender la singularité des expériences qu'Augustin connut à Milan et Ostie, ce qui permet d'apprécier combien l'expérience augustinienne, bien que nourrie du spiritualisme néo-platonicien, a été une expérience authentiquement chrétienne. Soulignons enfin notre désaccord avec la thèse bien connue de S.C. Byers qui assimile la notion augustinienne de volonté à la notion stoïcienne d'ὁρμή et qu'elle rappelle dans p. 172, n. 47. Cette thèse réduit la volonté à n'être plus qu'une impulsion à l'action, alors que la psychomachie du livre VIII des *conf.* souligne bien au contraire que la volonté chez Augustin est une instance contradictoire de décision, tout à la fois un 'je-veux' et un 'je-non-veux' comme l'analyse de manière fort juste de H. Arendt.

Dans la contribution suivante, L. Karfíková propose une efficace synthèse sur la question de la mémoire, de l'éternité et du temps dans les *conf.* (pp. 175-190). L'auteur met bien en exergue l'ambivalence de la mémoire où Augustin, en même temps, trouve et ne trouve pas la présence de Dieu, mais également le lien entre éternité et participation. G. Catapano, pour sa part (pp. 191-207), étudie le discours qu'Augustin tient sur les philosophes dans les *conf.* en étudiant plus précisément le rapport de l'évêque d'Hippone à Cicéron, et notamment à l'*Hortensius*, aux *Catégories* d'Aristote, au manichéisme, au scepticisme et au néo-platonisme. Au fil de cette étude, il montre avec beaucoup de justesse combien l'attitude d'Augustin vis-à-vis de la philosophie dans les *conf.* se caractérise par sa grande continuité par rapport à celle qui appert dans ses premiers ouvrages. On pourra compléter cette belle contribution par l'étude posthume de G. Madec sur l'*Hortensius* de Cicéron (G. Madec †, I. Bochet, « Augustin et l'*Hortensius* de Cicéron. Notes de lecture », in I. Bochet (éd.), *Augustin, philosophe et prédicateur. Hommage à Goulven Madec. Actes du colloque international organisé à Paris les 8 et 9 septembre 2011*, Paris, 2012, pp. 197-294). N. Baumann, quant à lui, étudie les places respectives que jouent l'orgueil et l'humilité dans les *conf.* (pp. 208-226). Il montre de manière fort pertinente combien cette dialectique structure le récit augustinien, tant il est vrai que la *uia humilitatis* est la voie chrétienne du salut par excellence. L'humilité a, en effet, partie liée avec la grâce,

car elle est un don de Dieu qui permet de se connaître et de se sauver. La dernière contribution de cette deuxième partie est l'œuvre de Ph. Cary et traite de la question de l'âme, du soi et de l'intériorité (pp. 227-241). L'auteur montre queles *conf.* mettent à jour plusieurs modalités de l'intériorité augustinienne. Néanmoins, le propos repose sur le présupposé fort connu de Ph. Cary qui considère Augustin comme un platonicien chrétien; or cette notion de platonisme chrétien est hautement sujette à caution, notamment lorsqu'elle est appliquée à Augustin. On peut ici renvoyer à la mise au point essentielle de G. Madec sur le sujet (« 'Platonisme' et 'Christianisme'. Analyse du livre VII des *Confessions* », in *Lectures augustiniennes*, Paris, 2001, pp. 121-184).

Cette deuxième partie de l'ouvrage propose ainsi un ensemble de contributions qui, tout à la fois, permettent d'aborder les thèmes essentiels que mettent en jeu les *Confessions*, et offrent des vues nouvelles, le plus souvent pertinentes et stimulantes, sur cette œuvre. On regrettera néanmoins que certains thèmes ne soient pas traités, notamment la question de la Trinité et, encore plus, celle du Christ, tant il est vrai que la spiritualité augustinienne dans les *conf.* est fondamentalement une spiritualité christocentrique.

La troisième et dernière partie de l'ouvrage, enfin, aborde la question de la transmission et de la réception des *conf.* de l'Antiquité à nos jours. G. Partoens offre une contribution très éclairante sur la tradition manuscrite, les éditions critiques et les traductions anglaises des *conf.* (pp. 245-262) qui constitue dès à présent une contribution de référence pour tout travail ultérieur sur ces sujets. L'auteur montre clairement les problèmes d'édition critique du texte latin, en raison d'une transmission médiévale qui ne propose pas deux manuscrits identiques, ce qu'il illustre en comparant les *stemmata codicum* radicalement différents adoptés par les principaux éditeurs contemporains du texte, à savoir P. Knöll, M. Skutella et L. Verheijen. E. L. Saak, pour sa part, étudie la réception des *conf.* au Moyen Âge (pp. 263-276). Tout en regrettant, sans doute à raison, l'absence d'une étude des *marginalia* des manuscrits des *conf.* susceptible de donner des éléments importants pour comprendre comment les *conf.* étaient lues à l'époque médiévale, l'auteur souligne bien la diversité des modalités de la réception médiévale de l'œuvre, qu'il s'agisse, sur un plan microstructural, de florilèges ou de citations, ou, sur un plan macrostructural, de biographies ou d'autobiographies. L'auteur consacre enfin quelques pages à la réception complexe des *conf.* d'Augustin par Pétrarque (pp. 271-274). La contribution de K. Ettenuber étudie la réception des *conf.* à l'époque moderne, de 1500 à 1650 (pp. 277-

294). L'auteur montre de manière très fine combien l'interprétation des *conf.* revêt un enjeu essentiel dans les polémiques qui opposent catholiques et protestants. L'intérêt de cet article est, en outre, de montrer l'importance des *conf.* dans le théâtre jésuite ou dans la poésie de cette époque. P. Riley, quant à lui, étudie la réception des *conf.* durant l'époque des Lumières (pp. 295-316). Il montre, à travers les reprises qu'en font Pierre Bayle, le Chevalier de Jaucourt ou Voltaire, combien la critique de la vie et de l'œuvre d'Augustin participe d'un projet de critique du Grand Siècle, le XVIIème siècle de Louis XIV, et d'une promotion des valeurs des Lumières. La dernière contribution est l'œuvre de M. Vessey et étudie les différentes stratégies de lecture des *conf.* (pp. 317-334).

L'ouvrage est complété d'une note bibliographique (p. 335), qui consiste uniquement en une présentation des *instrumenta* disponibles pour l'étude du texte et d'un *index nominum et uerborum* (pp. 337-340). Même si chaque contribution est complétée par une courte bibliographie, on peut regretter l'absence d'une bibliographie générale à la fin de l'ouvrage, ainsi que d'un *index locorum*, qui auraient été des outils très utiles pour exploiter parfaitement l'ouvrage. Nonobstant ce défaut, qui est surtout propre à la collection, force est de souligner la qualité de l'ouvrage qui donne des clefs de lecture très pertinentes pour entrer dans ce chef-d'œuvre intimidant que sont *Les Confessions* d'Augustin, en même temps que certaines de ces contributions offrent des pistes nouvelles et stimulantes pour des recherches ultérieures. Cet ouvrage constitue donc dès à présent un ouvrage classique que tout lecteur ou spécialiste d'Augustin se devra d'avoir dans sa bibliothèque.

Jérôme Lagouanère

TORNAU, Christian (ed.), De immortalitate animae. *Zweisprachige Ausgabe. Eingeleitet, übersetzt und kommentiert von Christian Tornau. Mit Beiträgen von Giovanni Catapano, Emmanuel Bermon, Lenka Karfíková und Giuseppe Balido* (Augustinus – Opera Werke 7), Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2020, 495 p.

After Plato wrote the *Phaedo* circa 385 B.C., the subject of the immortality of the human soul entered the Western philosophical tradition. Six demonstrations appear in this work, eleven in his works overall. None are repeated. This fact has led some to opine that Plato was dissatisfied with the efficacy of these attempts.

Be that as it may, the topic has remained unto the present day. Augustine's contribution to the subject is contained in his *De immortalitate animae*. This short work, authored by Augustine in Milan in 387 shortly before his baptism in late April, 387, contains a series of notes on the immortality of soul, preparatory to final publication as *Soliloquia* III. When Augustine wrote his *Retractationes* in 426, he discovered a manuscript of the work. He found the unfinished work almost incomprehensible, but decided to include it among his published works. It is to this short work that volume seven of *Augustinus Opera Werke* is devoted.

The author of this volume is Christian Tornau, professor of classical philology at the Universität Würzburg. Well respected in Europe, he is relatively unknown in North America. The present work witnesses to his expansive learning. This volume took him the better part of two decades to complete.

Tornau's work is divided into several parts. For our examination, four are important: (1) the introduction, (2) the text and German translation, (3) a commentary on the text and thought, and (4) four critical essays on various aspects of Augustine's thought regarding immortality. In the introduction, Tornau treats the date and occasion of the work, the demonstrations themselves, the philosophical and patristic background, and the place of the work in Augustine's corpus. Of particular interest is Tornau's tracing of the patristic intellectual struggle to reconcile the Greco-Roman doctrine of the immortality of the soul with the scriptural notion of the resurrection of the body. The history proceeds from Justin Martyr to Ambrose of Milan. By Augustine's time the harmonization was complete. Next the text of *De immortalitate animae* is presented. The text is the CSEL version, slightly emended, and is the best text available today. The critical edition was edited by Wolfgang Hörmann and published in 1986. Tornau's commentary follows. It consists of a sentence-by-sentence explication of the text. It is here that Professor Tornau evidences his immense learning. He gives several texts from earlier authors which either serve as comparisons illustrating the meaning of Augustine's text or were direct influences on Augustine's thought. Professor Tornau allows for influence of Cicero and Porphyry, among others, but quite obviously has a distinct preference for Plotinian influence, especially *Enneads* IV,7, Plotinus' treatment of the same subject. Finally, four essays by continental scholars complete the commentary. Indexes of ancient sources, biblical citations, and ancient and modern authors, as well as German and Latin indexes of topics complete the work.

Frederick Van Fleteren

TRAKADAS, Athena, *In Mauretaniae maritimis. Marine Resource Exploitation in a Roman North African Province* (Alte Geschichte, Geographica Historica 40), Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2018, 667 p.

Der umfangreiche Band (667 Seiten) enthält eine detaillierte Studie der Fischereiaktivitäten in der römischen Provinz *Mauretania Tingitana* (nordwestlicher Maghreb). Die Untersuchung konzentriert sich auf die römische Zeit (1.-3. Jh. n.Chr.), bettet diese jedoch in die gut dokumentierte punisch-mauretanische Zeit (ab 5. Jh. v.Chr.) und die eher summarisch behandelte nach-römische Zeit (bis 6. Jh. n.Chr.) ein. Sie umfaßt damit einen Zeitraum von mehr als 1000 Jahren. Während bisherige Studien sich vor allem auf die Pökelindustrie konzentrierten, macht die Autorin geltend, daß ihre Forschungen zum ersten Mal die Rolle von Frischfisch und frischen Schalentieren beleuchten, sowohl mit Hinblick auf die gefangenen Arten, die Fangmengen, Fangtechnologien, die Saisonalität und die diachrone Entwicklung des antiken Fischereibetriebs. Sie erlauben somit eine Darstellung des Einflusses der Romanisierung auf die Ernährung der Bevölkerung, die Fangdiversität, die Fangpraktiken, die Verarbeitungsindustrie und die Kommerzialisierung des Sektors.

Die Studie beruht im Wesentlichen auf archäologischen Quellen (Fisch- und Muscheltierreste, Amphorenscherben, Mauerreste, Fanginstrumente etc.), ergänzt durch deskriptive Quellen (Werke antiker Autoren, bildliche Darstellungen, Inschriften). Der erste Teil des Buches enthält ein methodologisches Kapitel, ein Quellenkapitel, ein kurzes Kapitel zum historischen Hintergrund sowie jeweils ein Kapitel zur Umwelt und Geographie (Kapitel 1-6). Dieser Teil wird abgeschlossen durch einen Abschnitt ‚Discussion' (ähnlich in den folgenden Kapiteln), wobei nicht ganz klar ist, ob es sich um eine Zusammenfassung oder um vorläufige Schlußfolgerungen handelt. Das 7. Kapitel enthält drei Fallstudien: Tamuda (Mittelmeerküste), Septem Fratres (Straße von Gibraltar) und Lixus (Atlantikküste), die stellvertretend die drei unterschiedlichen Meeressysteme in der Region abdecken sollen. Kapitel 8 trägt wieder den Titel ‚Discussion', wobei sich der Leser fragt, in welcher Beziehung diese einerseits zu den gleichnamigen Abschnitten in den vorhergehenden Kapiteln steht, und andererseits zu dem folgenden 9. Kapitel mit dem Titel ‚Conclusions'. Auf letztere folgen die Anhänge, die über 340 Seiten beanspruchen, während die eigentliche Studie ca. 280 Seiten umfaßt. Sie enthalten im Wesentlichen sog. Metadaten zu Fischfang und Fischverarbeitungsindustrie (Tabellen mit Fisch- und Meerestierresten, Fischereizubehör, archäologischen Quellen für die Pökelindustrie), historische Kartenwerke und gut strukturierte Indices.

Für den Historiker ist die Lektüre der methodologisch bedingt sehr detaillierten technischen Textabschnitte ebenso wie der teilweise notwendigen, mitunter aber auch redundant erscheinenden Wiederholungen zeitweise mühsam. Die Erkenntnisse der Studie mit Hinblick auf die diachrone Nutzung der Fischereiressourcen und die daraus resultierenden Einflüsse auf die ökonomischen, soziologischen und materiellen Strukturen in diesem Teil der antiken Welt sind jedoch von hohem Interesse. Sie lassen eine bemerkenswerte ökologische Stabilität der Küstenregionen und Flußmündungen während des gesamten Zeitraums wie auch die Priorität von Salzwasserlebewesen (gegenüber Süßwasserlebewesen) einschließlich von bisher wenig erforschten Arten wie Walen, Haien und Korallen, aber gleichzeitig auch Veränderungen in der Diversität, der verwendeten Technologien und der Produktionsstätten im gesamten Erfassungsgebiet erkennen. Die Studie kommt weiterhin zu dem Schluß, daß die archäologischen Nachweise für die Purpurproduktion und den Thunfischfang im Widerspruch zu der häufigen Erwähnung dieser Aktivitäten in den antiken Quellen stehen, was eine nähere Erforschung dieses Fragenkreises erforderlich macht.

Innerhalb des Gesamtzeitraums ergibt sich für die vorrömische Zeit, daß die Fischerei ökonomisch gesehen als Subsistenzindustrie vorrangig der Versorgung der lokalen Bevölkerung diente, wobei Fische und Meeresfrüchte einen Zusatz zu der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion darstellten. Soziologisch gesehen handelt es sich um ein während des gesamten Jahres ausgeübtes und im Wesentlichen individuell oder in kleinen Gruppen betriebenes Handwerk. Geographisch konzentrierte sie sich auf die Flüsse, Flußmündungen und den Küstenbereich an Mittelmeer und Atlantik. In römischer Zeit stellt die Autorin einen Diversitätsverlust fest, teilweise bedingt dadurch, daß die in der Provinz stationierten römischen Soldaten bestimmten Fischarten offenbar den Verzehr von Fleisch vorzogen. Gleichzeitig wird eine Steigerung der angelandeten Mengen und der dadurch bedingten Fangtechnologien vor allem im Küstenbereich und auf dem Meer in der Straße von Gibraltar und im Atlantik offenbar. Zudem fand eine Saisonalisierung der Fangaktivitäten und eine Professionalisierung der bisher kleinhandwerklichen Produktionsbedingungen statt, nachvollziehbar auch anhand der Zeugnisse für Pökelbetriebe, die mit *cetariae* (Bottichen) arbeiteten, womit eine wesentlich längere Haltbarkeit des Endprodukts und damit der Export von Überschüssen über die Grenzen der Provinz hinaus möglich wurden. Die nachrömische Zeit läßt einen weiteren Diversitätsverlust bei gleichzeitiger Schrumpfung der Fangmengen und des Pökelbetriebs, d.h. ein Zurückfallen auf die

lokale Versorgung erkennen, wobei sich die Fangaktivitäten weiterhin auf die Straße von Gibraltar und den Atlantik konzentrieren.

Die Studie von Athena Trakadas beschränkt sich nicht auf die Darbietung einer Unmenge von vor allem archäologischer Daten, sondern ergänzt und vergleicht diese mit anderen Quellen. Vor allem aber, und das ist für historisch Interessierte von besonderem Wert, enthält sie eine Synthese und eine historische Interpretation der Quellen, wobei auch die Entwicklung des römischen Stadtrechts (*municipia*, *coloniae*) Beachtung findet (S. 210: Septem Fratres im 3. Jh. n.Chr eher eine *colonia* als eine *civitas*). Sie bietet darüber hinaus eine solide Grundlage für weitere Meeres-, aber auch archäologische und vergleichende historische Forschungen, die unter anderem ein besseres Verständnis der literarischen Quellen ermöglichen könnten.

Gertrud Dietze-Mager

VAN EGMOND, Bart *Augustine's Early Thought on the Redemptive Function of Divine Judgement*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2018, vii + 293 p.

The title of Bart van Egmond's book, *Augustine's Early Thought on the Redemptive Function of the Divine Judgment*, suggested to me that the monograph would be a remarkably limited study. I wrongly assumed that the book would be concerned with damnation and predestination. Van Egmond, in fact, presents a much more complex study that examines three larger topics through a diachronic study of Augustine's writings from his earliest dialogues to the *Confessions*. The first topic involves Augustine's appropriation of philosophical pedagogy and how his Christian reframing of this tradition develops in this period. Closely related to this topic, Augustine's understanding of suffering, discipline, and its pedagogical function through his engagement with Manichaeism is the second larger concern of the book. The last and most comprehensive examination is the place of grace in relation to punishment and the justification for coercion.

These three concerns provide a gloss on what the title implies through "redemptive function of Divine Judgment" and situate van Egmond's study amidst several influential scholarly debates. The book contests the claim that Augustine's optimistic view of moral development for humanity per se in the *tempora Christiana* is exclusively dominant in his early writings before 394. The author rightly observes that both the understanding of the pedagogical role of punishment and

the place of authority, ecclesial and even secular, in God's providence are by no means absent from Augustine's early writings. This is an important and convincing aspect of van Egmond's study.

The book, as noted, proceeds by means of a diachronic treatment of Augustine's writings through the *Confessions*. The second chapter (the first is the Introduction), which is devoted to the writings from Cassiciacum and Rome, highlights two infrequently examined dimensions: Augustine's use of divine providence and authority in these works. Like his predecessors, Augustine holds that the threat of punishment is part of the process of education (p. 46). Punishment and coercion may aid the human person in abandoning vice, and purgation for the mind through rational disciplines brings one to understanding the truth (p. 47). However, Augustine does not possess confidence in the capacity of the human person to move and cling to God without fear, punishment, and reliance on Christ's salutary authority (p. 55). Concerning Augustine's conception of coercive providence, van Egmond writes, "The coercion of God is aimed at making us submit to his healing authority" (p. 57).

The next chapter, treating the period from Augustine's departure from Italy to his ordination (387-391), explores Augustine's "increased" understanding of how the fear of divine judgment functions and his "increased" trust of Christ as the doctor of the soul (p. 58). In the works from this period, Augustine still possesses a largely "pedagogical" understanding of the penal consequences of the fall and the function of salvation history, especially in relation to divine chastisement. Yet van Egmond questions the narrative that in this period Augustine possessed a progressive view of salvation history, in which Christians, unlike those in the Old Testament, do not need chastisement. Scholars, such as P. Brown and Cranz, have advanced this view based on Augustine's reading of the relationship between the Old and New Testaments. In response, van Egmond notes Augustine's use of "accommodation" in reading the Old and New Testaments. Both Testaments function to instruct the human and reveal God, though by different points of emphasis. Augustine's "progressive" view of history is not found on the anthropological plain, but rather "this progress primarily consists in God's salvific acts" (p. 98). This understanding of Augustine's "progressive" view of history means that there is not a "moral evolution within the Church, but rather a progression of divine revelation, from sign to reality. The threat of punishment does not disappear, but its nature changes" (p. 98). Hence, in the individual, even in ascent to God, sin does not go unpunished by God (p. 102). In this regard, van Egmond sees room

in Augustine's early thought for the idea that God "uses the laws of the civil government in the service of church discipline" (p. 109).

The fourth chapter treats the period from Augustine's ordination to his writing of the *Confessions*. Van Egmond's reading of this period includes but expands beyond the "Pauline Turn" narrative that sums up most scholarship on this period. He observes how *Ad Simplicianum* does not represent a departure in Augustine's understanding of the effects of Adam's sin (*peccatum originale*). Rather, Augustine begins "to deny that election is based upon God's foreknowledge of human faith" (p. 129). In addition, van Egmond homes in on the function of the law in relation to Christ as it develops from *De utilitate credendi* to Augustine's Pauline commentaries. He describes this development: "It was not just given to constrain sin and to foreshadow Christ's future teaching, but also to bring its hearers to the knowledge and confession of sin and to faith in the mediator of righteousness" (p. 136).

The *Confessions* occupies the final chapter of the book. The *Confessions* demonstrates Augustine's integration of the positive function of divine judgment including its penal and juridical dimensions. Van Egmond shows that Augustine, through his own life and exegetically in the final books, is able to identify the complexity of God's grace and judgment.

In his exposition of the writings from 391-396, van Egmond argues that Augustine's possesses a "pedagogical Christology." He writes, "In this model, the primary redemptive significance of Christ is not what he accomplished historically, but rather the subjective influence of his example on our minds" (p. 141). Yet the author also complicates this claim by pointing to Augustine's reading of Christ as more than a 'sign' of the Pauline 'old man'. However, on the next page (p. 144), van Egmond states that while Augustine's position is suggestive that Christ's death is the constitutive ground, that it is only a similitude is more likely. A few pages later, the author goes on to say, "The destruction of the 'old life from Adam' in us is not simply a matter of imitation, but of appropriation of what is already a reality in Christ" (p. 148) and that Christ's death is a sacrament or sign that effects what it signifies (p. 150).

Van Egmond appears to be of two minds; he tries to temper where his own reading has led: he has presented a strong reading against the simplified developmental narrative. It is one of the virtues of this study, as this reviewer sees it, to provide a different lens of analysis for a diachronic study of Augustine. Van Egmond is more conciliatory to the punctuated developmental reading when he writes,

"From an example of fortitude, and an inspiration to kill the desires of the flesh, Christ's death becomes the representative payment of the punishment of sin, which constitutes the juridical ground for the forgiveness of sins and the renewal of the will" (p. 156). He is more insightful in his conclusion that Augustine's conception of sin did not development greatly, but rather the "theme of humanity's bondage to sin and the devil moves to the foreground" (p. 157). The author has provided a significant qualification of the common reading of the development of Augustine's Christology. Hence, while van Egmond observes that in this period, "Augustine comes to understand the death of Christ as the constitutive ground for man's redemption" (p. 156), he also has identified strong ligaments of continuity with earlier thought.

Augustine's Early Thought on the Redemptive Function of Divine Judgement is an excellent study of Augustine's early theology. Though the book at times reads like a dissertation, a benefit is van Egmond's legitimate engagement with a deep amount of secondary scholarship in English, French, German, and Dutch. This is extremely rare in most monographs. In addition, van Egmond's exposition follows an attentive close reading of Augustine's texts, resisting overgeneralization. The chapters (three and four) on Augustine's writings from Thagaste and before the *Confessions* especially exhibit both these virtues. Scholars of Augustine, specifically those attentive to Augustine's theology, will find much to consider in van Egmond's book, which offers far more than the title suggests.

Thomas Clemmons

WESTRA, Liuwe H., ZWOLLO, Laela (eds), *Die Sakramentsgemeinschaft in der alten Kirche* (Patristic Studies 15), Peeters, Leuven 2019, 138 p.

Although this volume contains articles of a satisfactory scholarly quality, it remains wanting in many respects. Compiling six contributions – three in German, three in English – to a symposium organized by the Patristische Arbeitsgemeinschaft in January 2017, plus one additional article in German about the development of patristic scholarship in the Netherlands, the book's overall topic is sacramental communion in antiquity. The authors show how complex this reality was, how different Church fathers and disciplinary documents conceived of it, and how the Eucharist was key in the evolution both of liturgical practices and

of theological reflections. Sadly, however, the volume does not have an introduction worthy of that name, or one should take editor Westra's contribution to fill in that gap. Neither does it have a list of contributors or a decent index, which today is a minimum requirement and a reasonable expectation of fellow scholars. Moreover, one needs to say that more than half of the individual texts contain a lot of spelling and language errors, far too many to tolerate in a scholarly volume of this kind. It seems that no serious language revision was undertaken prior to giving the final 'good for print'.

In spite of these deficiencies, the content of most of the articles is interesting and relevant, even if it is striking that four authors straightforwardly state that they have actually dealt with the subject matter at hand more profoundly elsewhere. In a synthetic overview, Rouwhorst cautions in his typical style not to jump too quickly to theological conclusions about the Eucharist and Christian fellowship in the earliest centuries. For the situation then, as it has always been and is now, was far from ideal. Theologians indeed do well to carefully listen to historical scholars such as Rouwhorst, for the risk of stereotypes is always lurking when they talk of bygone centuries. Vaucher's contribution contains a similar warning, inasmuch as it aptly demonstrates that, against certain theological presuppositions, slaves were not full members of the Eucharistic communities in the early Church.

Stewart's contribution focuses on ancient Church orders, primarily the *Didachè* and the *Didascalia apostolorum*. He applies an interesting insight from American psychologist Bruce Tuckman, who in the 1960s and 70s described group dynamic processes. Tuckman's point is that groups show complex internal interactions and are confronted with many challenges for maintaining themselves. He speaks of phases of forming, storming, norming, and performing. Stewart's point is that the communities behind the aforementioned Church orders struggled intensively with the formation of their identity and leadership.

Van Loon's and Zwollo's contributions deal with individual Church fathers, Cyril of Alexandria and Augustine of Hippo, respectively. Both articles are in-depth investigations of primary text material and offer nuanced insights into the ways in which these two giants imagined the relation between the sacrament of the Eucharist and Christian communion. Whereas Van Loon reveals thought-provoking ideas of Cyril concerning the concepts of blessing (*eulogia*) and of sharing the body of Christ (*sussômos* – cf. Eph. 3), Zwollo's focus is on Augustine's understanding of *sacramentum* and (as) *mysterium* in book IV of *De Trinitate*.

Although readers may wonder why they would need this book or what they would use it for, since much information can be found in other publications, and since, after all, it approaches its major theme – sacramental communion and communities in the early Church – in quite a heterogeneous and fragmentary way, there is no doubt that it meets the standards of contemporary academic scholarship. I am afraid, however, that it will only find its way to certain specialized libraries, for it will not become the standard reference about the topic it addresses.

Joris Geldhof

WHITE, Peter (ed.), *Augustine. Confessions. Books V-IX* (Cambridge Greek and Latin classics), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York 2019, xii + 358 p.

There is no shortage of scholarly resources for Augustine's *Confessiones*. There is the splendid 1992 edition with commentary by James O'Donnell, freely available online to readers all over the world (www.stoa.org/hippo); there are fresh and adequate translations in all major languages (in my native language, Dutch, I mention the fine version by Wim Sleddens, O.S.A., published in 2009), and bibliographical tools are at hand through the usual channels, as well as in specialized books, journals, and online resources (www.augustinus.de ranking among the finest examples). Furthermore, Augustinian scholars can use such tools as the *Augustinus-Lexikon* and the breathtaking amount of primary textual material presented at sites such as www.augustinus.it, to mention just some major items among all that has been made available.

This prompts a simple but relevant question: why would anyone bother to publish a new commentary on the *Confessiones*, and why merely on a specific part?

For one thing, as a matter of principle, any new edition and commentary must be welcomed in advance. Every scholar may have something new or interesting to contribute or may address a part of the Augustine readership that has somehow been neglected. Classical works such as the *Confessiones* can never receive *too much* attention. Since so many books and papers about Augustine and his *Confessiones* are published year after year, it is surely not exaggerated if new commentaries keep on appearing as well. Since O'Donnell's 1992 edition, almost thirty years have passed. It seems that nearly everything in our field must be repeated or reworked at least once in every

generation. On a more practical level, a good reason to publish a work may be that it is the logical sequel to an existing publication.

The new book by Peter White (University of Chicago) offers an edition with commentary of Augustine's *Confessiones*, books 5 to 9. It comes in a well-known and highly appreciated series: the Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics, commonly known among classicists as 'the Green & Yellows'. Anyone who has ever leafed through such a volume knows what to expect: a succinct but useful introduction, solidly based on recent scholarship but without extensive discussion; a reliable Greek or Latin original text without translation; and above all: a helpful commentary, clearly organized and with mostly short, easily accessible lemmata that stay as close to the original as possible, while also enabling the reader to deepen his or her understanding of wider issues concerning the text, its historical background, and its literary composition.

That is, the series is clearly intended for readers who wish to study the original Greek or Latin text, and are already fairly proficient in the relevant classical language. Philosophers and theologians may find much from which they will profit, but they are not among the primary target groups of the series.

The practical reason why Peter Green has devoted himself to books 5 to 9 seems obvious: the 'Green & Yellows' already offer an edition of *Confessiones*, books 1 to 4, which was edited by Gillian Clark (University of Liverpool) back in 1995. Readers have had to wait quite a while, but now all popular parts of the *Confessiones* are covered in the series. (One wonders if books 10 to 13 will ever receive similar attention; White does not announce anything that would lead one to think so.)

Books 5 to 9 can be read in Latin with useful help from Peter White's notes. The thirteen-page introduction, which is brief even for 'Green & Yellow' standards, discusses the work in the life and literary career of Augustine, the Latinity of the *Confessiones*, rhetoric and style, book divisions and narrative structure, the content of books 5-9, and practical remarks on the present edition and commentary. All is adequate, helpful, and to the point. I would be happy to have my undergraduate students read this text as a first introduction to the subject, and in a way even to Christian Latinity in general.

The Latin text does not offer much that is new, as it is substantially the text of the 1992 edition by O'Donnell. Far from being a disadvantage, this ensures that the book may be conveniently used alongside other editions of the *Confessiones*, avoiding confusion about the Latin text. (Any teacher who has taught a canonical text, with students bringing along different texts, often from the internet, knows the practical problems that can arise in class.)

The book explicitly targets 'students of classical or patristic literature who wish to read Saint Augustine's *Confessiones* in Latin, but who find that that work presents elements with which they are unfamiliar' (opening words of the preface, p. IX). Accordingly, the commentary notes, comprising 266 pages (for 64 densely printed pages of Latin), mainly deal with primary matters such as syntax, unclassical word forms, and basic meaning. As a rule, the notes stay close to the Latin. Longer periods or difficult sentences are translated, references to Bible passages or Roman authors are given and explained, historical and other backgrounds are elucidated. Wider issues, such as Augustine's views on his own past, his relations with Monnica and others, and his essential religious ideas, receive attention, but with moderation and usually briefly.

As books 5 to 9 contain some of the most intense scenes of the *Confessiones*, such as Augustine's baptism or the preceding 'tolle... lege' garden scene (8.12), the commentary is bound to disappoint readers who are eager to delve further into any such matters. The lemma on the crucial words 'tolle... lege' (pp. 275-276) is a case in point: in fourteen lines the editor discusses whether the phrase may be understood as 'pick up [and] read', and whether Augustine actually heard them being spoken by someone outside his head. This is more than just Latin grammar, but not enough for an avid reader wanting to know everything there is to know here.

Having said this, there seems little room indeed for complaint. Peter White does not promise to give readers all there is to know, but rather to help and guide them in approaching the often difficult Latin of the *Confessiones,* and to offer just a bit more than the earlier commentator, Gillian Clark. His book does so in a convincing and reliable manner, within the clear cut format of the 'Green and Yellows' series. If the commentary will stimulate readers to undertake further studies into the *Confessiones*, for which there is ample material and occasion, it will have served its purpose well.

The book is a valuable contribution to *Confessiones* scholarship, and an indispensable tool for students and scholars. It should be purchased by any serious library of classics, as is true of any other volume in the series.

It is to be hoped that the earlier 1995 volume by Gillian Clark, which now seems out of print (it is no longer listed at the series website) and is not easy to obtain, will be given an update in the near future, to make it stand on a par with this very welcome book.

Vincent Hunink